- (1.) THIS writ application has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to challenge the validity of the order of the Chairman, Board of Revenue for Rajasthan, dated the 9th March, 1964.
(2.) THE brief facts leading to this petition are as follows: - THE houses of the petitioner Bhairondan and non-petitioner No. 3 Pannalal are situated in Mohalla Surana in Bikaner city facting each other and abutting on, and adjacent to, the public street. On 16. 10. 58 Bhairondan (petitioner) presented an application for permission to make certain constructions in his house. THE Municipal Board gave its permission on 8. 11. 58. It was alleged against the petitioner that he had made constructions against the petitioner that he had made constructions against the permission which was given to him. After an enquiry, the Municipal Commissioner, passed an order dated 25/28. 6. 60 to the effect that the stair case, the latrine and the soakpit constructed by the petitioner should be demolished forthwith. It was further ordered that the petitioner had made projections which were not authorised and for which no permission was obtained and, therefore, he made a recommendation to the Board that they should also be ordered to be demolished. Aggrieved by this order, the petitioner filed an appeal to the Municipal Council. While that appeal was pending, he presented another application for compromise to the Municipal Council. THE application was allowed by the President of Municipal Council on 15 9-61 and it was ordered that the offence was compounded on the condition that the petitioner would deposit Rs. 200/- as fine in the municipal treasury on account of the construction carried out without permission within one month from the date of that order. It appears that soon after this order was made, an Administrator was appointed in place of the Municipal Council by the State. THE petitioner's appeal was taken up by him on 16. 1. 62. It was observed by him that the order passed by the Municipal Commissioner on 25/28. 6. 60 stood revoked by the order of the President dated 15. 9. 61 and the appeal had become infructuous. A revision application against this order was filed by respondent No. 3 Pannalal before the Revenue Appellate Authority, Bikaner. It was dismissed by that Authority on 9. 8. 62. THEreafter, he filed another revision application before the Chairman, Board of Revenue. THE learned Chairman allowed the revision application on 9. 3. 64 and quashed the orders of the Revenue Appellate Authority dated 9. 8. 62, of the Administrator dated 16. 1. 62 and of the President, Municipal Council, dated 15. 9. 61. It is against this order that the present writ application is directed. It is urged by learned counsel for the petitioner that though the Chairman, Revenue Board, was an officer authorised by the State Government under sec. 300 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959, which will hereafter be referred to as 'the Act,' he had no power to revise the order of the Administrator or that of the President, Municipal Council under the said section It is very frankly conceded by the learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 that the Chairman, Board of Revenue, had no authority to revise the order of the President, Municipal Council, dated 15. 9. 61, because he was not "an officer appointed by the State Government in that behalf", as contemplated by sec. 300 of the Act. It is, however, contended by learned counsel for respondent No. 3 that the Chairman, Board of Revenue, could revise the order of the Administrator because he was an officer appointed by the State Government. It is contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that this argument is not tenable because the Administrator was not an officer appointed by the State Government to perform the duties of a Collector or to perform the duties of an officer which could be discharged by him under particular provisions of the Act, apart from the duties of the Board. It is pointed out that the Administrator was himself the duly constituted Board for the purposes of the Act under sec. 293 A and he functioned as a Board and not as a mere officer entrusted with limited responsibilities under some sections only. In order to determine this question, it would be proper to reproduce here sec. 293-A and 300 of the Act. "sec. 293-A. Power to appoint administrators in certain case - (1) Whenever - (a) any general elections to a board under this Act and the proceeding consequent thereon have been stayed by an order of a competent court or authority, or (b) the election of all the members or more than two-third of the total number of the members of a board has been declared by a competent court or authority to be void otherwise than in proceedings upon an election petition presented under sec. 36, or (c) the election of the first chairman of a newly constituted board has been stayed by an order of a competent court or authority or (d) the term or extended term of office of a board has expired and a new board has not been constituted in accordance with the provisions of this Act, or (e) all the members than twothird of the total number of the members of a board have resigned, the State Government shall, by notification in the official gazette, appoint an administrator for such period as may be specified in the notification and may by like notification, curtail or extend the period of such appointment. (2) On the appointment of an administrator under sub-sec. (1) all the powers and duties of the board shall be exercised and performed by the administrator so appointed and he shall be deemed to be a duly constituted board for the purposes of this Act. " "sec. 300. Power to call for records- (1) Any officer or authority authorised by the State Government may, for the purpose of being satisfied as to the correctness, legality, or propriety of any order passed under this Act by a Collector or other officer appointed by the State Government in that behalf, call for the relevant records and may, in doing so, direct that, pending the examination of the records, such order shall be held in abeyance. (2) On examining the records the officer or authority authorised as aforesaid may reverse or modify such order. " It would appear from the perusal of sec. 293a that the State Government may, by notification in the official gazette, appoint an administrator for such period as may be specified in the notification. It is noteworthy that this section does not require that the administrator must be an officer of the State Government. Secondly, it may be pointed out that according to sub-sec. (2) of sec. 293a when an administrator is appointed, all the powers and duties of board may and should be exercised and performed by him. It is expressly laid down that the administrator would be deemed to be a duly constituted board for the purposes of the Act. In other words, the adminstrator enjoys all the powers of the board and is required to discharge all the duties of the Municipal Board and he is equated with the Board for the purposes of the Act. We may now turn to sec. 300 of the Act. A bare perusal of that section would show that it empowers an officer or authority, authorised by the State Government, to call for the relevant records for the purpose of being satisfied as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any order passed under the Act by the Collector or other officer appointed by the State Government in that behalf. Since the Chairman Revenue Board, was authorised by the State Government to exercise his powers under sec. 300 of the Act, he could certainly revise the order of a Collector or other officer appointed by the State Government in that behalf. It is obvious that he could not under this sec. call for the record of the Municipal Board or the Municipal Council and revise its order, because it does not fall within the ambit of the words' 'collector or other officer appointed by the State Government in that behalf. 5 Learned counsel for respondent No. 3 has argued that even though the Chairman, Revenue Board, could not revise the order of the Municipal Board or the Municipal Council, he had authority under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 300 of the Act to revise the order of the administrator because he was an officer appointed by the State Government. In our opinion, this argument is not tenable because the words 'or other officer appointed by the State Government' appear after the word 'collector' and these words are further qualified by the words 'in that behalf, which appear thereafter and we have to interpret them in the context in which they appear. The context in which these words appear only shows that if there is an officer other than the Collector appointed by the State Government to perform any duty enjoined by the Act upon a Collector or upon him as such, then he would come within the ambit of this section. We may explain our views by an illustration. For instance, it may be pointed out that under sec 139 of the Act an appeal may be made to the Collector against a notice of demand under sec. 149. If an order is passed in such an appeal, it may be revised by the Chairman, Board of Revenue, under sec. 300 of the Act. Similarly if some other officer is likewise appointed by the State Government to carry on any particular duty or exercise any particular power under the Act, his orders may also be revised by an officer or authority authorised by the State Government under sec. 300. But, we do not think that such an officer or authority would be empowered to revise the orders of the administrator simply on account of the fact that he happens to be an officer of the State Government, because, as pointed out above by us, the moment he is appointed as an administrator, he will be a duly constituted board under sec. 293a (2) of the Act. Moreover, learned counsel for the petitioner is right in arguing that it is not incumbent upon the State to appoint an officer as an administrator of the Board. Even a non-official may be appointed as an administrator according to the language of sec. 293 A. If a non-official is appointed, his orders cannot be revised under sec. 300. This position is not challenged. Sec. 300 cannot, therefore, be so interpreted that if an officer is appointed under sec. 293-A as an administrator, his orders would be revisable under sec. 300, but if a non-official is appointed, his orders would stand on a different footing and sec. 300 would be excluded. Sec. 300, in our opinion, did not thus empower the Chairman, Revenue Board, to revise the orders of the admini- strator passed by him in that capacity. We do not mean to suggest that there is no remedy against wrong orders of an administrator, but sec. 300 is not the section which provides that remedy. The learned Chairman of the Board of Revenue had thus no jurisdiction to revise the order of the President, Municipal Council, Bikaner, dated 15. 9. 61 and that of the Administrator, Municipal Council, Bikaner, dated 16. 1. 62. We may further point out here that the revision before the Revenue Appellate Authority was not competent because it was not against an order of the Municipal Board but against the Chairman of the Municipal Council. But even so, the Chairman of the Board of Revenue had no jurisdiction to revise its order. In fact no revision lay against the order of the Administrator dismissing the petitioner's, appeal at the instance of the non-petitioner No. 3. If the petitioner's appeal was wrongly dismissed, he alone could feel aggrieved. No order was passed against non-petitioner No. 3 and therefore a revision could not lie at his instance. The impugned order dated 9. 3. 64 passed by the Chairman, Board of Revenue, cannot, therefore, be maintained and has to be quashed. The writ application is, therefore, allowed. The petitioner will get one set of costs from respondent No. 3. Before parting with the case, however, it may be observed that we should not be understood to mean to approve or disapprove the order of the President, Municipal Board Bikaner, dated, 15. 9. 61. It will be open to the parties to take proper legal action (if they so desire) in respect of their rights, according to law. .;