- (1.) THIS revision has been filed against the order of the Revenue Appellate Autho-rity, Udaipur dated 19. 9. 63 whereby the learned Revenue Appellate Authority held that the applicant was liable for the payment of Rs. 10,000/ -.
(2.) BRIEFLY stated, the facts of the case are that the Collector. Civil Supplies, Udaipur filed a requisition certificate on 22. 8. 1960 against the applicant for the recovery of Rs. 30,259. 49. The S. D. O. Udaipur, subsequently, filed a certificate u/s 4 of the P. D. R. Act in respect of this requisition and issued a notice against the defaulter along with a copy of the certificate. The petitioner filed an objection petition denying liability which was duly sent to the Collector for consideration. The Collector rejected the petition and communicated his order to the S. D. O. vide his letter No. 6900 dated 17. 12. 60 stating that the petitioner had stood surety for Kanhiyalal Kabra from whom the aforesaid sum was to be realised. As there was no possibility of realising the above sum from Kanhiyalal, the petitioner was liable for the payment of the sum as a surety. In view of this report, the S. D. O. ordered the recovery of amount from the petitioner. Having felt aggrieved by this order, the petitioner filed an appeal before the Revenue Appellate Authority. The main argument raised by him was that he was not liable to pay this amount as the certificate issued in this connection was defective and did not indicate on what account the amount was due. It was also denied by him that he had ever stood surety for Kanhiyalal. The learned Revenue Appellate Authority, on his part ordered the surety bond to be produced. A copy of the same having been produced, the learned Revenue Appellate Authority found that the bond indicated that the petitioner had stood surety for the amount of Rs. 10,000/ -. The next argument raised by the petitioner was that the agreement was not a valid agreement as it had not been executed on behalf of the State Govt. in the name of the Rajpramukh. This argument was held to be untenable by the Revenue Appellate Authority on the ground that the decision on this issue was to be made by the officer who filed the requisition certificate and that the Collector acting under the P. D. R. Act had only the jurisdiction to decide two issues; whether the demand was recoverable under this Act or whether the recovery is barred by any law for the time being in force. It was held by the Revenue Appellate Authority that the objection raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner did not fall under these two heads and could not, therefore, be entertained. Another objection which was raised before him was that the certificate was defective in as much as it did not indicate under what circumstances the money was due from the petitioner. The learned Revenue Appellate Authority examined the certificate and found that the certificate gave sufficient indication of the nature of the arrears and it was apparent from the reply received from the petitioner that he knew fully well the nature of the arrears due from him and the circumstances in which they had arisen. In the circumstances, the learned Revenue Appellate Authority rejected the appeal. Hence this revision petition. The main argument urged before me is that the surety bond on the basis of which the petitioner has been held to be liable to pay this amount is invalid. It is urged that the executive function of the State has to be discharged in the name of the Raj Pramukh and needs authentication by the Secretary to the Govt. in the absence of which no agreement is enforceable in view of Article 299 of the Constitution. In support of this contention, my attention has been invited to the rule, laid down in Karamshi Jethabhai Somayya V/s. State of Bombay now Maharashtra (1964 S. C. Page 1714) In this authority the learned Judges of the Supreme Court had an occasion to examine the scope of sec. 175 (iii) of the Govt. of India Act 1935, which is analogous to Art. 299 of the Constitution. It was held therein that the agreement which did not comply with the provisions of sec. 175 (iii) was void. The learned Govt. Advocate tried to repel this contention by arguing that the petitioner had not attacked the validity of the surety bond at any earlier stage. This argument was, however, found to be without any foundation. It was found in para 4 of the petition denying liability dated 7. 10. 60 that the petitioner had in no un-certain terms denied the existence of a contract between him and the Raj Pramukh of the State of Rajasthan as duly authenticated by the Secretary to the Govt. The argument of the learned Govt. Advocate that the reference in this para is only to the contract and not to the surety bond has no substance. It is obvious that the petitioners had raised this objection at the earliest stage and neither the Collector nor the Revenue Appellate Authority applied their mind to this objection which may be said to lie at the root of the demand. If the surety bond is void, no liability will accrue against the petitioner. The learned Revenue Appellate Authority has not examined the issue on the ground that it was for the officer filing the requisition to examine this issue while the officer filing the requisition has made no reference at all to this objection. In this connection a reference may be made to sec. 8 of the Rajasthan Public Demand Recovery Act, 1952 as it then stood. This section provides that the defaulter may within 30 days from the service of the notice u/s 6 or where the notice has not been duly served, within 30 days from the execution of any process for enforcing the certificate, present to the Collector issuing the notice, a petition in the prescribed form signed and verified in the prescribed manner denying his liability in whole or in part. It further lays down that the Collector to whom the petition has been presented shall forward such petition to the officer or authority charged with the realisation of the public demand for disposal and such officer or authority shall hear and determine the petition as expeditiously as possible and shall communicate the result to the Collector who shall set aside, modify or vary the certificate. A perusal of the record shows that the petition denying liability was filed on 7. 10. 60 and was duly forwarded to the officer charged with the realisation of the public demand, in this case the Collector, Supplies. His decision was communicated to the Collector (P. D. R.) by his letter dated 17. 12. 60 whereby the officer charged with the responsibility for the realisation of the demand held that the petitioner was liable to pay the amount as the surety of Kanhiyalal Kabra. In the circumstances, the responsibility of the Collector acting under the P. D. R. was restricted to the realisation of the amount by due process of law. Of course, sec. 9 of the aforesaid Act as it then stood required the Collector, P. D. R. to issue and determine the petition u/s 3 if it proceeded on the ground that the demand was not re-coverable under this Act or that its recovery by suit was barred by any law for the time being in force. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that in this case the recovery by suit is barred by any law for the time being in force, as the agreement is void and, therefore, it was the responsibility of the Collector acting under the P. D. R. Act to determine this issue. To my mind it will be stretching the intendment of the legislature too far, if it is held that the clause covers the question of the validity of the agreement. The intendment of the legislature is obviously, confined to any bar imposed by any law for the time being in force against the recovery under the P. D. R. Act, but could not be said to cover the examination of the question of the validity of such a bond. At any rate, I find no substance in the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the bond executed by the petitioner is invalid on the ground that it has not been authenticated by the Secretary to the Govt. on behalf of the Raj Pramukh. It may be noted that this bond has been executed by the petitioner, who stood surety for Kanhiyalal Kabra. If all such bonds were required to be authenticated by the secretary when accepting them on behalf of the Govt it would lead to an impracticable situation. The Supreme Court authority cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner relates to a case in which the bond was executed by a Superintending Engineer on behalf of the Govt. and the bond was held to be void because it was felt that a Superintending Engineer, who had not been duly authorised, could not bind the Govt. to a contract. In the present case, the position is quite the reverse. In this context a reference may be made to Chaturbhuj Vithaldas Jasani v/s. Moreshwar Pareshram & others (A. I. R. 1954 S. C. 236) wherein it was held that it would be disastrous to hold that the hundreds of Government officers who have entered into a variety of contracts, often of a petty nature and sometimes in an emergency, cannot contract orally or through correspondence and that every petty contract must be effected by a ponderous legal document couched in a particular form. It may be that Government will not be bound by the contract, but that is a very different thing from saying that contracts as such are void and of no effect. It only means that the principal cannot be sued, but there would be nothing to prevent ratification especially if that was for the benefit of Government. In the present case, the bond was executed by the petitioner and exists for the benefit of the Govt. I fail to appreciate how the executant can escape the consequences of the bond executed by him on the technical plea that it was not authenticated by the Secretary to the Govt. on behalf of the Raj Pramukh. It was further observed in the above authority that the provisions of Art. 299 are there to safeguard Govt. against unauthorised contracts. If a contract is un-authorised or in excess of authority, it is right that the Government should be safeguarded. It is, therefore, obvious that the petitioner cannot seek the protection of Art. 299 of the Constitution and escape the liability accepted by him on behalf of Kanhiyalal Kabra. The next argument pressed by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that Column No. 4 of the certificate issued by the Collector dors not specify the period for which the demand is due nor does column No. 5 specify the particulars of public demand for which the certificate was issued and therefore, the certificate is not enforceable as the necessary foundation for recovery has not been laid. In support of this contention, he has drawn my attention to Rajhumal vs. The State of Rajas-than (1957 RLW Page 370) which lays down four essential requirements which are the foundation for proceedings under the Public Demand Recovery Act. These essentials are : (1) that the demand should be one covered by the Schedule of the Act. (2) that there is a requisition as required under sec. 3 unless the case is covered by sec. 4 (2 ). (3) that there is a certificate in strict compliance with sec. 4, and (4) that a notice has been served under sec. 6 on the defaulter. It was held in this case that if any of these conditions is not present there is a patent lack of jurisdiction in the Collector to proceed under the Act. A perusal of the aforesaid case shows that the certificate in that case was signed by the D. S. O. The learned Judges held that it was necessary that full designation of the authority should be mentioned so that the defaulter may know who is the person who is calling him a defaulter. In this case, the amount due was mentioned and it was said that this represented the cost of Government grain issued to him but the period for which the demand was due was not mentioned and it was not shown when the grain was, supplied. The learned Judges felt that to enable the defaulter to know exactly for what period the demand was being made from him, and whether he had already paid it, it was necessary to mention the period. The learned Judges held that both these defects are substantial defects which invalidate the certificate, and thus the foundation was not laid for proceeding under the Act. In the present case, the designation of the officer issuing the certificate is given as Collector, P. D. R. (Sub-Divisional Officer) Udaipur, but the other entries of course, suffer from the same infirmities as found by the learned Judges in Rajhumal's case. Under the column for the 'amount of public demand including interest, if any, for which the certificate is signed and period for which such demand is due' the entry is Rs. 30259. 94 NP. Under the column prescribed for further particulars of the public demand for which this certificate is signed the entry is 'recovery of the cost of foodgrains. It is obvious that these entries do not comply with the requirements of the certificate and do not convey to the defaulter exactly for what period the demand is being raised and in what capacity he is liable to pay the demand. As was found, subsequently, by the learned Revenue Appellate Authority, the demand could not exceed Rs. 10,000/- and the defaulter was liable to pay the demand as a surety for Kanhiyalal and not on account of the cost of foodgrains as the certificate indicates. The learned Revenue Appellate Authority ignored these deficiencies and brushed aside the objection of the petitioner on the ground that the petitioner knew that he had stood surety and that these deficiencies were not of such a nature as to hold that the foundation of the demand had not been correctly laid. It may be seen that this line of argument is contrary to the view taken by the learned Judges in Rajhumalls case. As pointed out above, the deficiencies as found in that case were exactly similar to the deficiencies discovered in this case. In the circumstances, I fail to see how the rule laid down in Rajhumal's case can be ignored. It is true that in Rajhumal's case the name of the authority raising the demand was not clearly given, but so far as the other columns are concerned, there is a remarkable similarity in the two cases. The learned Judges found that the lack of mention of the period for which the sum was due was a substantial defect which invalidated the certificate. The same is true in this case. In fact when the Collector (P. D. R.) came to know that the amount was due from the defaulter on account of his surety bond, he should have modified the certificate accordingly. This he failed to do. The result of this failure must be held to be fatal, in view of the above authority. I am, therefore, constrained to accept this revision petition and set aside the impugned order. This, however, will not debar the Collector from proceeding to recover the amount due to the Govt. in accordance with the law. . ;