- (1.) THIS second appeal arises out of the following circumstances The plaintiffs Shri Onkarlal and others brought a suit in the court of the District Judge Raj Samand of the former Mewar State on 25. 9. 1948 for redemption of agricultural land. Shankerlal, defendant, contested the suit and filed his written statement on 25. 11. 1948 After the enforcement of the Rajasthan Revenue Courts (Procedure and Jurisdiction ) Act, 1951 the case was transferred to the court of the S. D. O. on 29 8-1953. Subsequently the defendant applied for amendment of his written statement on 17. 4. 1954 A number of amendments were sought to be introduced. The most important of them related to limitation, plaintiff's right to sue, resjudicata, valuation, absence of necessary parties and foregone relief. The trial court allowed some of these and rejected others. Both the parties went up in appeal before the Additional Commissioner who allowed partly both the appeals and allowed some of the amendments, which were disallowed by the trial court and rejected some which were allowed by it. The defendant has come up in second appeal against this order before us.
(2.) AN objection was raised as to the maintainability of this appeal based on the provisions of sec. 225 (2) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, which lays down that no appeal shall lie from any order passed in appeal against an order The learned counsel for the appellant conceded this proposition and requested that the appeal may be treated as a revision. As regards the conversion of this appeal into revision the request was granted. The respondents' counsel contended that as the matter could be agitated in second appeal from the decree of the trial court no revision lies. Reliance in this connection was placed upon 1952 R. L. W. 342 (Pyarchand vs. Dungar Singh.) This authority clearly supports the respondents' contention. It was laid down by their lord ships of the Rajasthan High Court that to make the revision entertainable it is not enough that a decided case exists. It has further to be shown that no appeal lies from that order to the High Court whether directly or indirectly. If there is a direct appeal to the High Court viz. first appeal the revision will not be competent. Even if there is a indirect appeal viz second appeal or the order in question can be taken in either first or second appeal to the High Court taking the ground of appeal under sec. 105 the High Court will not be competent to entertain a revision. This view was further re-affirmed by their lordships of the Rajasthan High Court in a Full Bench decision reported in 1953 RLW ,629 (Purohit Swaroop Narain vs. Gopinath ). It was held there in that "the revisionability of the order depends on whether an appeal lies in the suit or proceeding If an appeal lies in the suit or proceeding and if order in question can be challenged in appeal whether it be first or second appeal no revision would be competent to the High Court. " The appellant's counsel has cited 1956 RLW,33 (Sahu Brijraj Sharan vs. Sahu Raghunandan Shorma ). This case is clearly distinguishable from the decisions referred to above on the ground that it was a case under the Indian Stamp Act. Sec. 36 of the Act lays down that "where an instrument has been adopted in evidence, such admission shall not, except as provided in sec. 61, be called in question at any stage of the same suit or proceeding on the ground that the instrument has not been duly stamped (Sec. 61 of the Act provides for revision of certain decisions of courts regarding the sufficiency of stamps ). As an appeal was barred on the point their Lordships evidently considered it to be a fit case in the exercise of their revisional jurisdiction. It is further important to note that the decisions referred to above (1952 RLW 342 and 1953 RLW, 629) were neither referred to nor considered in this decision. In the present case the question as regards the propriety or otherwise of granting the amendment sought for can be examined in second appeal as and when it may come up before the Board. Hence this revision would be clearly incompetent. Before leaving the case we would like to observe that almost a decade has elapsed and yet no appreciable progress appears to have been made towards the final disposal of the suit. It is well known maxim of law that justice delayed virtually tantamounts to justice denied. The trial court should, therefore, proceed with the trial of this suit keeping in view this aspect of the case as well. With these observations appeal is hereby rejected. .;