Wanchoo, C. J. - (1.) THIS is a reference by the Board of Revenue under sec. 243 (2) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act (No. III) of 1955, and arises in the following circumstances : -
(2.) DEVI Singh and Roop Singh plaintiffs brought a suit against Junjar Singh defendant in the court of Munsif, Desuri in December, 1950. Their case was that they had a right of way through the field of the defendant, and also a right to carry water through it. The Munsif held that such a suit was covered by item 25 of Group B of the First Schedule of the Rajasthan Revenue Courts (Procedure and Jurisdiction) Act (No. I) of 1941, and transferred the suit to the Revenue Court having jurisdiction for disposal. The suit reached the court of the Sub-divisional Officer, Bali, who dismissed it on the merits in December, 1953. There was then an appeal to the Commissioner, which was disposed of by the Additional Commissioner in July, 1955. The Additional Commissioner dismissed the appeal. Thereupon, the plaintiffs went in second appeal to the Board of Revenue. The plaintiffs then raised, apparently for the first time, before the Board of Revenue that the revenue courts had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, and their main reason for saying so was that the suit was for the grant of a permanent injunction. The learned members of the Board have stated that it is settled law that a suit for a permanent injunction was beyond the jurisdiction of a revenue court, and have referred to Lala vs. Sujan Singh (l ). They held that as this was a suit for permanent injunction; the Munsif was not right in transferring the suit to the Sub-divisional Officer. They, therefore, made this reference under sec. 243 (2) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act; 1955, which came into force on the 15th of October, 1955, and replaced the Rajasthan Revenue Courts (Procedure and Jurisdiction) Act (No I) of 1951. With all respect to the learned members of the Board, I must say that they have stated the proposition, that a suit for permanent injunction is beyond the jurisdiction of a revenue court, much too widely. There is no doubt that in Lala's case (l), Bapna J. held that that particular suit was primarily for permanent injunction, and was not covered by any of the classes of suits mentioned as triable by revenue courts in the schedule referred to in sec. 7 of the Rajasthan Act No. 1 of 1951. It was in these circumstances that he said that the suit was triable by the civil court. But in Puria vs. Chaturia (2), Bapna J. himself was careful to point out that where the suit of a plaintiff was triable by the revenue court as coming within certain items of Group B of the First Schedule to the Rajasthan Act No. I of 1951, a prayer for permanent injunction was entirely unnecessary, and the addition of that prayer made no difference to the jurisdiction. In yet another case Gulla vs. Doliya (3), I held that where the plaintiff sued seeking declaration of his tenancy rights in a well and for division of his share in the lands attached to the well, and both of these reliefs were triable exclusively by revenue court, the addition of a relief for permanent injunction and damages would not oust the jurisdiction of the revenue courts to try the suit, as the essential reliefs were obtainable from the revenue court. A comparison of these two later cases with Lala's case (l), will make it clear that Bapna J. held in that case that the main relief in that suit was for permanent injunction, and the suit was not covered by any of the classes of the suits mentioned as triable by the revenue court, and it was in those circumstances that he said that the suits of that kind were triable by the civil courts. What I wish to emphasise is that merely because there is a prayer for permanent injunction, the jurisdiction of the revenue court will not be ousted. The court will have to see what is the essential relief sought, and if the essential relief sought is something which the revenue court can give, the addition of a prayer for permanent injunction or any other ancillary relief will not oust the jurisdiction of the revenue court (vide explanation to sec. 7 (2) of Act No. I of 1951 ). What we have to see, therefore, in this case is what is the essential relief claimed by the plaintiff, and whether that relief can be granted by the revenue court There are two essential reliefs claimed by the plaintiffs in this case, namely (1) a right of way over the land belonging to the defendant and (2) a right to take water over the land belonging to the defendant. Now item 25 of Group B of the First Schedule of Act No. I of 1951, provides for a suit for a right of way over another's field to one's own well or field. Then item 26 of Group B provides for the right of taking water through another's Dhura (channel ). This, in my opinion, means the right of taking water through a Dhura in another's field. Thus both the reliefs sought by the plaintiffs could e given by the revenue court under Act No. I of 1951. The plaintiffs sought these reliefs, and in addition a prayer for permanent injunction was also made. This prayer would not, in my opinion, oust the jurisdiction of the revenue court, for the essential reliefs prayed for were the plaintiffs' right of way over he field, and the plaintiffs' right to take water through a channel over another's and. I am, therefore, of opinion that the Munsif was right in holding that he suit was triable by the revenue court. As such the appeal, which is pending before the Board, must be decided by the Board even though sec. 251 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act now seems to indicate that such suits would be triable after the coming into force of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act by civil courts. However, sec. 206, sub-secs. (3) and (4), which provide for transfer of cases from civil court to revenue court and vice versa, do not deal with appeals, and therefore the intention of the legislature was that appeals should be decided by the tribunals where they were pending when the Rajasthan Tenancy Act came into force. In this view of the matter, the Board has jurisdiction to decide this appeal even after the coming into force of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. I, therefore, reject the reference, and send the record back to the Board of Revenue for the decision of the merits. .;