GANGA PRASAD TIWARI Vs. MAHENDRA KUAM
LAWS(RAJ)-1956-11-26
HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN
Decided on November 12,1956

GANGA PRASAD TIWARI Appellant
VERSUS
MAHENDRA KUAM Respondents

JUDGEMENT

- (1.) THIS revision, which has wrongly been styled as an appeal, arises out of the following circumstances - Mahendra Kumar, Gordhan Lal, etc. plaintiffs brought a suit against Ganga Prasad Tiwari and others, defendants, in the Court of the Assistant Collector, Jaipur for partition of an Udak State grant comprising of 8 pieces of agricultural lands in different villages of Tehsils Lalsoth, Dausa, Sawai Jaipur, etc (Details have been in given para 2 of the plaint ). The suit was contested by Tiwari Ganga Prasad on the ground that the State grant was resumed on 1. 8. 54 and hence a suit for its partition was not maintainable. It was also alleged that the estate was impartible. A preliminary issue was, therefore, struck by the trial court on the maintainability of the suit in view of the resumption of the grant prior to the institution of the suit. (The present suit was filed on 13. 8. 54 ). The learned Asstt. Collector after hearing the parties on the point came to the conclusion that even though the State grant stood resumed, the plaintiffs had a right to seek a declaration of their interest in the amount of compensation that was to follow the resumption of the grant and according to him the suit was, therefore, maintainable. A revision was filed against this order of the Asstt. Collector, dated 27. 11. 55 in the Board and the same was rejected on 22. 6. 55 on the ground that the matter could be agitated in second appeal and hence the revision was incompetent. Thereupon the defendant filed an appeal against the order of the trial court before the learned Additional Commissioner, Jaipur on 7. 7. 55 and prayed for the benefit of the provisions of secs. 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act. The learned Additional Commissioner rejected the request for extending the period of limitation, and rejected the appeal as being, barred by limitation. The defendants have come up in revision before us
(2.) WE have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have looked into the record as well. On the question of limitation, however, we find no vaild grounds to differ from the learned Additional Commissioner. The revision was rejected by the Board on 22-6 55 and the appeal was filed before the Additional Commissioner on 7. 7. 55. No explanation for this delay has been offered by the applicants either in. the lower court or before use and in the absence of the same, it must be held that there is no sufficient or just cause for attracting the provisions of secs. 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act. There is yet, however, another point which deserves to be examined in the case and as it goes to the very root of jurisdiction, we have requested the learned counsel for the parties to address us on the same. It is an admitted fact that the state grant mentioned in Para 2. of the plaint stands resumed under the provision, of sec. 21 of the Rajasthan Land Reforms & Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952 (hereinafter to be Referred, as the Act ). The suit thus obviously becomes a suit for partition of an estate which is no longer in the possession or enjoyment of the defendant Ganga Prasad Tiwari, but stands resumed to the Government, as laid down in Sec. 22 (1) of the Act. It provides that from the date of resumption of any Jagir lands, notwithstanding anything contained in any existing Jagir law applicable thereto, the right, title and interest of the Jagirdar and of every other person: claiming; through him in his jagir land shall stand resumed to the Government free from all encumbrances. The learned counsel for the opposite party has argued two points which according to him make the suit maintainable by the trial court. WE shall discuss each of them separately. The first point is that even if the State grant stands resumed, the Jagirdar is to get a compensation and rehabilitation grant from the Government and the opposite party has some share in it, and the authority to declare the same vests in the trial court and not in the Jagir Commissioner. This contention is clearly untenable. Section 29 of the Act lays down that any co-sharer of a Jagirdar who under any existing Jagir law is entitled to receive any share cut of the income of any Jagir lands shall be paid such amount every year from the annual instal-ments of compensation and rehabilitation grant payable under this Act as bears to total compensation and rehabilitation grant the same proportion which his share of the income bears to total income of Jagir land. Section 32 deals with determination of compensation. The Jagir Commissioner is authorised to determine the amount, if any, payable to co-sharers under sec. 29 (sec. 32 (1) (e) of the Act ). Section 37 of the Act lays down that if in the course of the proceedings under this Act any question relating to title, right or interest in any Jagir land, other than the question referred to in sec. 3 of the Rajasthan Jagir Decisions & Proceedings Validation Act, 1955 arises and the same has not already been determined by a competent authority, the Jagir Commissioner shall proceed to make an inquiry into the merits of the question so arising and pass such orders thereon as he deems fit. Section 46 of the Act bars the jurisdiction of civil and revenue courts in certain matters and lays down that no civil or revenue court shall have jurisdiction in respect of any matter which is required to be settled, decided or dealt with by any officer or authority under this Act. As pointed out above, the question, as to whether a co-sharer is entitled to a compensation payable to the Jagirdar is a question falling within sec. 29 of the Act which the Jagir Commissioner is bound to determine as laid down in sec. 32 and sec. 37 of the Act and hence sec. 46 of the Act bars the jurisdiction of Civil or Revenue courts in that behalf We, therefore, hold that the question raised by the learned counsel for the opposite party is a question which must be determined by the Jagir Commissioner and no revenue court has jurisdiction over it. The other point made out by the learned counsel for the opposite party is that on resumption of the State grant some properties like private lands, buildings wells, etc. remain with the Jagirdar as contemplated by sec. 23 of the Act and hence his suit may be deemed to be a suit for partition of this category of properties. This argument is equally untenable. In the first place, the suit as it stands is one clearly and exclusively for the partition of the State grant ; the details of which are given in para 2 of the plaint. It is to be remembered in this connection that the suit was filed on 14. 8. 55 and the State grant stood resumed on 1. 8. 55. The plaintiffs were, therefore, bound to so frame their suit as to make it clear that partition was sought by them not of the State grant agricultural lands but of other property which remained or was retained by the Jagirdar under sec. 23 of the Act. Even if this be ignored for a moment, it is clear that the question as to whether any property is of the nature referred to in sec. 23, the Jagir Commissioner is authorised to hold an inquiry and to pass such order thereon as he deems fit. If the plaintiffs seek to establish any title, right or interest in such property it would by clearly covered by sec. 37 of the Act and hence the jurisdiction of Revenue court would stand barred by sec. 46 of the Act. We, therefore, hold that the trial court has no jurisdiction in the matter. For these reasons, we would allow this revisions, set aside the orders of the lower courts and remand the case to the Court of the Assistant Collector, Jaipur with the direction that the plaint presented before it be returned to the plaintiffs for presentation to a competent authority. .;


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