BHANDARI, J. - (1.) THIS is a Civil Second Appeal arising out of a suit for compensation filed by the Firm Mohanlal Ramchandra against the Union of India for the recovery on Rs. 1,000/- under the following circumstances. There was a Firm Doongar Mal. Mohan Lal at village Dholipal, District Ganganagar. the proprietor of which was Mohanlal. Ridhkaran was the Munim of that Firm. He was sent to Kesinga (District Kalihandi, Orissa) to sell gram. After selling the gram, he sent the sale-proceeds to the said Firm by post. It is alleged that on 18. 7. 1957, he sent Rs 2,500/- by insured a registered parcel and another sum of Rs. 2,500/-by a registered letter. Delivery of both these articles was taken of from the post office concerned. The said Firm, however, found that the insured parcel contained Rs. 1,500/- and on further scrutiny, it was found that seals that had been affixed on the insured parcel had been changed and that on the cloth cover of that parcel there was tampering inasmuch as the words 'insured for Rs. 2,500/- (Rupees two thousand & five hundred) only', written in copying pencil at the top of the cover were altered to read 'insured for Rs. 1,500/- (Rupees one thousand & five hundred) only. ' All this came to the knowledge of Mohanlal on 1. 8. 1957 when the said Munim came back from Orissa. On 3. 9. 1957 Mohanlal transferred his claim to the plaintiff Firm Mohanlal Ramchandra of Ganganagar after receiving Rs. 1,000/ -. After serv-ing notice under Sec. 80 C. P. C. on 9. 9. 1957 to the defendant, the plaintiff brought the suit on 4. 3. 58 for the recovery of Rs. 1,040/- out of which Rs. 40/- were claimed as interest. The written statement on behalf of the Union of India was signed by the Superintendent of Post Offices, North Rajasthan and also by the Government Pleader who had filed a Vakalatnama signed by that officer on behalf of the Union of India. The defendant denied the material allegations. The suit for recovery of Rs. 1,000/- was decreed by the trial court. The appeal of the Union of India to the District Judge, Ganganagar failed. Hence this second appeal.
(2.) IN this appeal, a preliminary point has been urged by the plaintiff-respondent that the appeal on behalf of the Union of INdia has been filed by Shri Raj Narayan, the Assistant Government Advocate of Rajasthan and the Advocate was not duly authorised to file the appeal. Shri Raj Narayan has relied on S. R. O. (Statutory Rules & Orders) No. 3950, dated 5. 12. 1957 of the Government of INdia by which the Government Advocates of High Court have been appointed to be the Government Pleaders for purpose of O. 27, R. 8 (b) C. P. C. in relation to any suit by or against the Government, not being of the nature specified in that notification. He has also contended that at the time of the filing of the appeal he had filed the Vakalatnama on behalf of the Union of INdia signed by the Superintendent of Post Offices, North Rajasthan Division, Bikaner who, according to him, was duly authorized to represent the Union of INdia. At the time of arguments he also filed a memorandum disclosing that he had instructions to appear and act on behalf of the Union of INdia and was duly authorised to do so by the Superintendent of Post Offices, North Rajasthan Division, Bikaner. It is to be examined whether in view of the contentions raised by Shri Raj Narayan, the preliminary objection is to be rejected. The relevant part of the notification relied upon by Shri Raj Narayan runs, as follows: - New Delhi, the 5th December, 1957 S. R. O. 3920.- In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (a) of R. 8b of O. XXVII of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) and the supersession of the noti- fication of the Government of India in the Ministry of Law No. S. R. O. 1035, dated the 2nd June, 1953, the Central Government hereby appoints the person specified in the second column of the Schedule annexed hereto as Government Pleaders for the purposes of the said Order in relation to any suit by or against the Central Government, SCHEDULE Court Officers 11. Rajasthan (a) High Court (b) Other Courts Government Advocates High Court District Government Pleaders The aforesaid notification purports to have been issued by the Central Government in exercise of the powers conferred under clause (a) of R. 8-B of O. XXVII C. P. C. The relevant part of O. 27, R. 8b C. P. C. runs, as follows: - "8-B.- Definition of "government" and "government Pleader".- In this Order unless otherwise expressly provided "government" and "government Pleader" mean respectively - (a) in relation to any suit by or against the Central Government, or against a public officer in the service of that Government, the Central Government and such pleader as the Government may appoint whether generally or specially, for the purposes of this Order; (b ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " The contention of the learned Advocate for the respondent is that the said notification cannot serve any purpose for two reasons. The first argument is that the said notification says that the Government Advocates of the High Court of Rajasthan shall mean the Government Pleader appointed generally or specially for the purposes of O. 27 and reference to the Government Pleader has been made only in RR. 4, 5, 6 and 8 of O. 27 C. P. C. and therefore the Government Advocates of the High Court of Rajasthan could act for the Union Government only for the purpose of the aforesaid rules and not for any other purpose. The argument is that presentation of an appeal is an act which could be performed by a recognized agent appointed under R. 2 of O. 27, or by a pleader appointed under R. 4 O. 3 and the notification makes no such appointment. The other argument is that only Government Advocates appointed by the Rajasthan Government for the High Court of Rajasthan were empowered to act for the Union of India for the purposes of the aforesaid Rules and Mr. Raj Narayan who was Assistant Government Advocate at that time could not so act. For the purposes of the appreciation of the first point, it is necessary to refer to the provisions of O. 27. R. 1 makes provision for the signing by or against the Government. O. 27, R. 2 makes provision for persons authorised to act for the Government. This rule may be set out in extenso.- "2.- Persons authorised to act for Government.- Persons being ex officio or otherwise authorised to act for the Government in respect of any judicial proceeding shall be deemed to be the recognized agents by whom appearances, acts and applications under this Code may be made or done on behalf of the Government. R. 3 of O. 27 C. P. C. is not important. R. 4 makes provision for appointment of an agent of the Government for the purpose of receiving processes against the Government issued by such courts. R. 5 is again important and it makes provision for granting a reasonable time for communication with the Government through proper channel. It runs, as follows: - "5. Fixing of day for appearance on behalf of Government.- The Court, in fixing the day for the Govt. to answer to the plaint, shall allow a reasonable time for the necessary communication with the Government through the proper channel, and for the issue of instructions to the Government pleader to appear and answer on behalf of the Government, and may extend the time at its discretion. " R. 6 empowers the court to direct the attendance of any person to answer any material questions relating to the suit if the Government Pleader is not accompanied by any such person. R. 8, sub-sec. I makes provision for defending a public officer and runs as follows: - "8. Procedure in suits against public officer. (1) Where the Government undertakes the defence of a suit against a public officer, the Government pleader upon being furnished with authority to appear and answer the plaint, shall apply to the Court and upon such application the Court shall cause a note of his authority to be entered in the register of civil suits. " The contention of the learned counsel for the respondent is that none of the rules referred to above empowers the Government to appoint a pleader over-riding the provisions of O. 3 and as Shri Raj Narayan had not been appointed as pleader in accordance with the provisions of that Order, he could not have acted for the Union of India and the Central Government and filed the present appeal. Learned counsel has referred to the various provisions of O. 3 in order to draw parallel between the provisions of that Order and the provisions of O. 27 For example, he has urged that what is to be done by a party to a suit under O. 3, R. 2 may be done under 0. 27, R. 2 by the Government in the matter of appointment of recognised agents. He has also stated that O. 27, Rule corresponds to O. 3, R. 3 for the purpose of receiving process. He has however, urged that there must be compliance of O. 3, R. 4 to enable a pleader to act for any person whether it be Government or any other body and for this, he has relied on clauses (1) and (2) of R. 4 which run, as follows: - "4. Appointment of pleader.- (1) No pleader shall act for any person in any Court, unless he has been appointed for the purpose, by such person by a document in writing signed by such person or by his recognized agent or by some other person duly authorized by or under a power of attorney to make such appointment. (2) Every such appointment shall be filed in Court and shall be deemed to be in force until determined with the leave of the Court by a writing signed by the client or the pleader, as the case may be and filed in Court, or until the client or the pleader dies or until all proceedings in the suit are ended so far as regards the client. " It may also be pointed out that the Rajasthan High Court has added further a new clause 6 to this Rule and that runs, as follows: - " (6) No Government pleader within the meaning of O. 27, R. 8-B shall be required to present any document empowering him to act, but such pleader shall file a memorandum of appearance signed by himself and stating the particulars mentioned in sub-rule (5 ). " Regarding this clause. , learned counsel for the respondent has argued that even this clause makes it necessary for the pleader appointed by the Government to file a memorandum of appearance signed by himself and stating the particulars mentioned in sub-rule 5. 6. These contentions no doubt have great force and can only be rejected if I take the view that an appointment of a pleader made under O. 27, r. 8-B can be taken to be appointment of a recognized agent under Rule 2 of the said Order for the reason that such appointment is for all the purposes of O. 27. In India a pleader has the power both to act and plead and the Govt. as such can appoint a pleader for the purposes i. e. the Government has the power to appoint a pleader for the purpose of acting. In the matter of acting, a pleader is acting merely as the recognized agent of the party. Rule 2, O. 27 which has been quoted above empowers the Government to authorize persons to act for the Government in respect of any judicial proceeding and such persons are to be deemed recognized agents within the meaning of O. 3 by whom appearance and applications under the Code of Civil Procedure may be made or done on behalf of the Government, It is to be noted that under R. 8-B, the appointment by the Government may be for any of the purposes mentioned in O. 27 which in my opinion-includes the purpose of appointment of recognized agent under Rule 2. If this meaning of the notification and of Rule 8-B is to be adopted, the Government Advocate appointed by the Government for the Rajasthan High Court have the right to act for the Government in the High Court. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, emphasised the opening words of rule 8-B and urged that Rule 8-B gives only the meaning of 'government' and 'government pleader' wherever such words occur and these words do not occur under Rule 2 and therefore an appointment made under O. 27, r. 8-B cannot be an appointment of a recognized agent under Rule 2. At first sight this contention appears to have enough force but when we examine the provisions of Rules 5 and 8 carefully, we find that even these rules contemplate that the Government Pleader shall be representing the Government throughout the case. I may refer in this connection to Lutfar Raha-man Laskar Haji Kabadali Naskar vs. The State of West Bengal (l), where it has been laid down that - ". . . . . . . . . A Government pleader need only intimate to the Court that he is representing the Government in the proceedings before the Court. No stamped power or Vakalatnama is required to be filed. " I may also refer to the amendment of O. 3, r. 4 CPC by the Rajasthan High Court which has added as Rule 6 to the effect that no Government pleader within the meaning of O. 27, Rule 8-B shall be required to present any document empowering him to act, but such pleader shall file a memorandum of appearance signed by himself and stating the particulars mentioned in sub-rule (5 ). This again shows that an appointment under O. 27, r. 8-B is for the purpose of pleading and acting in the case and not for any limited purpose unless so specified. Learned counsel for the respondent has argued that one of the requirements of O. 3, r. 4 (6) is that the memorandum of appearance should be in the name of the person by whom he is authorised to appear and in this case as the Central Government has not appointed any recognized agent, Shri Raj Narayan could not give the name of any person by whom he was authorised to appear and that the name given by Shri Raj Narayan, Shri G. L. Narula the then Superintendent of Post Offices, North Region, Division Bikaner as the person who had authorised him to appear is not correct, because the said officer was appointed only to sign the written statement. I am however, of the view that the Vakalatnama filed by Shri Rajnarayan with the appeal may be taken to fulfil the requirements of O. 3, Rules 4 & 5 CPC as it is mentioned in the Vakalatnama that Shri Raj Narayan was appearing for the Union of India. The next argument of the learned counsel for the respondent is that Shri Raj Narayan was the Assistant Government Advocate, and not the Government Advocate, and therefore he could not be deemed to have been appointed under O. 27, R. 8-B. As already mentioned, the notification states that the Govt. Advocates appointed for the Rajasthan High Court by the State Government shall be the Government Pleaders for the Union of India in the Rajasthan High Court. It is to be seen whether this appointment is wide enough to include the Assistant Government Advocate. The definition of Government Pleader given in sec. 2 (7) is, as follows - "government Pleader" includes any officer appointed by the State Government to perform all or any of the functions expressly imposed by this Code on the Government Pleader and also any pleader acting under the directions of the Government Pleader. " That definition is inclusive definition and wide enough to include any Government Pleader appointed by the State Government to perform all or any of the functions of the Government Pleader. An Assistant Government Advocate is appointed by the State Government to perform at least some of the functions expressly imposed by the code on the Government Pleader which term must be taken to be synonymous with the Government Advocate. Thus, Mr. Raj Narayan though an Assistant Government Pleader at the time of the filing of the appeal could be included within the expression of the Government Advocate mentioned in the notification. Learned counsel for the respondent has drawn my attention that this very notification while referring to Orissa High Court makes mention of Government Advocate, High Court and Assistant Government Advocate for High Court. Similarly, he has also referred that for West Bengal High Court, Assistant Government Pleader, High Court was separately mentioned. His argument is that whenever it was considered necessary to appoint an Assistant Government Advocate or Assistant Government Pleader, it was specially mentioned in the notification which only leads to the inference that Assistant Government Advocate is not included within the expression Government Advocate. This argument at its best only shows that the notification was not drawn in very precise language, but this does not mean that the Assistant Government Advocate appointed by the Rajasthan State Government for Rajasthan High Court could not act under the notification for the Central Government. Mr. Raj Narayan has also tried to meet this argument by pointing out that in Rajasthan there was only one Government Advocate, while the expression used in the notification is "government Advocates" which signified that the Deputy Government Advocate and Assistant Government Advocates were intended to be included within the expression "government Advocate" in the notification. In my opinion, Shri Raj Narayan could act for the Central Government in this case and had the power to present the appeal and the preliminary contention raised by the learned counsel for the respondent has no force Having disposed of the preliminary objection, I come to the merits of the case. In order to appreciate the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants, it is neccessary to take notice of the relevant provisions of the Indian Post Office Act, 1891 (hereinafter called the Act) and also of the Indian Post Office Rules, 1933 (hereinafter called 'the Rules') framed by the Central Government in exercise of the powers conferred under the Act. Sec. 33 of the Act runs, as follows : - "33. Liability in respect of posted articles - Subject to such conditions and restrictions as the Central Government may, by rule, prescribe, the Central Government shall be liable to pay compensation, not exceeding the amount for which a postal article has been insured, to the sender thereof for the loss of the postal article or its contents, or for any damage caused to it in course of transmission by post : Provided that the compensation so payable shall in no case exceed the value of the article lost or the amount of the damage caused. " The relevant part of Rules 81 is, as follows : - "81. There shall be payable to the sender of an insured postal article compensation not exceeding the amount for which the article has been insured, for the loss of the postal article or any of its contents or for any damage caused to it in course of transmission by post: Provided that the compensation shall in no case exceed the value of the article or any of its contents lost or the amount of the damage caused, and provided that in the case of loss the sender shall furnish full particulars of the contents of the postal article and their value : - Provided also, that no compensation shall be payable - (c) where the insured article has been delivered to the addressee and he has signed and returned the receipt therefor; . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (f) where there is no visible damage to the cover or seals; . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Learned councel for the appellant has urged that on the parcel cover (Ex. 2), Ridhkaran is mentioned as the sender and he alone could have maintained the suit and neither the addressee Baboo Mohanlal Banthia, nor the plaintiff, who claims to be the assignee of the claim can maintain the suit as under sec. 33 of the Act compensation is payable only to the sender and not to anybody else and this is also the position under Rule 81. The second contention is that the delivery of the insured article had been taken by the addressee and he had signed and returned the receipt therefor and as such, under the proviso to Rule 81, no compensation can be claimed. The third contention is that a claim of compensation is merely a right to sue which cannot be transferred under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, and as such, the plaintiff Firm cannot maintain the suit. The first contention is sought to be controverted by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent on the ground that Ridhkaran was only a Munim or servant of Mohanlal Banthia, proprietor of the firm Doongarmal Mohanlal, and whatever he did, he did as an agent of the plaintiff firm and that the principal must be deemed to be the sender, while interpreting sec. 33 of the Act or Rule 81 of the Rules, and thus Mohanlal was entitled to compensation under the aforesaid provisions of law. In reply to the second contention, it is urged that Mohanlal when he took delivery of the parcel from Dholipal Post Office, acted under the misrepresentation that the same was insured for Rs. 1,500/-, while in fact, as held by the lower appellate court it was insured for Rs. 2,500/-, and as such, it must be held in the circumstances of the case that the addressee had taken delivery of an altogether different article than that was handed over at the Post Office Kesinga as the cover arid the contents of the article delivered at Kesinga were materially altered by the servants of the Central Government. It is contended that the addressee was falsely represented when he took the delivery that the parcel was insured for Rs, 1,500/- only and not for Rs. 2,500/- and it is on account of misrepresentation that he took the delivery, otherwise he would not have done so, and the case must be; treated as if no delivery had been taken at all. He has further contended that even if it be held that the servants of the Central Government were not responsible for tampering with the cover (Ex. 2) of the parcel, yet there was a misrepresentation which operated in the mind of the addressee while taking the delivery and the same consequences flowed. Apart from this, under the general law of the land Mohanlal was entitled to recover compensation for the loss sustained by him on account of the tampering with of the parcel and short delivery of its contents. The third contention is sought to be controverted by pointing out that Mohanlal, proprietor of the firm Doongar Mal Mohan Lal had an actionable claim against the defendant which could be assigned under sec. 130 of the Transfer of Property Act and such a claim was not a mere right to sue which could not be transferred under sec. 6 of the Transfer of Property Act. I may begin discussion on these points by pointing out that sec. 6 of the Indian Post Office Act, 1898, which is quoted below, exempts the Government from liability for loss, misdelivery, delay or damage to any postal article in course of transmission by post, except in so far as such liability may in express terms be undertaken by the Central Government as provided in the Act - "6. Exemption from liability for loss, mis delivery, delay or damage.- The Government shall not incur any liability by reasons of the loss, misdelivery or delay of, or damage to, any postal article in course of transmission by post except in so far as such liability may in express terms be undertaken by the Central Government as hereinafter provided; and no officer of the Post Office shall incur any liability by reason of any such loss, misdelivery, delay or damage unless he has caused the same fraudulently or by his wilful act or default. " This section, therefore, gives a statutory protection to the Government from liability by reason of loss, misdelivery or delay of, or damage to, any postal article in course of transmission by post, even though such liability may exist under the general law relating to carriers. Learned counsel for the respondent has argued that the instant case does not fall under any of the categories mentioned in sec. 6 inasmuch as neither the parcel has been lost nor has it been misdelivered, nor is there any damage to it. His contention is that in fact the servants of the defendant fraudulently or clandestinely took part of the contents of the parcel, and to coverup this misconduct, an alteration was made on the cover of the parcel by substituting Rs. 1,500/- for Rs. 2,500/- as the amount for which the parcel was insured. In my opinion, this argument has no force. It is a case in which liability is sought to be cast on the Government by reason of the loss of part of the contents of the parcel. The word 'loss' covers a case where the entire postal article is not lost but only part of its contents are lost. In any case, the word 'damage' would cover it because there can be no doubt that the postal article has been damaged. Learned counsel for the respondent has relied on the case of the Calcutta High Court - Union of India vs. Sri Narayan Agarwalla (2), wherein it has been held that - "the Government of India cannot escape liability to pay compensation for loss caused by non-delivery of an article if received for carriage and delivery where the article has not been proved to be lost by the Government. " In that case, the argument that 'loss' included loss to the Government as also loss to the owner was rejected and it was laid down that loss in sec. 6 did not mean pecuniary loss or any other loss to the owner of the goods through being wrongfully deprived of the possession or enjoyment thereof but means loss to the postal department of the Government. The learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court relied on sec. 72 of the Indian Railways Act before its amendment by Act No. 31 of 1961 and the authority of the Calcutta High Court in East Indian Railway Co. vs. Jogpat Singh (3) wherein the contention that loss contemplated in that section meant loss to the owner was repelled. Even accepting this view, there is no doubt that in this case the Central Government suffered the loss of Rs. 1000/ -. It is contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that loss which has come into existence on account of fraudulent and clandestine conduct of the defendant cannot be treated to be a loss to the defendant. A similar argument on the interpretation of Sec. 72 of the Indian Railways Act was repelled in Balaram Harichand vs. The Southern Marhatta Railway Company Limited (4), and it was held that the words "loss, destruction or deterioration" in sec. 75 (1) of the Indian Railways Act, IX of 1890, included loss caused by the criminal misappropriation of the parcel by a servant of the railway administration in charge thereof. The same view must be taken in interpreting that expression 'loss' in Sec. 6. Thus, the Central Government cannot be held liable for the payment of Rs. 1,000/- on the general principles of law, except in so far as such liability has been undertaken by the Central-Government in express terms.
(3.) NOW, let me, proceed to examine the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellant. The sender, as shown on the cover of the parcel (Ex. 2) is Ridh Karan. It is argued on behalf of the appellant that he alone could maintain the suit, as under Sec. 33 of the Act, compensation is payable by the Central Government to the sender of the insured article for the loss of the postal article or its contents. In this connection, mention is made of Sec. 14, the relevant part of which runs, as follows - "14.- Post Office marks prima facie evidence of certain facts denoted.- In every proceeding for the recovery of any postage or other sum alleged to be due under this Act in respect of a postal article - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (b) the person from whom the postal article purports to have come shall, until the contrary is proved, be deemed to be the sender thereof. " In my opinion, a person who has not been shown on the postal cover to be the sender can show that he is the real sender and the name on the parcel cover is that of his agent or servant through whom he sent the parcel. The sending of an insured parcel can be performed by a person through an agent or a servant. There is no reason to hold that the word 'sender' in Sec. 33 of the Act is limited to the person whose name appears as sender on the parcel and holding that only the person from whom the postal article purports to come can be said to be the sender and no other person can be taken to be the sender. Sec. 14 of the Act has no doubt raised a rebuttable presumption that a person from whom a postal article purports to have come can be taken to be the sender thereof, but this rebuttable presumption may be raised in proceeding for the recovery of any postage alleged to be due in respect of a postal article. The postal authorities may claim that the person from whom the postal article purports to have come is prima facie liable to pay the dues, unless he proves that he is not the sender. Sec. 14 has a limited application and cannot in any way be of much assistance in interpreting the word 'sender' in Sec. 33. In a case, the name of a servant appears on the parcel as the sender, but it is proved that the real sender is a different person, the latter can maintain a suit for compensation, I, therefore, reject the first contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. The second contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that in the instant case, the addressee had taken delivery of the insured article and he had also signed and returned the receipt therefor, and as such, no compensation is payable either to the Firm Doongar Mal Mohanlal or to the plaintiff as the proviso to R. 81 says so. There is no doubt that the addressee had taken the delivery and the proviso lays down that in such a case no compensation shall be payable. To controvert this, argument, learned counsel for the respondent has argued that delivery was taken under misrepresentation as the parcel cover (Ex. 2) showed that it was insured for Rs. 1,500/- while it was in fact insured for Rs. 2,500/ -. A short answer to this argument is that there is no evidence that Mohanlal acted on such misrepresentation. On the other hand, the case of the plaintiff is that Mohanlal came to know that there was an alteration in the figures for which the parcel was insured when Ridh Karan came to village after the delivery of the parcel and informed him that he had sent Rs. 2,500/- and had insured the parcel for that amount. Thus, this is not a case in which the addressee acted on any misrepresentation. Then, again, sec. 6 exempts the Government from liability for loss, misdelivery, destruction or damage, except in so far as such liability has been undertaken by the Central Government in express terms. R. 81 clearly states that there shall be no liability when an insured article has been delivered to the addressee and he had signed and delivered the receipt therefor. Learned counsel for the respondent has contended that this proviso cannot obviously be made applicable to a case of the delivery of a different article from that which has been delivered to the addressee and extending this argument a little further he has argued that when the insured article has been tampered with, it cannot be taken that the same has been delivered to the addressee. This argument, in my opinion, has got no force. It was for the addressee to examine the article and if he suspected any foul play not to have taken delivery of it or to have taken its open delivery. Learned counsel has contended that in this case, the parcel cover appeared to have been undamaged and therefore the delivery was taken. He has further contended that none else but the servants of the defendant must be held liable for damaging the parcel and taking out Rs. 1,000/-from it for if any other person would have done so, he would not have altered the figure for the amount for which the parcel was insured. All these arguments are of no avail because sec. 6 of the Act gives statutory protection to the Central Government which is absolute terms and that protection cannot be taken away because of the circumstances pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent. I am of the view that in this case, the proviso (a) to R. 81 is applicable. Neither the Firm Doongarmal Mohanlal nor the plaintiff who is the assignee of the claim can recover any amount for any loss of the contents of the parcel or any damage to it. This being the position, the plaintiff's suit deserves to be dismissed. In view of this conclusion, it is not necessary to examine whether the claim of compensation could have been assigned by the Firm Doongarmal Mohanlal to the plaintiff Firm or not. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, the appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the District Judge, Ganganagar dated 2. 5. 1960, are set aside and the plaintiff's suit is dismissed In the circumstances of the case, I order that the parties shall bear their own costs throughout. Learned counsel for the respondent prays for leave to appeal to a Division Bench. Leave to appeal is granted. . ;