Bapna, J. - (1.) THIS is an application under sec. 5 of the Limitation Act.
(2.) IN a suit for damages, the trial court gave a decree to the plaintiff, and the defendants' appeal was partly allowed by the District Judge, Jaipur City, and the decretal amount was reduced to Rs. 1,666/- by judgment dated 24th June, 1955. The defendants applied for copy of the judgment and decree on 8th July, 1955, and got the same on the 20th July, 1955. He filed the appeal on the 10th of October, 1955, when the office reported that the period of limitation expired on 6th October, 1955. It was said by the appellant that 8th and 9th October were holidays. The appellant moved an application on 2nd November, 1955, for condoning the delay on the ground that his lawyer Mr. M. had asked him to obtain a copy of the judgment of the trial court also, and when he got it, the appellant was under the impression that in computing the period of limitation the time required for obtaining the copies of the judgment of the first Appellate Court as well as of the trial court will be excluded. The appellant's impression obviously having no weight, the appellant tried to reinforce his affidavit by an affidavit of Mr. M. , dated 30th April, 1956, who said that the appellant brought the copy of the judgment and decree of the first appellate court, whereupon he advised him to obtain the copy of the judgment of the trial court also, which was to be filed along with the memorandum of the second appeal. He said further that the appellant came with the copy of the judgment of the trial court, whereupon Mr. M. was under the impression that the time spent in obtaining the copy of the trial court would also be excluded, and as such told the client that "there was ample time for filing the appeal. " Mr. M. went on to swear that for that reason the appeal was not filed within limitation. It may be stated that the application to obtain the copy of the judgment of the trial court was made on 7th September, 1955. It was ready on 21st September, and was delivered on the 1st of October, 1955. As stated earlier, the impression of the appellant, who is not a lawyer that the time required for obtaining the copy of the judgment of the trial court would be excluded has no relevance. The mistake of law, which can enable an appellant to obtain the benefit of sec. 5 of the Limitation Act must be one which is bona fide, and nothing is bona fide which is not done with due care and attention. The appellant's own impression is of no value, and it is for this reason that the appellant's affidavit was sought to be supplemented by the affidavit of Mr. M. , advocate. The provision of law allowing exclusion of time is contained in sec. 12 of the Limitation Act, and it clearly permits exclusion of the time spent in obtaining copies of the judgment and decree appealed from, and not any other. The decree and judgment appealed from in the present case were the decree and judgment of the first appellate court. Mr. M. is said to be an advocate of about 14 years' standing and one should expect even this much knowledge from an advocate of that standing. Mr. M. has taken refuge under Rule 132 (c) of the High Court Rules, which required a copy of the judgment of the trial court to be filed along with the memorandum of second appeal. That rule, however, does not provide for limitation, and the impression that Mr. M. may have about the exclusion of the period spent in obtaining the copy of the judgment of the first court cannot be said to be bona fide or with due care and attention. It may be noted that even when the copy of the judgment of the trial court was obtained by the appellant there were 6 days left within which he could file an appeal. The statement of Mr. M. that he was the Calient that there was still ample time does not held the appellant for he was not told how much time was still left for the appeal. It was thus not on the advice of Mr. M. that the appellant came to think that the time spent in obtaining the copy of the judgment of the trial court will be excluded. In my opinion the action of the appellant was not bona fide in the sense that it was without due care and attention. The delay has been due to the appellant's own impression and not what he may have been told by the lawyer. I, therefore, reject the application under sec. 5 of the Limitation Act. The appeal is obviously barred by time and it is accordingly dismissed. The respondents Nos. 1 and 2 will get half the costs. . ;