KAN SINGH, J. - (1.) THIS is a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution by one Seth Mansukh Rai More by which he questions the validity of certain orders passed by the respondents for assessing to rent the land that he obtained by a patta from the Jagirdar of Dundlod on Sawan Sudi 6th Samvat year 1994, and he seeks appropriate writ, direction or order prohibiting the respondents from imposing any land revenue or rent on the land obtained by the petitioners. He further prays that the proceedings already taken in the matter by raising the demand of rent against him be quashed.
(2.) THE relevant facts may be stated as follows : THE petitioner, who was leading businessman of Nawalgarh, was desirous of providing educational facilities for the benefit of the people of that area and in particular for education in Sanskrit to the young boys of his home district. With this object he established contact with the Jagirdar of Thikana Dundlod for the acquisition of the land. His case is that the Jagirdar first sold him 101 Bighas of Kham land in Dhani Pipalwali adjoining Dundlod town by a patta of Sawan Sudi 6th Samvat year 1994, and as this land was found to be insufficient for the purpose he negotiated for more land and the Jagirdar thereafter sold 199 Bighas of Kham land and a consolidated patta of the entire land was issued in favour of the petitioner on Pos Sudi 15th Samvat year 1998. THE petitioner's case is that this land was pur- Chased by him for an amount of Rs. 31,500/- and it was to be utilised for the purpose of construction of a school, a Sanskrit Pathshala, a Boarding House and residential and other houses, play grounds, garden, well, dairy farm and for cultivation for charitable objects as specified in the patta given to him by the Jagirdar. According to the petitioner, the land was sold to him by the Jagirdar on out and out sale basis and the only condition attached to it was that the Jagirdar would charge what was known as 'bichoti Mohrana'. The petitioner's case is that there was no obligation on him to pay any rent, land revenue cesses or any other tax to the Jagirdar. The petitioner proceeds to say that after obtaining this land from the Jagirdar of Dundlod he invested a substantial amount of more than Rs. 2,00,000/- in the construction of buildings for Sanskrit Pathshala, big temple, Boarding House, School, play grounds, dairy farm and other buildings and the institution that he had brought into being was named as "saatvic Jeewan Shala". According to the petitioner, a fairly large number of students are receiving education in this institution and reside there in the Hostel. There are also teachers who are residing at the institution. Sometime in Jan. 1948 Janku and Shambhoo Malis of Dundlod complained to the Dy. Commissioner of Jhunjhunu that the Jagirdar of Dundlod had sold this land to the petitioner in contravention of the provisions of the Government orders contained in Revenue Standing Order No. 12 of the former Jaipur State. On receiving this application the Deputy Commissioner of Jhunjhunu enquired into the matter and submitted his report to the Revenue Board of the former Jaipur State on 7. 3. 1949 to the effect that the Jagirdar had transferred about 300 Bighas of land for consideration of Rs. 31,500 but in view of the institution having been brought into existence by the petitioner after spending a substantial amount in raising various constructions on this land, the Deputy Commissioner recommended to the Revenue Board of the former Jaipur State that though the transfer of land by the Jagirdar was in contravention of Standing Orders, sanction of the Government be obtained for regularising the transfer. By the time the matter came to be considered by the Board of Revenue, Rajasthan had been formed and the former Jaipur State was integrated with it. The case was then dealt with by the Rajasthan Revenue Board. The Rajasthan Revenue Board in its turn called for a detailed report from the Deputy Commissioner and eventually it recommended to the State Government that ex-post facto sanction be accorded for the sale of the land made by the Jagirdar to the petitioner. In pursuance of the recommendations made by the Board of Revenue the Government of Rajasthan sanctioned the sale of land by the Jagirdar of Dundlod in favour of the petitioner. The sanction conveyed by the Revenue Secretary was in the following terms : "i am directed to convey sanction to regularise the alienations of the following agricultural lands by the Thikanas Dundlod and Bissau against the standing order No. 12 of the Former Jaipur Government - (1) Sale of 300 Bighas (Kham) of agricultural land in Dhani Pipalwali by Thikana Dundlod to Seth Mansukh Rai of Nawalgarh for a consideration of Rs. 31,500/- during Samvat 1994 and Samvat 1998. " The petitioner claims that as a result of this sanction accorded by the Government the sale of the land made by the Jagirdar in favour of the petitioner became as good as sale of this land made by the State Government. The petitioner proceeds to state that he continued to run the said institution on the lands purchased by him peacefully and without any interference and he was not paying any rent or revenue either to the Jairdar or to the State, but trouble started around the year 1958 on a report made by the Patwari to Tehsildar of Udaipurwati, respondent No. 4, to take up the question of realising rent from the petitioner for this land for Samvat years 2014 at the rate of Rs. 260/11/- as rent and Rs. 16/4/6 as cess for each year. Accordingly, when a demand of Rs. 1107/15/- was raised against the petitioner by the Tehsildar, he filed objections against this demand, but the Tehsildar after overruling the petitioner's objection held that the land was liable for the payment of rent in accordance with sec. 90 and 93 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 (Act No. XII of 1956 ). Against the order of the Tehsildar the petitioner filed an appeal before the Collector of Jhunjhunu. The Collector by his judgment dated 27. 5. 59 partly accepted the petitioner's appeal and excluded rent in respect of the land which was covered by the buildings and he ordered that the rent be charged for the remaining area. The actual assessment of rent in accordance with the Collector's judgment was, however, left to the Tehsildar. The petitioner then went up in revision to the Revenue Board against the judgment of the Collector. The Board, however, dismissed, the revision application of the petitioner vide its judgment dated 14. 11. 60. In attacking these orders the petitioner contends that the land in question had been sold to him outright by the Jagirdar and the same was not held by him for any agriculcural purpose but for educational purpose namely, for running a Sanskrit Pathshala and for the maintenance of students receiving education at the institution. He submits that the buildings of the institution do not stand on any agricultural holding. According to the petitioner, the land being not agricultural, but one in the nature of 'abadi' he was not liable to pay any rent for the same. The writ petition has been opposed on behalf of the respondents, but no written reply has been filed by the learned Government Advocate. As the Collector and the Revenue Board have relied on sec. 90 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956, for coming to the conclusion that the land was liable to pay rent, we may proceed to deal with this section. Material portion of sec. 90 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act runs as follows : "sec. 90. Liability of all land to payment of revenue or rent - (1) All land, to whatever purpose applied and wherever situate is liable to the payment of revenue or rent to the State Government, except such land as has been wholly exempted from such liability by special grant of, or contract with the State Government, or by the provisions of any law for the time being in force. . . . (3) The State Government may exempt any land from the liability to such payment by means of a special grant or contract or in accordance with previsions of any law for the time being in force. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " The term "land" has been defined in the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, in sec. 5 (24) to mean land which is let or held for agricultural purposes or for purposes subservient thereto or as grove land or for pasturage; including land occupied by houses or enclosures situated on a holding. Amongst other things the petitioner wants to avoid the impact of sec. 90 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act on the ground that the land purchased by him was not an agricultural land but 'abadi' land and, therefore, that section did not impose any liability on him to pay rent to the State. It is true that in seeing whether sec. 90 of the Land Revenue Act applies to any particular land we have to see whether the land is an agricultural land within the meaning of sec. 90 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act. Now the Government order by which the ex-post facto sanction was accorded for the transfer of the land by the Jagirdar in favour of the petitioner recites that the sanction was being given for sale of 300 Bighas (Kham) agricultural land in Dhani Pipalwali by Thikana Dundlod. Then the Patta of the land granted to the petitioner by Jagirdar of Dundlod, Ex. 1 on the record in reciting the several purposes for which the land was being granted, states that it was being granted for the purpose of construction of a School, Sanskrit Pathshala, School for Agriculture, Dairyfarm, well, garden, Boarding House and for play grounds. From this recital in the patta one cannot infer that the land was not granted for agricultural purposes along with other purposes. The purposes indicated in the patta were manifold and they certainly did not altogether exclude agriculture. In other words, the land which was prior to the petitioner's purchasing it, agricultural land did not entirely cease to be so after it was purchased by the petitioner when he raised various buildings as a part of it for the purposes of the institution brought into being by him. If in that context the Government characterised the land to be agricultural land while according sanction for its sale and thereafter the Tehsildar and the Collector treated it as partly agricultural land then we cannot necessarily say that they had committed any error of law. Now if on the material before them the Revenue Officers could legitimately hold the land to be agricultural land then sec. 90 will apply and that land which is used for an agricultural purpose will be liable for the payment of rent, unless the petitioner could bring his case under any of the exempted categories indicated therein. The exemption from payment of rent is earned if a particular petitioner is able to show any grant in his favour exempting him from payment of rent, or if there is any contract with him and the Government in this regard, or such exemption is given to him under any provision of law. The petitioner has, however, not been able to bring his case under any of the exempted categories. Now the perusal of the order passed by the Collector Ex. 6 on the record shows that the Collector had already ordered that rent be not charged for the land occupied by the building or such land as is non-culturable such as play grounds and he has confined the incidence of rent only to the land used for cultivation. This order was affirmed by the Revenue Board. Therefore, to the extent the Revenue Officers are charging rent only for the land used for cultivation, their orders cannot be said to be in contravention of any provision of law. We may observe that the Collector has left the question of actual assessment of rent to the Tehsildar and we have no doubt that he will be assessing rent only for such land as is used for cultivation, in the light of the order passed by the Collector. We therefore, hold that the petitioner cannot succeed in avoiding the payment of the rent in the matter as it stands. We should not however be understood to lay down that he has no case for getting the desired relief from the Government. The Government or the Collector for that matter may very well consider the question of passing appropriate orders for converting this agricultural land into 'abadi' land in view of the philanthropic purposes to which the land has been put by the petitioner by investing a substantial amount. With these observations we hereby dismiss the writ petition, but in the circumstances of the case, leave the parties to bear their own costs. . ;