- (1.) THROUGH this appeal the jagirdar of Thikana Begu seeks to attack the order of the Jagir Commissioner dated 24-4-63 relating to the declaration of his personal property. Before we could embark upon the merits of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant sought to address the court in respect of ground No. 15 of the appeal. His contention is that under Sec. 23 Sub sec. 2 of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952, the Jagir Commissioner has no authority to have the list submitted by a Jagirdar examined suo-moto. Sec. 23 (1) saves the property enumerated therein from being resumed. Sub-Sec. 2 lays down that if any question arises whether any property is of the nature referred to in sub-sec. (1), it shall be referred to the Jagir Commissioner, who may, after holding the prescribed enquiry, make such order thereon as he deems fit. The learned counsel contends that this section empowers the Jagir Commissioner to institute an enquiry only, if any, question arises with regard to the nature of the property and is referred to the Jagir Commissioner. According to his interpretation, this section does not authorise the Jagir Commissioner to institute the enquiry suo-moto. According to his contention, Rule 23 which permits the Jagir Commissioner to review the list on his own motion runs counter to the Act and must, therefore, be struck down as invalid.
(2.) THE Government Advocate has repelled this contention by arguing that the power to declare the personal property vests in the Jagir Commissioner. According to him, it will be a travesty of justice if the Jagir Commissioner is debarred from applying his mind to the list submitted to him. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the appellant has invited our attention to Huzrat Syed. vs. Commr. of Wakfs (AIR 1954 Cal. p. 346 ). This case relates to the Bengal Wakf Act (13 of 1934 ). Examining the scope of the rules framed under a statute, it was observed therein that in some statutes, power is given to frame rules and when they are framed they are made part of the statute. In such a case, it might be permissible to supplement the provisions of the statute itself, within limits. But where rules are to be framed for "carrying'' out the purpose of the Act," such rules cannot travel beyond the four corners of the Act itself. It was also held therein that in the case of statutory rules, the Court can always go into the question as to whether they are inconsistent with the statute under which they are made. The question, apparently, before us now is whether the rule 23 which permits the Jagir Commissioner to review the list on his own motion falls within the four corners of the Jagir Act or whether it travels beyond its scope. In this context it would be desirable to refer to Rules 22 to 28 which lay down the procedure for determining the personal properties of a jagirdar. Under Rule 22, the Jagirdar is expected to submit to the officer taking over charge of his jagir, a list of the properties which he claims as bis private and personal properties, under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 23 of the Act. If the officer taking over such charge is of the opinion that any property included in the list does not fall within the compass of sub-sec. 1 of sec. 23, he is required to record the reasons for his opinion and refer the matter to the Jagir Commissioner under sub-sec. 2 of sec. 23. A copy of such list is also required to be affixed on the notice board of the Tehsil and the Municipal Board or Village Panchayat are also required to be informed so that they may submit their objections, if any. Under Rule 23, the Jagir Commissioner is required to hold an enquiry into the reference. He is also authorised to hold an enquiry, in case he decides to review the list on his own motion. The attack of the learned counsel for the appellant is directed against this provision. Sub-rule 2 empowers the Jagir Commissioner to entrust the enquiry to any officer not below the rank of an Assistant Jagir Commissioner or Sub Divisional Office -. Rules 23 and 25 relate to the manner of the issue of the notice and Rule 26 lays down who may contest the claim of the Jagirdar. Rule 28 lays down that reasonable opportunity will be given to the contesting parties to prove their respective contentions and that the enquiry shall be held in the manner provided for the trial of a suit by a Revenue Court and where the enquiry has been held by any officer other than the Jagir Commissioner such officer shall submit the record with a report of his finding to the Jagir Commissioner who will pass such orders as he deems fit. As the final authority rests with the Jagir Commissioner it would be logical to infer that he is expected to apply his mind to the list submitted by the Jagirdar and to examine whether the property falls within the compass of Sec. 23 (1) of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act. To limit the jurisdiction of the Jagir Commissioner only to those cases where a reference has been received from the officers below him, would be, to say the least an absurd proposition. Surely, this could not be the intendment of the Legislature. In this connection, suport may be sought from the analogous rule laid down in Chandra Kant Rao vs. State of Rajasthan (R. R. D. 1963 page 124 ). In this case, the learned judges of the Rajas-than High Court were called upon to examine the validity of Rule 37 C which sought to oust the jurisdiction of the Jagir Commissioner from enquiring into and determining the amount recoverable from a Jagirdar u/s 22 (1) (e ). Their Lordships came to the conclusion that since the award was to be finalized by the Jagir Commissioner, it was apparent that it was for the Jagir Commissioner to determine the amount recoverable from a Jagirdar u/s 22 (I) (e ). It was, therefore, held that the rule which ousted the jurisdiction of the Jagir Commissioner to enquire into and determine the amount recoverable from the Jagirdar was inconsistent with the provisions of the parent Act and was, therefore, void. In the instant case, as well, it may be noted that the final authority to declare the personal property of the Jagirdar vests with the Jagir Commissioner and it would run counter to the scheme of the Act if the Jagir Commissioner is not held entitled to examine the list suo-moto. If the view of the learned counsel for the appellant is accepted, the decision of the officer taking over charge would be final. Evidently, it would be repung-nant to the provision of law which authorises the Jagir Commissioner to examine the report of the subordinate officers and to pass such orders as he may deem fit. As was laid down in State of U. P. vs. C. Tobit (A. I. R. 1958 S. C. 414) it is well settled that the words of a statute, when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the Legislature had in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strictly grammatical or etymological propriety of language nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion of which they are used, and the object to be attained. In order, therefore, to come to a decision as to the true meaning of a word used in a statute, one has to enquire as to the subject matter of the enactment and the object which the Legislature had in view. Having regard to the object and the scheme of the Act, it cannot be gain said that the intendment of the legislature was to subject the list presented by the Jagirdar to the ultimate scrutiny of the Jagir Commissioner. If this had not been the intendment of the Legislature, it could, as well, have said that the orders of the officer taking over charge would be final. In laying down that the opinion of the officer taking over the charge would be subject to a further enquiry by and the decision of the Jagir Commissioner, the Legislature took the final decision out of the hands of the officer taking over charge or the enquiry officer appointed by the Jagir Commissioner under rule 23 (2), It would not be in harmony with the object and the scheme of the statute if the jurisdiction of the Jagir Commissioner to examine the list suo-moto is ousted. If the provision of the rule which authorises the Jagir Commissioner to review the list on his own motion led to any injustice or took away any accrued right of the Jagirdar, it would be held to be void. But this is not the case of the learned counsel for the appellant. On the other hand, it may be observed that to allow Jagir Commissioner to pass such orders as he deems fit in a case where a contention has been raised by the officer taking over charge or by any interested party and to disallow him at the same time from examining the list suo-moto, would lead to an absurdity. Surely, this could not be the intendment of the Legislature. As a result, therefore, we have no hesitation in rejecting this contention of the learned counsel for the appellant and hereby direct that the case may now come up for hearing on merits. Per Shri Gajendra Singh - I had the benefit of going through the judgment proposed to be passed in this case by my learned colleague. The preliminary point raised by the counsel for the appellant was whether the provisions of sub-section 2 of Sec. 23 of the Jagir Act 1952 are in any way inconsistent with the provision of Rule 23 of the Jagir Rule 1954. The context in which this preliminary objection has been raised by the counsel for the appellant is that while a jagir is resumed under sec. 21 of the Jagir Act, certain consequences flow from this act of resumption and they are mentioned in sec. 22 of the same Act. All properties mentioned in that section stand resumed on the resumption of the jagir and vest in the State free from all incumbrances, save those which are mentioned in sec. 28 of the Jagir Act. In order to determine what properties are saved from being vested in the State as an act of resumption, sub-sec. 2 of sec. 23 clearly provides as follows - "sec. 23 sub-sec. (2) If any question arises whether any property is of the nature referred to in sub-sec. 1 it shall be referred to the Jagir Commissioner, who may, after holding the prescribed enquiry, make such order thereon as he deems fit. " It invariably happens that when a Jagir is resumed and right, title and interest of a jagirdar is extinguished, certain properties mentioned in sec. 23 are saved from being resumed. Certain disputes naturally arise, as to which property is to be saved from being vested in the State u/s. 23 of the Act. It is for determination of these disputes that sec. 23 sub-sec. (2) of the Act specifically provides that whenever any question arises whether the property is of the nature referred to in sub-sec. (1) of sec. 23, the matter will have to be referred to the Jagir Commissioner, who may after holding the prescribed enquiry make such orders thereon as he deems fit. It is only upon arising upon this question that the matter has to be referred to the Jagir Commissioner and not otherwise. Rules 22 to 28 of the Jagir Rules, 1954 deal with the procedure which has to be followed at the time of resumption These rules merely lay down the duties of the Officer taking over charge of the jagir to conform to certain formalities in order to determine the issues which property should be allowed to remain with the jagirdar as his personal property as mentioned in Sec. 28 of the Act and the rest should vest in the State. It is for the sake of convenience that the Officer-in-charge is deputed to take over the charge of the jagir who calls for the list of the personal property. It is for him to scrutinize the list first and if he finds that the jagirdar has mentioned in that list those properties which he is not entitled to hold under sub-sec. 1 of sec. 23, he shall record reasons and the opinion that he intends to hold and refer the matter to the Jagir Commissioner under sub-sec. 2 of Sec. 23 of the Act. Therefore, the Jagir Commissioner under sub-sec. 2 of Sec 28 gets these limited references wherever doubts have been raised with regard to the nature of the property which should be be allowed to be retained by the jagirdar or any other person. He should then as the rule lays down institute an enquiry under rule 23 and give notice to the parties concerned. A bare perusal of rule 23 clearly indicates that upon receipt of reference under the last preceding rule, the Jagir Commissioner shall appoint a date for holding an enquiry into the matter. The form "upon receipt of a reference" under rule 28 and the phrase "if any question arises" in sub-sec. 2 of Sec. 28 are similar and analogous in nature. The Jagir Commissioner acts under sub-sec. 2 of Sec. 28 and these questions arise under that section only as a result of the reference received under rule 22 from the Officer deputed for taking over charge of the resumed jagir. Rule 23 however makes a further provision which empowers the Jagir Commissioner to review the list on his own motion in order to institute an enquiry. It is this provision that the counsel for the appellant contends is outside the scope of Sec. 28 of the Act and is thus inconsistent with the provisions of the Act and the Jagir Commissioner has no jurisdiction to review the list on his own motion. The interpretation whether the jagir Commissioner could review the list on his own motion or not depends upon the context in which these provisions in the rule and the Act have been incorporated by the legislature. Sec. 48 of the Jagir Act, 1952 empowers the Government to make rules for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Act. Sub sec. 2 of that sec. 48 particularly empowers the Government to make rules to provide for various matters enumerated in that sub-section. Under sub-sec. 1 of sec, 48, the Government may make general rules. By the Notification dated September 14, 1954 it appears that the Government have exercised its power u/s 48 and they have made these rules which are general as well as particular, with regards to some of the matters referred to in sub-sec. 2 of sec. 48. Sec. 23 which is a particular matter does not find place in snb-sec. 2 of sec. 48. Therefore, the Government could only make general rules for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the Act with regard to sec. 23 of the Act. In doing so rules 23 has been provided which empowers the Commissioner to review the list on his own motion of the personal property submitted by the Jagirdar and to institute such enquiry in the! matter. To my mind there seems to be no inconsistency in the provision of this Act or in this rule. Under sec 2 of sec. 23 a question must arise whether a property falls within the scope of rule 23 or not and it must be referred to the jagir Commissioner. It is only upon these two circumstances that the prescribed enquiry could be held and final orders be passed by the Jagir Commissioner. The question would only arise when a list is taken or if no list is given, the officer taking charge of the property may report that certain properties must vest in the State or may be allowed to be retained by the Jagirdar. He has to make a positive reference to the Jagir Commissioner. The Jagir Commissioner may well examine this reference. He may even peruse the list submitted by the jagirdar and may even hold an opinion on the review of the list that the property claimed by the jagirdar as his personal property does not answer to the nature mentioned in sec. 23 of the Act. It is only in these circumstances that he can institute an enquiry and it could then be said that the question has arisen under sub-sec. 2 sec. 23 of the Jagir Act which Requires the determination of the nature of the property which is required to be saved from being resumed. It is often noted that instead of the Officer taking charge of the resumed jagir and the Jagir Commissioner examining the list of such jagir properties in a limited manner embarks upon the wholesale enquiry with regard to the entire property which clearly falls within the description given in sec. 23 sub-sec. 1 of the Jagir Act. It is for the Officer incharge to satisfy himself and to make a reference, or the Jagir Commissioner to review the list suo-moto and if he considers necessary that an enquiry should be started for those limited items which are to be saved from being resumed or vested in the State. But those properties which clearly answer to the description mentioned in R. 23 are not the subject matter of enquiry. I often find that the Jagir Commissioner has embarked unnecessarily upon the wholesale enquiry inviting objections from all sorts of people and thus prolonging the winding up of the act of resumption of Jagir for unnecessarily long times. It is these matters that requires to be avoided in future. I entirely agree with my learned colleague that the power of the Jagir Commissioner to review the list and to open an enquiry cannot be inconsistent with the provisions of a question arising whether a property is a personal property of the Jagirdar or not and an enquiry should be instituted or not. The jurisdiction would be exercised by the Jagir Commissioner either upon a reference by Officer taking charge of the Jagir or the Jagir Commissioner himself maybe like to review. The term question arises is wide enough to cover both processes of setting the machinery of enquiry into motion, but however it must be clearly understood that in doing so the Jagir Commissioner's enquiry is limited to only those properties which fall on the border line. The contest by the State is understandable to the extent that the property may hot answer to the description mentioned in Sec. 23 of the Act and should rightly resume and vest in the State, but the provision in rule 26 of the Act as to who can participate in such enquiry seems to me unnecessary. If any inhabitants of the locality in which the property is situated is in any way interested he may contest the claim of the jagirdar in respect thereof. The question of inhabitants participating in such enquiry seems to be out side the scope of this jagir Act. The sec. 23 clearly lays down that on resumption certain properties mentioned in that section are saved from being resumed or they shall continue to belong to or held by such jagirdar or other person. Therefore, the provisions of rule 26 of the Jagir Rules, 1954 in allowing the inhabitants of the locality or the Gram Panchayat or the Municipality to get interested in the matter would lead to an adjudication of interests which have from time to time been deprecated by this tribunal as well as by the High Court of the Judicature of Rajasthan. The local inhabitants or the Gram Panchayat or the Municipalities could be given notice only with a view to contest the claim on behalf of the State in order to determine whether a particular property should vest in the State or remain with the Jagirdar. But in doing so, it is observed that it has opened flood gates of unnecessary litigation and enquiry. The interest of the State could better be looked after by the Officers of the State. On the contrary cases have come to the notice of this Board where these inhabitants, the Gram Panchayats, and the Municipal Boards, even supported the cases of the Jagirdars in matters of personal property for reasons best known to them. At times numerous parties have been associated and given notice to participate in such enquiries. Such procedure adopted by the subordinate officers are highly unwarranted and outside the scope of these rules and Act. The Officer is untrusted with the determination of a simple question, whether the property is to be saved from being vested u/s 23 of the Act falls within the description mentioned in sub-sec. 1 or not and nothing more. . ;