Sharma, J. - (1.) THIS is a petition by Thakur Madansingh under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India.
(2.) THE petitioner has been detained under the orders (hereinafter to be referred to as the impugned order) of the District Magistrate, Sikar (hereinafter to be referred to as the District Magistrate) dated the 18th of December, 1955, under sec. 3 (1) read with sec. 3 (2) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (Act No. IV of 1950, as amended upto date) (herein after to referred to as the Act) on the ground that it was necessary to detain him with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. After his detention the grounds of his detention were served on him as required by sec. 7 of the Act. THEse grounds are contained in Annexure B and are 21 in number. THE petitioner presented this petition before this Court on the 6th of January, 1956. His allegations are that he is one of the founder of 'ram Rajya Parishad', a political body in opposition to the Congress and was an active worker and organiser of the said Party in Rajasthan. In the last general elections, in the year 1952, he took vigorous steps throughout the whole of Rajasthan in support of the candidates of Ram Rajya Parishad and it was mainly through his efforts that 28 candidates of the said party and many other independent candidates were elected to the Rajasthan Legislative Assembly and formed a strong opposition party within the said Assembly under the name and style of Sanyukt Dal. ' He says that he is also the President of Bhooswami Sangh, a body representing the land holders of Rajasthan and that on account of his political activities which were and are of peaceful and non-violent nature, the petitioner has been an eye-sore of the Congress Ministry of Rajasthan in particular and the Congress leaders thereof in general. According to him it is on account of the above mentioned reasons that he was first detained by the orders of Sri Z. S. Jhala, District Magistrate, Jaipur dated the 15th June, 1955, under the same provisions of the Act but was afterwards released on an agreement being arrived at between the Government of Rajasthan and the representatives of Bhooswami Sangh. According to this agreement the Government promised to appoint a committee to consider the demands of land-holders and that committee was to include some representatives of Bhooswami Sangh. This agreement was not honoured by the Government and the petitioner, in order to clarify the position, informed several representatives of Bhooswami Sangh at several places in Rajasthan inclusive of Sikar. It has been suggested that the impugned order has been issued in order to avenge the action of the petitioner informing the representatives of Bhooswami Sangh about the non-fulfilment of the agreement of June, 1955, by the Government. He impugns his detention order principally on the following grounds - (1) That in the order of detention no place of detention has been mentioned and, therefore, it is invalid; (2) That most of the grounds relate to the past activities on the basis of which he was detained by Mr. Jhala in June, 1955. THEy are not relevant to his present detention; (3) That the grounds of Annexture B excepting ground No. 15 relate to the alleged activities of the petitioner outside the district of Sikar and the District Magistrate had, therefore, no power to take those grounds into consideration in making the present detention order; (4) That the grounds served on the petitioner are irrelevant and vague and are not sufficient for making an effective representation by the petitioner at the earliest possible moment and (5) That even if only some of the grounds are irrelevant and vague, the order of detention cannot be maintained even though there may be other grounds which are sufficient for making an effective representation. As has been said above, the grounds served on the petitioner are contained in Annexture B attached to the petition. The petitioner has also filed the grounds which were served on him at the time of his detention in June, 1955, by the order of Sri Z. S. Jhala and they are contained in Annexture D. It has not been denied on behalf of the State that the grounds mentioned in Annexture B are not the grounds communicated to the petitioner for his present detention and the grounds contained in Annexture D are not the grounds served on him at the time of his detention in June. 1955. The case of the petitioner is that most of the grounds contained in Annexture B are almost the same as the grounds contained in Annexture D and this shows that the District Magistrate passed the impugned order mechanically without applying his mind to the fact whether there existed any grounds which made the detention of the petitioner necessary in the interest of maintenance of public order. His contention also is that the grounds are altogether irrelevant to the object of detention, viz, the maintenance of public order and that most of the grounds are vague which are altogether insufficient to give him an earliest opportunity of making an effective representation against his detention. He has also raised a point that some of the grounds relate to his activities before his detention in June, 1955, and some of them relate to the activities outside the district of Sikar. It has been contended that the impugned order is bad on this ground also. Another point raised is that no place of detention has been mentioned in the order of detention and this also makes it illegal and invalid. The petitioner, therefore, prays that an order be issued or passed directing the State of Rajasthan to produce the person of the petitioner from the Central Jail, Jaipur before the Court and that the petitioner be set at liberty. The petitioner has filed an affidavit in support of the allegations in his petition. On behalf of the State an affidavit has been filed by the District Magistrate which is dated 12th January, 1956 In this affidavit the District Magistrate swears that he issued the detention order on a careful consideration of the materials placed before him by the police authorities and that he was satisfied that the activities of the petitioner were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and his detention was necessary. He also said that the grounds of detention are neither vague nor irrelevant and that no extraneous matter was taken into consideration by him at the time of the issue of the impugned order. He further says that the grounds of detention supplied to the petitioner are quite sufficient and intelligible and all the particulars have been mentioned in detail and the petitioner can make an effective representation on their basis. He further says that the order of detention dated 18th December, 1955, has been approved by the Government on the 28th of December, 1955. We have heard Sri O. C. Chatterji on behalf of the petitioner and Sri C. B. Bhargava on behalf of the State. Sri Chatterji has pressed the following points in order to show that the impugned order is bad and the petitioner's detention thereunder is illegal. We shall consider all these points one by one in their serial number. Point No. (1) - It has been argued by Sri Chatterji that there is no mention of the place of detention in the detention order and, therefore, it is bad and cannot be maintained. We have carefully considered sec. 3 of the Act under which the impugned order of detention was issued by the learned District Magistrate Under sec. 3, there is no provision that in the order of detention the place of detention shall be mentioned. Clause (2) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 3 gives the objects for which detention order may be passed against any person;clause (b)provides for detention of a foreigner within the meaning of the Foreigners's Act,1946 (No. XXXI of 1946) with a view to regulating his continued presence in India or with a view to making arrangements for his expulsion from India. Sub-sec. (2) specifies the authorities, who besides the Central and State Governments can order detention under the Act; sub-sec. 3 provides for the reporting of the fact of detention to State to which the authority mentioned in sub-sec. (2) is subordinate and sub-sec. (4) similarly provides that in case an order of detention is made or approved by the State Government u/s 3, the State Government shall, as soon as may be, report the fact to the Central Government together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as in the opinion of the State Government have a bearing on the necessity for the order. Thus it would appear that there is nothing in sub-sec. (33)which makes it obligatory on the detaining authority to give the place of detention in the detention order. It is in sec. 4 that power to regulate place and conditions of detention has been given to the appropriate Government. But it is not the petitioner's contention that the Rajasthan Government has not specified the place by general or special orders where the detenus under the Act are to be detained. His only contention is that the order of detention does not mention the place of detention and as we have said above, it is not necessary under law to specify the place of detention in the order of detention We are supported in our view by a ruling of the Bombay High Court in this case of Prahlad Krishna Kurane vs. The State of Bombay (I ). It has been held by a Division Bench in that case that - "failure to mention in the detention order the place where the detenu is going to be detained does not render the order vague or invalid. " Point No. 2 - We have read the grounds of detention contained in Annexture B which for the sake of convenience are reproduced below: - (1) In May, 1955, when Shri Madan Singh of Danta was President of the Rajasthan Bhooswami Sangh, he called the Annual session of the Sangh at his residence, namely, Danta House, situated in Jaipur. The session commenced on May 30, 1955 and lasted for five days During this period a number of meetings were held in which programmes and questions of policies were discussed. Object of the session was to organise and consolidate the Sangh. A large number of Bhooswamis and other volunteers were, accordingly summoned from various parts of Rajasthan and accommodated at Danta House and at other places in Jaipur. Funds were collected by Shri Madan Singh to finance the activities of the Sangh. Messing arrangements for the participants were made at the Danta House. (2) In the aforesaid meetings, Shri Madan Singh took the most prominent part. The gist of the speeches delivered by him was to appeal to the jagirdars to lend support, both in men and money, to the Sangh and to incite them to defy law and disturb public peace and order, even by resorting to acts of violence. (3) In the meetings on June 2 and 5, 1955, he advocate the creation of a religious State in Rajasthan as opposed to the secular State laid down in the Constitution of India, The Sukhadia Ministry was asked to quit within a period of three days and the audience was incited to open violence under the garb of Satyagrah. (4) An agitation was, later on, organised at Jaipur under his guidance and supervision on which occasion a number of cyclostyled leaf-lets captioned 'ran Bheri' meaning 'call for battle' were prepared and distributed mostly at Danta House under his instructions. In Ran Bheri No. 2, an open challenge was throne to the Government in the following words - "these scoundrels of democracy have sucked the blood of the people and we shall never tolerate them setting on the throne of Bhagwan Ram. " Most of the other Ran Bheris were also of a similarly provocative character defaming the Government and officials and preaching violence. (5) On June 12, 1955, over 600 Rajputs assembled at Danta House from where an effigy of the Rajasthan Government was taken out and burnt on the main road near Chaupar Manak Chowk. (6) As a result of the inflammatory speeches delivered by and incitement given to Bhooswamis to resort to violence, public order was disturbed and sec. 144 Cr. P. C. had to be promulgated on June 13, 1955 in Jaipur City. (7) After the promulgation of sec. 144, a meeting was held in Danta House at about 4 p. m. the same day under the chairmanship of Sri Madan Singh. In his presidential speech he incited the jagirdars to violence and exhorted them to retain their jagirs with the help of their swords. It was also decided in the meeting that the order u/s 144 Cr. P. C. should be defied. (8) As a result of the above, batches of Bhooswamis collected in Johari Bazar and shouted the following slogans on June 14, 1955. Ek Dhakke Aur Do, Sukhadia Sarkar Tor Do One Two Three Four, Congress Haram Khor. On the arrest of these batches by the Police, a meeting was again held at Danta House at about 8 15 p. m. which was attended by about 500 Bhooswamis. In this meeting also Sri Madan Singh exhorted the audience to be firm. His concluding remarks were that they had taken their jagirs by shedding their blood and would not part with them. (9 ). It was no longer considered desirable to let things drift on and Sri Madan Singh was ordered to be detained under Preventive Detention Act by the then District Magistrate, Jaipur. (10) Later on Sri Madansingh expressed a desire to call off the agitation and to advise his followers to represent their grievances to the Government in a constitutional manner. On this Sri Madansingh was released from detention. The agitation was given up; The Government responded by releasing all those who had been convicted and were confined in Jails, and by withdrawing the pending prosecutions against others. But soon afterwards, Sri Madansingh again started propaganda for defiance of the lawful orders of the Government, and has ever since been acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order which would be evident from the following (11) Immediately after his release, a meeting (200) on behalf of the Bhooswami Sangh was held on July 21, 1955, at Danta House in which Sri Madansingh delivered a speech stating therein that the settlement had been achieved with the consent of the leaders of All India Kshatriya Mahasabha and other prominent workers. In case the Government does not fulfil the demands of the Sangh, the agitation should be started again from village to village, he said. (12) A procession of Bhooswamis is was taken out on July 27,1952. from Danta House to Chaupar Manak Chowk where a public meeting was held in which Sri Madansingh accused the C. I. D. and Police for their misbehavior with the Satyagrahis and once more exhorted the audience to re-start the agitation vigorously from village to village in case the Government did not fulfil their demands. (13) He presided over the meeting of the Working Committee of Bhooswami Sangh held at Danta House on August 5 and 6 at which discussions centered round the alleged given to them by the Government and the letter received from the Revenue Secretary asking them to intimate names of two Bhooswami Sangh representatives for the Committee appointed by the Government to settle their demands. They, however, decided not to do so as the composition of the Committee was not to their satisfaction. (14) Not content with his anti law and order activities in Rajasthan, Sri Madansingh visited Ratlam on 21st August, 1955, in connection with the Madhya Bharat Rajput Sewa Sangh Conference. He addressed the representatives and members of the Working Committee (300) the same day, wherein he stated that Satyagrah was the only panacea for their ills. (15) Addressing a public meeting (2000) under the auspices of the District Bhooswami Sangh held at Sikar on 21st September, 1955, Sri Madansingh openly preached defiance of lawful orders and violence against the Government. Some relevant portions of this speech are given hereunder : - Muje Sikar aya huya char panch sal ho gaya halanki yah meri janam bhumi hai. Men up logon se muafi chahta hun. Men is arse men Udaipur, Bikaner, Jodhpur, Dungarpur, ki taraf raha aur uske bad Jaipur raha aur is daure men mene Bhoo-swamio ka sanghthan banaya. Ab bhashno se kam chalne vala nahi hai. Laton ke bhoot baton se nahi mante. Isliye sanghthan mazabut katna chahiye. . . . . . . . . . . . . Mene aj Sukhadia se bhi keh diya ki ham jagire is tareh se nahi saupengey. chahe kuch bhi ho. . . . . . . . . . . Congress wale yaha prachar karte he ki jagiri khatam kar dengye. Ham yuheen jagire nahi dengye. Jaise inke barkon ne dee ho. Ham jagiren beizzati ke sath nahi dena chahate. Jaise ki dusre pranto me hui hai. Muje yah batlaye ki jagire khatam hone ke bad janta ko kya fayada huya. Aaj tak kisi bhi Congressi ne mujeh iska jabab nahi diya. Jagire bhi khatam karte hei aur muavza bhi nahi milega. Tehsildar Sahib kisano se kaheta hai ki jagirdaro ko lagan mat do. Meh bhi hukam deta hun ki tum log jagiri ka charge mat do. Jagire to lele our khane ko kuch nahi de. Mene yah kabhi nahi kaha hai ki Mansingh dakoo bane magar jab chottey bhooswamio ko khane ko muavza nahi milega to bhukha marta hua dakoo banega yah sahi cheej hai. Bhukha marta kaya ne karta Jab ki hamne telephone dwara Jaipur se Tehsildar saheb Sikar ko yah kahela diya tha ki kisano ko aap parche taksim ne kare phir bhi unhone parche taksim kar diye. Agar Tehsildar Sahib nahi manange to ham andolan karange, Ya to yahi rahenge ya Sikar ke rajput he rahenge. Tehsildar Sahib kal person tak chalejavenge. . . . . . . . . Rajasthan ke rajput ab chup nahi baithenge. Ham hamara manter padhenge. . . . . " (16) Sri Madansingh directed the workers of the Sangh to collect funds and recruit volunteers for restarting the agitation in case the Government did not fulfil their demands. Workers have since been acting accordingly and establishing branches of Bhooswami Sangh at various places in Rajasthan. (17) To train the volunteers of the Bhooswami Sangh for defiance of law and order, a Bhooswami Sangh and Kshatriya Yuwak Sangh camp was organised at Sirohi on October 23, 1955, which was also attended by Sri Madansingh. On October 25, six batches of volunteers (20 each) were imparted instructions in the method of staging a demonstration during an agitation. They were also given practical training in the method of firing with muzz loading guns and in the ways of counter-acting Lathi charges by the Police. Lectures were delivered regarding action to be taken by agitators in case a prohibitory order u/s 144 Cr. P. C. was promulgated Mock schemes were conducted in which volunteers acted as Collector, Superintendent of Police, Sub-Inspector of Police etc. On the next morning, the volunteers took out an effigy of Sri Sukhadia in a procession reciting "ram Nam Satya Hai " and burnt the same near a tank about 200 yards away from Sarveshwar temple. A mock demonstration was then shown looting the shop of a Baniya, firing shots with a 12 bore gun at supposed S. P. and S. L and pelting stones at the Police during a mock lathi charge. (18) Meetings (2000-2500) of the jagir-dars were held at Mitrapura and Bonli (Sawai Madhpur) on November 18 and 19 respectively wherein Sri Madansingh instigated the Jagirdars not to surrender their jagirs on any account and to dishonour the congressmen, when they visit their area in election campaigns. (19) On November 1, 1955, Sir Madansingh while addressing a meeting of Bhoo-swami Sangh held at village Toda Bhim (Sawai Madhopur), criticised the bonafides of the present Government and appealed to the jagirdars not to hand over their jagirs to the Government at any cost and asked them to keep themselves in readiness for the Satyagrah which was to be launched shortly. (20) On November 22, at Danta House, Jaipur, a camera meeting of Bhooswami Sangh was had in which it was decided that another Satyagarh should be launched. In this connection, Sri Madansingh visited Sikar on the 2nd of December, 1955 and after meeting Colonel Hanumansingh and other members of Bhooswami Sangh left for Jhunjhunu side. (21) From a perusal of the above mentioned facts, it is evident that Sri Madan, singh is again acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. There is no doubt that the grounds Nos. 1 to 8 relate to the activities of the petitioner before his previous detention under the orders or J. S. Jhala, dated the 15th of June, 1955. However, it cannot be said that in coming to the conclusion that it was necessary to detain the petitioner u/s 3 of the Act, the District Magistrate was unjustified in taking those activities in to consideration among other activities of the petitioner after his release from detention under the said order. It was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Bhim Sen. vs. The State of Punjab (2) that - "instances of past activities are relevant to be considered in giving rise to the subjective mental conviction of the detaining authority that the persons to be detained are likely to indulge in objectionable activities. " There is another decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ujagar Singh vs. State of Punjab (3) in which the detenus were served with the order of detention when they were in jail and the activities related to the period prior to their being confined in jail. The same grounds which were served on the detenus for their previous detention were served on them but their Lordships did not consider the subsequent detention invalid on this ground. The observation of their Lordships are as follows - "there is nothing strange or surprising in the fact that the same grounds have been repeated after the lapse of several months in both the cases, when it is remembered that the petitioners were under detention and in jail during the whole of the intervening period. No fresh activities could be attributed to them There could only be a repetition of he original ground or grounds, whether good or bad. It does not follow from this that the satisfaction of the detaining authority was purely mechanical and that the mind did not go with the pen. The past conduct or antecedent history of a person can be taken into account when making a detention order, and, as a matter of fact, it is largely from prior events showing the tendencies or inclinations of the man that an inference could be drawn whether he is likely even in the future to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. If the authority satisfied himself that the original ground was still available and that there was need for detention on its basis, no mala fides can be attributed to the authority from this fact alone. " This decision is also an authority for the view that simply on the ground that subsequent detention is based on the same grounds on which his previous detention was based, the subsequent order of detention cannot be held to be malafide nor would it give rise to an inference that the satisfaction of the detaining authority who made the subsequent order of detention was purely mechanical and that its mined did not go with the pen. In the present case, an affidavit has been filed by the District Magistrate in which he has sworn that he carefully considered the materials placed before him by the police authorities and that he was satisfied that the activities of the petitioner were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and his detention was necessary. There is no reason to disbelieve the affidavit of the District Magistrate. We have compared the grounds in Annexture B with the grounds in Annexture D and some of the grounds from No. 1 to 8 in Annexture B are in some respects similar to the grounds given Annexture D. Take for instance grounds No. 1 and 2 of Annexture B. They are more or less the same as the opening part of ground No. 1 in Annexture D. Ground No. 3 of Annexture B contains some of the allegations of clause (b)of ground No. 1 of Annexture D. Ground No. 4 of Annexture B contains some of the allegations of clause (f) of ground No. 1 of Annexture D ; Ground No. 5 of Annexure B contains some of the allegations of claused; of ground No, 1 of Annexture D; grounds Nos. 6 and 7 of Annexture B are substantially the same as grounds No. 2 of Annexture D and ground No. 2 of Annexture D and ground No. 8 of Annexture B too contain some of the allegations mentioned in ground No. 2 of Annexture D It would thus appear that although all the grounds from 1 to 8 of Annexture B are not the same as the grounds given in Annexure D but some of them in some respect tally with the grounds given in Annexture D while some of them are substantially the same. The District Magistrate, of course rested the impugned order inter alia on the grounds Nos. 1 to 8 but as has been said above simply on account this impugned order cannot be held to be bad and unsustainable. There is, therefore no force in| this point and we consequently over-rule it. It has been argued by Sri Chatterji that in any case the activities of the petitioner given in all other grounds excepting ground No. 20 took place outside the jurisdiction of the District Magistrate and, therefore, he had no right to take those activities into consideration in making the impugned order. Sri Chatterji has not been able to satisfy us either from the wordings of sec. 3 or from any other section of the Act or from any authority that the District Magistrate acted without jurisdiction in making the order of detention against the petitioner on a consideration of some of grounds which covered the activities of the petitioner out-side the district of Sikar. It has also not been denied that ground No. 20shows that the petitioner visited Sikar on the 2nd of December,1955, in connection with a camera meeting of Bhooswami Sangh held at the house of the petitioner in Jaipur on the 22nd of November, 1955, in which it was resolved that another Satyagrah should be launched and that in that connection the petitioner saw Colonel Hanumansingh and other members of Bhooswami Sangh at Sikar on the 2nd December, 1955. The District Magistrate was perfectly justified in taking into consideration the activities of the petitioner inside the district of Sikar along with his activities outside the district in order to satisfy himself in detention of the petitioner was necessary in order to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order within the district of Sikar. The object of the Act is to prevent inter alia the disturbance of public order. It is not a punitive Act. If from the activities of a person beyond his jurisdiction an authority entitled to detain is satisfied that if that person is at large, he was likely to disturb the public order, that authority would be perfectly justified to detain that person specially when his one or two activities inside the authority's jurisdiction are such from which also an inference may be deduced that he might disturb the public order. This point too has therefore no substance and must be rejected. Points Nos. 4 and 3.- These points may be dealt with together. Under point No. 4,the argument is two fold: One of them is that) the grounds are irrelevant to the object of the impugned order, namely, the maintenance of public order and the other is that they are vague and are not sufficient to give the petitioner an earliest opportunity of making an effective representation against them. We have carefully gone through all the grounds given in Annexure B and noted herein under point No. 2. We shall now deal with them one by one from the point of view of relevancy first and from the point of view of vagueness and otherwise thereafter. Ground No. 1 - It was argued by Mr. Chatterji that there is nothing in this ground to how that the petitioner did any act which was prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. From the ground, as it stands, the activities mentioned therein appeared to be innocuous but on a careful thought we have come to the conclusion that this ground is in effect introductory to ground No. 2. This has, therefore, to be read with ground No. 2 and if there is anything in ground No 2 which shows that it is relevant to the object of detention, the ground No. 1 cannot be rejected as being irrelevant to the object of the impugned order Ground No. 2.- In this ground it has been mentioned that the gist of the speeches delivered by the petitioner at the session of Bhooswami Sangh mentioned in ground No. 1 was to appeal to the jagirdars to lend support both in men and money to the Sangh and to incite them to defy law and disturb public peace and order even by re-storting to acts of violence. This ground cannot, therefore, be said to be altogether foreign to the object mentioned in the impugned order and ground No. l also which appears to be part and parcel of this ground cannot be rejected as irrelevant. Ground No. 3.- This ground also shows that speeches were made at the meetings on 2nd and 5th June, 1955, at which the petitioner incited the audience to open violence under the grab of Satyagrah. This grounds too, has, therefore, relevancy to the object of the impugned order. Ground No, 4.- In this ground it is mentioned that cyclo-styled leaflets captioned 'ram Bheri' were prepared under the guidance and supervision of the petitioner at Danta House and were distributed mostly at Danta House 'ram Bheri' means 'call for battle. ' It is also stated that other 'ram Bheries, were also distributed which preached violence. This ground too is therefore, relevant to the object of the impugned order. Ground No. 5 - This ground shows that an effigy of the Rajasthan Government was taken out and burnt on the main road near Chaupar Manak Chowk by over 600 Rajputs assembled at Danta House, As the effigy is said to have been burnt on the main road near Chaupar Manak Chowk and hundreds of Rajputs were present there, it cannot be said that this ground was so convincingly irrelevant as being incapable of bringing about satisfaction in any rational person, which has been held to be the test of a completely irrelevant ground to the object of detention by the majority of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Bombay vs. Atma Ram (4 ). Ground No. 6.- This ground also shows that inflammatory speeches delivered and incitement given to Bhooswamis to resort to violence led to the disturbance of public order on account of which sec. 144 Cr. P. C. had to be promulgated on the 13th of June, 1955. in the Jaipur City. Applying the test laid down by their Lordships in the case of Atma Ram mentioned above in ground No. 5, we cannot say that this ground is altogether forcing to the object of detention. Ground No. 7.- In this ground also it has been stated that the petitioner incited the Jagirdars to violence and exhorted them to retain their jagirs with the help of their swords and it was decided in the meeting held in Danta House under the chairmanship of the petitioner that the order u/s 146 Cr. P. C. should be defined. The subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority from this ground that the petitioner was likely to disturb the public peace and order cannot be questioned. Ground No. 8.- This ground also mentions that the petitioner exhorted the audience to be firm and told them that they had taken their jagirs by shedding their blood and would not part with them. This ground cannot be said to be irrelevant to the object of the impugned order according to the test laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Atma Ram's case (4 ). Ground No. 9.- This ground is in fact a statement of fact that the petitioner was ordered to be detained under the Act by the then District Magistrate, Jaipur. Strictly speaking it cannot be said to be a ground for his present detention. It has been mentioned simply to show what action the authority had to take on account of the activities of the petitioner mentioned in grounds Nos. 1 to 8. The validity of the order simply because this statement of fact has been introduced in between the activities which preceded and those which followed it cannot be held to be invalid. Ground No. 10.- This ground says that after his release from detention under the order of Sri Z. S. Jhala, the petitioner again started propaganda for defiance of the lawful orders of the Government and has ever since been acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. This opinion is based upon the grounds that follow and its relevancy or irrelevancy can be judged in the light of those grounds. Ground No. 11 - In this ground the only thing that has been said is that immediately after his release the petitioner addressed a meeting of the Bhooswami Sangh stating therein that the settlement had been achieved with the consent of the leader of All India Kshatriya Maha Sabha and other prominent workers and that in case the Government did not fulfil the demands of the Sangh the agitation should be started again from village to village The only allegation is that the petitioner said that the agitation should be started again from village to village in case the Government did not fulfil the demands of the Sangh. There is no trace in this ground that the agitation exhorted upon should be violent or such as might disturb the public order. The agitation may be constitutional as well as unconstitutional and peaceful as well as violent. Simply because the word agitation has been used, it cannot be said that there was incitement to disturb the maintenance of public order. This ground has, therefore, no relevancy to the object of detention. Ground No 12 - In this ground too all that has been said is that a procession was taken out from Danta House to Chaupar Mank Chowk and a public meeting was held there in which the petitioner accused the C. I. D. and police for their misbehaviour with the Satyagrahis and once more exhorted the audience to restart the agitation vigorously from village to village in case the Government did not fulfil their demands. In this ground too no mention has been made as to what sort of agitation was insisted upon and, therefore, it cannot be said that this has relevancy to the object of the impugned order. Ground No. 13 - In this ground too the only thing that has been said is that the petitioner presided over a meeting of the working committee of Bhooswami Sangh on 5th and 6th August, 1955, wherein discussions centered round the alleged assurances given to them by the Government and the letter received by the Revenue Secretary asking them to intimate names of two Bhooswami Sangh representatives for the committee but it was decided not to send any representative as the composition of the committee was not to their satisfaction. The statements in this ground too also appear to be altogether innocuous and it has, there-force, no relevancy to the object of detention. Ground No. 14.- In this ground also nothing has been shown which may be said to have relevancy to the object of the impugned order, The only thing said is that at a meeting of the working committee of Bhooswami Sangh at Ratlam, the petitioner said that Satyagrah was the only panacea for their ills. The word 'satyagrah' by itself cannot be taken to mean an activity calculated to disturb public order. Satyagrah literally speaking means adherence to truth and even as equivalent to civil disobedience it does not necessarily convey the idea that any incitement was given to violence or to cause disturbance of public order. It may be mentioned that in ground No. 3, the District Magistrate has said that the audience was incited to open violence under the garb of Satyagrah. There are no such words in this ground to show that incitement to violence was given under the garb of Satyagrah. It would, therefore, be taken that while preaching Satyagrah no such words were used on this occasion from which incitement to violence might be inferred. This ground is, therefore, not relevant to the object of detention. Ground No. 15.- This ground cannot be said to be irrelevant. The petitioner has been credited with certain remarks which might be taken to imply that the members of his association were incited to commit dacoity if their means of livelihood were taken away from them. The petitioner also exhorted the audience not to obey the orders of the Tehsildar. Considering the audience before which the speech is alleged to have been made it cannot be said that it was altogether foreign to the object of detention. The petitioner is also alleged to have said that mere speeches would not suffice and those who deserve kicks could not be persuaded by mere words. From the short of audience before which these expressions are said to have been used, it cannot be said that no rational human being could consider them connected in some manner with the object of maintenance of public order. The ground cannot, therefore, be said to be irrelevant in the context of detention order. Ground No. 16.- There are no statements in this ground from which it might be said that this ground has any relevancy to the object of detention. Directing the workers of the Sangh to collect funds and recruit volunteers for restarting the agitation in case the Government did not fulfil their demands does not lead to the conclusion that any incitement was given to disturb public order. Compliance by the workers with the direction given in establishing branches of Bhooswami Sangh which has not been shown to have been declared unlawful as yet cannot be said to be an activity prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The ground is, therefore, irrelevant. Ground No. 17.- This ground shows that at a camp of Bhooswami and Kshatriya Yuwak Sangh at Sirohi, the petitioner was present. At that camp practical training was given to the volunteers in the matter of firing with muzzle loading guns and in the ways and means of counter acting lathi charges by the police. Mock schemes were conducted in which volunteers acted as Collector, Superintendent of Police etc. and a mock determination was conducted in a jungle nearby in which the mob was shown looting the soap of a Baniya, firing shots with a 12 bore gun at supposed S. P. and S. I. and pelting stones at the Police during a mock lathi charges. In this ground there are allegations from which the learned District Magistrate might very well have formed a subjective opinion that the petitioner was acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. This ground cannot be held to be irrelevant to the object of detention. Ground No. 18.- In this ground it has been stated that the petitioner instigated the jagirdars not to surrender their jagirs on any account and this might be taken to incite the audience to resist the taking of jagirs at any cost. This ground may, therefore, be said to have some relevancy to the object of the impugned order. Ground No. 19.- This ground is also more or less the same as ground No. 18 and this may also be said to have some relevancy to the object of detention. Ground No. 20.- In this ground nothing has been said which would shows that the petitioner was likely to disturb the police order or instigated others to do so. The only thing that has been said is that at a meeting on the 22nd of November, 1955, at Danta House, it was decided that another Satyagarh should be launched As has been said above, simply asking to launch Satyagarh does not necessarily mean to give incitement to disturb public order. Another thing which has been said is that in this connection the petitioner visited Sikar on the 2nd of December, 1955, and after meeting Colonel Hanuman Singh and other members of Bhooswami Sangh left for Jhunjhunu. This act also on its face appears to be altogether innocuous. To our mind, this ground has no relevancy to the object of the impugned order. Ground No. 21.- This ground only says that from a perusal of the above mentioned facts it was evident that the petitioner was again acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. As has been discussed above, some of the grounds cannot be said to be irrelevant to the object of the impugned order while others appear to be irrelevant. This ground by itself does not disclose any particular fact from which it may be said that it has relevancy or not to the object of the impugned order. We thus come to a finding that grounds Nos. 11 to 14, 16 and 20 of the grounds contained in Annexure B, as they stand, are such as cannot be said to be in any way relevant to the object of detention. It has been held by the majority of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of the State of Bombay vs. Atmaram (4) mentioned above that a ground cannot be said to be irrelevant to the object of detention so long as there is some connection between it and the object of detention, i. e. , the ground by itself is not so convincingly irrelevant and incapable of bringing about satisfaction in any rational person, and the question whether such ground can give rise to the satisfaction required for making the order is outside scope of Court's enquiry. We have kept this dictum of their Lordships in mind in coming to the conclusion that some of the grounds mentioned above were irrelevant to the object of detention. So far as grounds Nos. 10 and 21 are concerned, they are simply generalisations from the grounds Nos 11 to 20. As some of the grounds from 11 to 20 have been held to be irrelevant to the object of detention, it may be said that the generalisations too are partially faulty. We now proceed to examine the second argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner, that is whether the grounds or some of them are so vague as to deny the petitioner an earliest opportunity to make a representation against them. Before examining the grounds from this point of view, it would be advisable to say as to what is meant by the grounds being vague in this context. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court had to consider this question in the case of State of Bombay vs. Atmaram (4) quoted above. The judgment of the majority was delivered by Kania C. J. on behalf of himself, Fazi Ali, Mukerjee and Chander Shekar JJ. His Lordship observed in para 14 at p. 164 as follows - "'vague' can be considered as the antonym of 'definite'. If the ground which is supplied is in capable of being understood or defined with sufficient certainty it can be called vague. It is not possible to state affirmatively more on the question of what is vague. I must very according to the circumstances of each case. It is however, improper to contend that a ground is necessarily vague if the only answer of the detained person can be to deny it. That is a matter of detail which has to be examined in the light of the circumstances of each case. If, on reading the ground furnished it is capable of being intelligently understood and is sufficiently definite to furnish materials to enable the detained person to make a representation against the order of detention it cannot be called vague. The only argument which could be urged is that the language used in specifying the ground is so general that it does not permit the detained person to legitimately meet the charge against him because the only answer which he can make is to say that he did not act, as generally suggested. In certain cases that argument may support the contention that having regard to the general language used in the ground he has not been given the earliest opportunity to make a representation against the order of detention. It cannot be disputed that the representation mentioned in the second part of Art. 22 (5) must be one which on being considered may give relief to the detained person. " Under Art. 22 (5) of the Constitution of India, the authority making the order should, as soon as may be, communicate to the person detained the grounds on which the order has been made and should afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order. Consistent with this provisions of the Constitution the Parliament enacted in the Preventive Detention Act, sec. 3, which lays down the conditions necessary for the detention of any person Sec. 7 which lays down that grounds of order of detention shall be communicated to such person and he shall be afforded the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention to the appropriate Government. The order can be made only when the detaining authority is satisfied that the activities of the intended detenu are prejudicial to one or the other of the objects given in sec. 3 (a) of the Act A detenue has two rights, viz , (1) of being furnished with the grounds of the order of detention and (2) of being given the earliest opportunity for making a representation. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Atma Ram (4), said that so far as the first right is concerned, the only thing that has got to be seen is that the grounds should have a rational connection with the ends mentioned in sec. 3 of the Act. As regards the second right, their lordships said that the detenue must be served with such particulars which will enable him to make the representation at the earliest possible opportunity. Their Lordships observed that on infringement of either of these two rights, the detained person has a right to approach the court and complain that there has been an infringement of his fundamental rights and even if the infringement of the second part of the right under Art 22 (5) is established he is bound to be released by the court (P. 164 ). This ruling of the majority of their Lordships of Supreme Court was relied upon by a Divisional Bench of this Court, in the case of Durg Singh vs. State (5), and it was held that where the grounds are so vague that the detenu cannot make an effective representation he has a right to approach the court and complain that there has been an infringement of his fundamental rights and even if the infringement of the second part of the right under Art. 22 (5) is established, he is bound to he released by the Court. In that case the detenu was served with five grounds, all of which were so vague and general that the only answer to them could be a simple denial. Under the circumstances of that case this Court held that the grounds were not sufficient for giving the detenue the earliest opportunity to make a representation against the order of detention In those grounds no dates were given when the alleged incident took place nor was it made clear as to whether the incident took place on different dates or on one and the same date and whether all of them were part and parcel of the same incident or different incidents It was held that the case came within the following observations of the majority of their Lordships in Atmaram's case (4) and that the detenus were entitled to be released. "in certain case that argument (the only possible answer that the detenu can give to each and every one of the ground is a simple denial may support the contention that having regard to the general language used in the ground, he has not been given the earliest opportunity to make a representation against the order of detention. " Having thus laid down as to what is meant by the term vague in the present context we proceed to examine the ground in order to find out if they are so vague as not to give the petitioner the earliest opportunity to make a representation against the impugned order.
(3.) DEALING with the grounds from the point of view of vagueness, we need not take up the grounds one by one as, in our opinion, with the exception of the following grounds all other grounds are such as give sufficient particulars for the purpose of giving the detenu the earliest possible opportunity of making a representation against the impugned order under Art. 22 (5) of the Constitution read with sec. 7 of the Act. The grounds which we consider to be insufficient for the purpose of giving of such opportunity to the petitioner are as follows - Ground No. 3 - In this ground although the dates of the meetings have been given but it has not been said as to what was the language or the gist thereof from which it was concluded that the audience was incited to open violence under the garb of Satyagrah, Satyagrah by itself does not necessarily involve any violence. Some language must have been used advocating Satyagrah from; which the District Magistrate inferred that the audience was incited to open violence under the garb of Satyagrah. If the words or the gist thereof had been given in the ground, it may have been possible for the petitioner to represent that the language used was incapable of inciting the audience to open violence. By not giving the language or the gist thereof in this ground, the District Magistrate denied the petitioner an earliest opportunity of making an effective representation against this ground. Ground No. 4 - In this ground nothing has been said as to on what dates the cyclostyled leaflets captioned Ran Behri were distributed. The only thing that has been said is that an agitation was elate on organised at Jaipur under the guidance and supervision of the petitioner and on that account a number of cyclostyled leaflets captioned Ram Behri were prepared and distributed. The word 'laser on' is very vague. If any dates had been mentioned, it would have been open to the petitioner to plead that on those dates he was not even present at Jaipur. There is still vaguer statement in this ground that "most of the other Ran Bheris were also of a similarly provocative character defaming the Government etc, etc. " It does not disclose what was the number of Ran Bheris and what was contained in those Ran Bheris. Only the contents of Ran Bheri No. 2 have been given. So far as the other Ran Bheris are concerned, not even gist thereof has been given. The only thing that has been said is that they were of provocative character defaming the Government and officials and preaching violence. These expressions may be sufficient for the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. But they are certainly not sufficient to give the detenu an earliest opportunity of making a representation against them. If the contents of these Ran Bheirs or atleast the gist thereof had been quoted as in the case of Ran Bheri No. 2, it might have been possible for the petitioner to show that there was no trace in them of any incitement to violence or to disturb public order. The petitioner was certainly denied an opportunity to make an effective representation against this ground by couching it in a vague language. Ground No. l0 - In this ground it has been said that the petitioner after his release from detention in June, 1955, has ever since been acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order which would be evident from the following ground. The validity of this ground from the point of view of giving an earliest opportunity to the detenu for making a representation under Art. 22 (5) of the Constitution and sec. 7 of the Act depends upon the grounds that follow. In ground No. 11 to 15, particulars such as dates, the gist of the speech etc. had been given and, therefore, it cannot be said that the particulars were not sufficient for giving the petitioner an earliest opportunity of making an effective representation against the impugned order. In ground No. 16 no dates have been given. It has not been made clear at what places directions were given by the petitioner. It has not been shown in what places in Rajasthan, workers have since been acting according to the directions of the petitioner and establishing branches of Bhooswami Sangh This ground too is vague to give the earliest opportunity to the petitioner of making an effective representation against the impugned order. In grounds Nos. 17, 18, 19 and 20, dates have been, the places have also been given and the gists of the speeches wherever necessary have been given. Other sufficient particulars have also been given which might enable the petitioner to make an effective representation at the earliest possible moment against the impugned order. Grounds Nos. 2 and 5 to 8 also give sufficient particulars, viz. , dates, places and gist of the speeches. It has not been shown that in what way they were insufficient to give the petitioner an earliest opportunity of making an effective representation against the impugned order Ground No. 9 is simply a statement of fact showing that the petitioner was ordered to be detained under the Preventive Detention Act by the order of the District Magistrate, Jaipur. No representation could be made against this statement of fact. Thus to our mind it is only Grounds Nos. 3, 4 and 16 which can be said to be so vague as to deny the earliest possible opportunity to the petitioner of making an effective representation against the impugned order. If the detention is based on such grounds, the detenu has certainly a right to be released. It was, however, argued by Sri C. B. Bhargava on behalf of the State that simply because some of the grounds are vague, detention order cannot be held to be invalid. We shall proceed to examine this presently. It has been said above that the decision of the detaining authority in detaining a person under the Act is subjective and it is not open to the Court to hold applying an objective test that the decision was not well founded or was based on insufficient grounds. Under these circumstances, it is not open to this Court to say that if only some of the grounds which have been communicated to the petitioner are irrelevant or vague the detention order could be justified on the remaining grounds. If it were possible for the Court to apply an objective test it might have said so. The objective test is denied to this Court in such matters and, therefore, it cannot say that the objective decision based on remaining grounds is perfectly right. We do not know which of the various grounds influenced the mind of the District Magistrate. It may be that if those grounds, which have been held to be irrelevant or vague, were not considered by the District Magistrate he might not have made the order of detention. Just as a great latitude has been given to the detaining authority to base the order of detention on its subjective decision an obligation has been caste upon it to base decision only on the grounds which are relevant to the object of detention and serve the detenu with such grounds as might enable him to have an earliest opportunity to make a representation against his detention order. In case there is one ground only, it must stand the test of relevancy and of being sufficient to give the detenu an earliest opportunity of making a representation If there are more than one ground, all of them should be relevant and should be such as to enable the detenu to make a representation at the earliest possible opportunity against the impugned order. Even if a single ground is irrelevant, the order cannot be sustained because it will not be possible for the Court to apply any objective test and to say whether the order would have been made only on the basis of the remaining grounds. Similarly if a single material ground is vague, the detenu is denied an opportunity of making an appropriate representation against it at the earliest possible moment and thus his constitutional right under Art. 22 (5) of the Constitution is infringed. It was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Ram Krishan Bhardwaj vs. The State of Delhi (6) that a petitioner has the right under Art. 22 (5) of the Constitution to be furnished with particulars of the grounds of his detention sufficient to enable him to make a representation which on being considered may give relief to him. This constitutional requirement must be satisfied with respect to each of the ground communicated to the person detained, subject of course to a claim of privilege under Cl. (6) of Art. 22. Where it has not been done in regard to one of the grounds, the petitioner's detention cannot be held to be in accordance with the procedure established by law within the meaning of Art. 21 and he is, therefore, entitled to be released. 31. In that case there were about a dozen grounds on which the detenu was detained and only one of the grounds, namely - (e) was found to be vague. The ground was as follows - " (e) You have been organising the movement by enroling volunteers among the refugees in your capacity as president of the Refugee Association of the Bara Hindu Rao. " This ground was found to be extremely vague as no particulars were given to the petitioner to enable him to make an adequate representation against the order of detention, and it was held that it infringed the constitutional safe, guard provided under Art. 22 (5) of the Constitution. It was argued on behalf of the State of Delhi in that case that reading it with some other grounds, it could be gathered that the petitioner was organising the movement by enrolling volunteers between a certain period. Their Lordships held that interpretation to be plausible, but observed that the detenu who was a layman not experienced in the interpretation of documents, could hardly be expected without, legal aid, which was denied to him, to interpret the ground in the sense explained by the counsel for the State. Their Lordships further observed that surely it is upto the detaining authority to make his meaning clear beyond doubt, without leaving the person detained to his own resource for interpreting the grounds. We must, therefore, hold that the ground mentioned in sub-para (e) of para 2 is vague in the sense explained above. Their Lordships further observed "we are of opinion that the constitutional requirement (sufficient to enable him to make a representation) which on being considered may give relief to him must be satisfied with respect to each of the grounds communicated to the person detained, subject of course to a claim of privilege under cl. 6) of Art. 22. "their Lordships were pleased to release the detenu in that case. It has not been shown to us that the particulars which have not been given in grounds Nos. 3,4 and 16 were with-held under a claim of privilege under Cl. (6) of Art. 22. ;