- (1.) THIS application in revision which is directed against an appellate order of Additional Commissioner, Jaipur, dated 21. 12. 54, has arisen in the following circumstances. On the recommendation of the Tehsildar Chaksu the Sub Divisional Officer, Jaipur, by his order dated 1. 12. 1953, appointed Ghasi S/o Shiva Ram, Ram Nivas S/o Madho, and Har Nath S/o Uda, as Patels of village Mundya which was formerly held in muafi, but subsequently became khalsa. At the time it was held in muafi, the State-grantee who had the right to appoint a Patel in pursuance of the provisions of sec. 33 (3) of the Jaipur Land Revenue Act did not do so. Ghasi and Har Nath, opposite party, were working as de facto Patels after the village was resumed by the State. Ghasi submitted an application to the Tehsil for entering his name and that of Har Nath in the register of Patels. He based his claim on the ground that he had been formerly working as a Patel and so had Har Nath. Ram Niwas applicant filed an uzardari alleging that Madho who had adopted him as his son had been working as a Patel and after his death he had also worked in that capacity. Ram Nivas's claim to be appointed as a Patel was contested by Har Nath on the ground that there was no tangible evidence to show that Madho had been appointed as a Patel under the orders of some competent authority. It is hardly necessary to trace the previous history and vicissitudes of litigation between the parties beyond pointing out that Har Nath who had been constantly opposing the claim of Ram Nivas to the appointment of a Patel lodged an appeal before the Additional Collector Jaipur against the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Jaipur appointing Ghasi, Ram Nivas and Har Nath as Patels. His appeal was rejected by the learned Additional Collector on 31. 8. 54. He filed a second appeal before the Additional Commissioner, Jaipur. The appeal was accepted on the ground that the trial court had not tried the case according to proper procedure and its decision was based upon insufficient material and could not, therefore be maintained. The learned Additional Commissioner remanded the case to the learned Sub-Divisional Officer with the direction that he should try the case afresh on the four issues which had been framed by the learned Additional Commissioner and were to the following effect - (1) Whether Madho was entitled to succeed Siria his son and worked as Patel after Siria's death ? If so whether he worked under the orders of competent authority ? (2) Whether Ram Nivas is the adopted son of Madho and is in the family of Siria and Madho and whether he has worked or has been working as patel since the death of Madho and if so whether he has so worked or has been working in the knowledge and with the sanction of the revenue authorities ? (3) Whether in the past Ram Niwas and Madho have been paid remuneration payable to Patels ? (4) Wheter the names of Madho and Ram Niwas are entered in any land record or settlement record or any other revenue papers as Patels ?
(2.) WE have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also examined the record. A preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the opposite-party with regard to the maintainability of this application in revision. His contention was that the application in revision which was filed on 26. 7. 56, after the enforcement of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 on 1st July, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act), did not lie to the Board as the matter relating to the appointment of Patels was a non-judicial matter. Section 83 of the said Act lays down that such as application would lie to the Government. The learned counsel for the applicant urged that the substantive right of revision which had accrued to the applicant would remain unaffected by any subsequent change in the law. He also contended that the Board in exercise of its power of superintendence as laid down in sec. 9 of the said Act could interfere with the orders of the courts below in certain circumstances. He further urged that sec. 6 (e) of the General Clauses Act applied to the circumstances of the case. He relied on A. I. R. 1928, Allahabad, page 169 and A. I. R. 1956, Orissa, Page 7 (now, 12 ). For a proper decision of the point in issue it is necessary to consider the effect of a new enactment on pending cases. The general rule on this subject it stated by Lard Coke in the Second Institute 292 in his commentary on the Statute of Gloucester ; Novo constitution furturis forman imponere debt non proeteritis; and the principle is one of such obvious convenience and justice, that it must always be adhered to in the construction of statutes, unless where there is something on the face of the enactment putting it beyond doubt that the Legislature meant it to operate retrospectively. There is a consensus of opinion on the point that substantive right acquired, when the old law was in force, cannot be adversely affected by a new enactment. But rules of procedure furnish an exception. In this connection we may also refer 1o the observations of Wilde B, (afterwards Lord Penzance) in 2 Bombay 148, which may be reproduced here with advantage ; "where you are dealing with right of action, and an Act of Parliament passes, unless something express is contained in that Act, the right of action is not taken away ; but where you are dealing with mere procedure unless something is said to the contrary and the language in its terms applies to all actions, whether before or after the Act, there, I think the principle is that the Act does apply without reference to the former law or procedure. " In Nisar Hussain vs. Sunder Lal, (11 R. D. 339 - H. C), which was a case from U. P. it was held that enactments dealing with the procedure had an immediate effect and must, unless the contrary is expressed, apply to all actions, whether commenced before or after the passing of the Act, on the ground that a party has no vested right in the mere procedure. It is correct that in matters of substantive law rights acquired under the old Act will not be lost by the passing of the new Act, unless the Legislature has expressly or by necessary intendment given a retrospective effect to the new legislation. At times it may be difficult to state with precision the exact nature of the distinction between substantive law and the law of procedure. The distinction is, however, well marked. 'a substantive law' says, Sir John Salmond in his Treatise on Jurisprudence, is concerned ends which the administration of justice seeks ; procedural law deals with the means and instruments by which those ends are to be attained The latter regulates the conduct and relations of courts and litigants in respect of litigation itself ; the former determines their conduct and relations in respect of the matter litigated. He proceeds to give an example which clearly brings out the distinction between substantive law and procedural law. Whether A has a right to recover certain property is a question of substantive law, for the determination and the protection of such rights are among the ends of the administration of justice ; but in what courts and within what time he must institute proceedings are questions of procedural law, for they relate merely to the modes in which the courts fulfil their functions. The learned counsel for the opposite party has aptly referred to a decision of the Rajasthan High Court in A. I R. 1955, page 204, Purushottam Singh vs. Narain Singh and the State of Rajasthan, that is directly applicable to the question which is involved for determination in the present case. The learned Chief Justice summed up the whole position succinctly as follows. "if the repealing Act provides a new forum where a legal proceeding coming on from before the repealed Act came into force can be pursued thereafter, the forum must be as provided in the repealing Act and no party can insist that the forum of the repealed Act must continue. " In this decision sec. 6, clause (e) of the General Clauses Act was considered in great detail. The authorities on which the learned counsel for the applicant has placed a great deal of reliance are, strictly speaking, not relevant to the point involved in the present case. We may deal here with the argument that the Board can interfere in exercise of its powers of superintendence. The Board has no such absolute power now because the exercise of this power is subject to the other provisions of the said Act The position which emerges may be stated thus. The said Act has not taken away the right of revision, if it can strictly speeking be called a right which accrued to a party in Patelai cases It has only altered the forum in which such a right can be adjudicated upon by enacting in sec. 83 that the revision in non-judicial cases would lie to the Government. In the result we are clearly of opinion that the preliminary objection, which turns on a substantial ground, must prevail. The application in revision shall, therefore, stand rejected. .;