- (1.) THIS is the unsuccessful defendant's second appeal in a suit under article 25 Group-B Schedule I of the Revenue Courts Procedure and Jurisdiction Act filed by the respondent plaintiff Bhuralal which was decreed by the S. D. O. and confirmed in appeal by the learned Additional Commissioner, Udaipur.
(2.) WE have heard the counsel appearing for the parties and have gone through the record of the case. It transpires that the plaintiff respondent No. 1 filed a suit in the court of the S. D. O. Bhilwara claiming a right of way through the fields of respondents No. 2 and 3 and the defendant appellant. The trial court decreed the suit and held that the plaintiff had a right of way to go on foot through the fields of the respondents No. 2 and 3 and to take his cart through the field of the defendant appellant. Harlal and Moti Gadri defendants respondents were apparently satisfied with his decree as they did not go in appeal before the Additional Commissioner Shri Rameshwar Nathani the appellant defendant alone went in appeal before the learned Additional Commissioner The learned Additional Commissioner examined the facts of the case and after hearing the parties come to the conclusion that the plaintiff-respondent used to take his cart through the field of the defendant appellant and this track existed for the last 10 years, and that it had recently been obstructed by a gate on this track thereby denying the right of way to the plaintiff respondent namely Bhonralal Pancholi. Accordingly he rejected the appeal and the judgment of the trial court was upheld. Hence this second appeal before the Board. The learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to satisfy us as to whether the order in appeal was contrary to law or to some usage having the force of law or that there existed a substantial error in the procedure followed by the lower court. His only contention is that after the coming into force of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, matters of this nature were triable by a Tehsildar under Sec. 251 of Rajasthan Tenancy Act and the S. D. O. was not competent to try and dispose it of under the Revenue Courts Procedure and Jurisdiction Act which has since been repealed. What he really means is that although at the time of the institution of the suit it was triable by S. D. O. under the provisions of the Revenue Courts Procedure and Jurisdiction Act yet after the coming into force of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act which repealed the former Act, it should have been disposed of according to the provisions of the latter Act i. e. the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. We see no substance in this argument. As laid down in Kamta Singh vs. Jogeshwar decided by the Board of Revenue. U. P. 1952 R. D. Page 303" the repeal of a statute cannot possibly affect the vested right which has already accrued under the provision of the repealed Act when that Act was in force. The right to move a particular court for a relief and the right to pursue it to its final stage is a right vested by statute in a party to the suit and as such the repealing Act cannot take away that right from the suiter unless the statute provided so expressly. That right to sue as well as the right to appeal is a vested right, and therefore unless the repealing Act says so clearly that rights cannot be taken away. " Sec. 206 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act which deals only with the procedure of Revenue Court about the disposal of the suit, appeals, etc. does not in any way effect the vested rights of the parties which had accrued to them under the provisions of the repealed Act (Revenue Courts Procedure and Jurisdiction Act) when that Act was in force. This being so the suit was rightly tried by the S. D. O. and it shall be disposed of throughout all the stages including this second appeal in accordance with the provisions of the Revenue Courts Procedure and Jurisdiction Act. It was also urged by learned counsel for the appellant that as a question of title was involved in this suit and a relief was prayed on the ground of easement, such suits were triable by a civil court under the Indian Easements Act and the jurisdiction of a revenue court was barred. This argument is again without any force. It is to be noted that the substantive law about claiming a right of way etc. is given in Sec. 14 of Kanun Mal Mewar and the procedure for the disposal of such suits is given in Art. 25 Schedule I Group B of the Revenue Courts Procedure and jurisdiction Act. It, therefore, follows that a revenue court is competent to dispose of suits of this nature only in so far as these conform to the substantive law given in sec. 14 of the Kanun Mal Mewar State. If, however, any party desires to re-agitate the matter on grounds other than those mentioned in see. 14 of the Kanun Mal Mewar State, it may do so in any competent court if the law so permits. This being so we do not find any reasons to interfere with the concurrent findings of the lower courts. The appeal, therefore, stands dismissed. .;