- (1.) THIS is the unsuccessful plaintiffs' second appeal whose suit for recovery of arrears of rent for Svt. 2005 in respect of the land in dispute was dismissed by the trial court, the Additional Commissioner. Jodhpur confirming the same in first appeal.
(2.) WE have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and have gone through the record as well. The case for the plaintiffs is that Devi Chand and Sayab Chand defendants were granted a lease of the land in dispute on 20. 6. 46 for a period of 16 years. The lease deed was duly registered. According to the lease deed, the defendants agreed to pay three kalsis of wheat as rent annually on the day of Baisakh Sudi 15. Subsequently on 4. 10. 48 both the defendants accompanied by Mangya and Bhima approached Shri Hansraj advocate brother of Dhanpat Raj plaintiff and told him that Mangya was prepared to pay 5 kalsis of rent as against three. Thereupon Hansraj got another lease deed executed by Mangya and the lease deed executed by Devi Chand and Sayab Chand was cancelled. The lease deed executed by Mangya was to be registered but somehow or other it could not be done. Bhima promised to have the lease deed delivered to the plaintiffs after registration. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants defrauded Hansraj Advocate by extending a promise for payment of enhanced rent as a result of which their lease deed was cancelled. According to the plaintiffs the liability for rent for Svt. 2005 of the defendant continued intact. The trial court held that the liability of the defendants Devichand and Sayabchand came to an end with the cancellation of the lease deed in accordance with an agreement arrived at between the parties. The learned Additional Commissioner has upheld this view. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants has challenged the propriety of the decisions of the lower courts before us on the ground that the surrender was incomplete inasmuch as it was not accompanied by a registered surrender deed, that Hansraj had no author-ity to act for the plaintiffs and hence there was no cancellation of the original agreement and that the defendants acted fraudulently in the transaction and hence they cannot be allowed to take advantage of their own fraud There is no substance in either of these contentions. Sec. 21 of the Marwar Tenancy Act lays down the procedure for surrender of an agricultural tenancy. Sub-secs (1) and (2) lay down that a tenant not bound by a lease for a fixed term may at the end of my agricultural year surrender his holding by sending a registered notice to his landholder and by giving up possession thereof. If the tenant omits to send the registered notice before the first day of April, his liability for the rent of the holding for the agricultural year next following the date of the surrender shall continue. Sub-sec. (3) however makes it clear that nothing in this section shall affect any arrangement by which a tenant and his landholder may agree to the surrender of the whole or any portion of a holding. In the present case the surrender by Devichand and Sayabchand was arranged with the consent of the plaintiffs. As regards the authority of Shri Hansraj Advocate to act for the plaintiffs, suffice to observe that the circumstances of the case leave no room to doubt that he acted as an agent for the plaintiffs in the matter and the authority to so act was clearly implied as can be inferred from these circumstances. Shri Dhanpatraj has clearly stated in his statement that in his absence Hansraj and Sampatraj attend to his work and that the office of Hansraj and Dhanpatraj are joint. It is also an admitted fact that Devichand and Sayabchand paid rents to Hansraj in respect of this contract which was duly entered upon the back of the registered lease deed and this had been clearly accepted in the plaint itself The lease deed was with Hansraj and it was cancelled by writing out diagonally upon it the fact of its cancellation. It is also an admitted fact that the plaintiffs never thought it fit to repudiate the action taken by Hansraj. |nor did they ever serve the defendants with a notice that the action taken by Hansraj was ultra vires of him and that they should not consider themselves free from the liability of the contract. In fact the plaint itself shows that they want to hold the defendants liable upon the original contract only when they found that the fresh contract could not be enforced against Mangya etc. The statement of Ridhraj P. W. 3 goes a step further and makes it clear that it was not only Hansraj who cancelled the registered lease deed as Sampatraj was also present at that time and he was also a party to that cancellation. As pointed out above, Dhanpatraj has admitted that in his absence his interests are looked after by Hansraj and Sampatraj. The defendants were therefore perfectly justified in believing that Hansraj and Sampatraj were acting for the plaintiffs and were competent to cancel the lease deed entered into between the parties. The plaintiffs are now estopped from denying that Hansraj and Sampatraj were their agents while cancelling the lease deed. Lastly we fail to find any element of fraud or deceit that may have been resorted to by the defendants. The only instance of deceitful act mentioned by the plaintiff is that they brought a party who was prepared to pay 5 Kalsis but which eventually refused to perform its part of the contract. Obviously the defendants Devichand and Sayabchand cannot be held liable for any breach of contract by Mangya and others. The plaintiffs accepted Mangya as their new tenant with eyes wide open and if ultimately he turned out to be an undesirable party Devichand and Sayabchand can hardly be held responsible in that behalf merely on the ground that they had brought Mangya with them. The responsibility of the respondents to pay rent came to an end with the cancellation of the lease deed accepted by the plaintiffs and hence the lower courts were justified in dismissing the claim preferred by the appellants. The appeal is hereby rejected.;