Sabina, J. - (1.) Vide this order above mentioned two petitions would be disposed of.
(2.) Petitioner had faced trial in two complaints under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') with regard to dishounour of cheques dated 30.7.2007 and 20.7.2007. Petitioner had faced trial under Section 138 of the Act in Criminal Complaint No. 271/2009 with regard to dishonour of cheque dated 20.7.2007 in the sum of Rs. 10,000/-. Petitioner had also faced trial in Criminal Complaint No. 272/2009 with regard to dishonour of cheque dated 30.7.2007 in the sum of Rs. 10,000/-. Petitioner has been convicted and sentenced by the courts below in both the complaints under Section 138 of the Act. Hence, the present two above mentioned petitions have been filed by the petitioner.
(3.) During the course of arguments learned counsel for the petitioner has not challenged the conviction and sentence of the petitioner under Section 138 of the Act as awarded by the courts below. Learned counsel has submitted that the sentence qua imprisonment in both the complaints be ordered to run concurrently. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that both the complaints have arisen out of the same transaction. In support of his arguments learned counsel has placed reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shyam Pal v. Dayawati Besoya & Anr. Criminal Appeal Nos. 988-989 of 2016 (Arising Out Of S.L.P. (Crl.) Nos.6226-27 of 2016) decided on 28.10.2016 , wherein it was held as under:- The imperative essentiality of a single transaction as the decisive factor to enable the Court to direct the subsequent sentence to run concurrently with the previous one was thus underscored. It was expounded as well that the direction for concurrent running of sentence would be limited to the substantive sentence alone. In a more recent decision of this Court in Benson v. State of Kerala Criminal Appeal No.958 of 2016 (since disposed of on 03.10.2016) and the accompanying appeals, arising from the conviction of the appellant from his prosecution on the offences proved, this Court in the singular facts as involved and having regard to the duration of his incarceration and the remission earned by him, extended the benefit of such discretion and directed that the sentences awarded to him in those cases would run concurrently. It was noticeably recorded that the offences in the cases under scrutiny had been committed on the same day. The benefit of the discretion was accorded to the appellant therein referring as well to the observation in V.K. Bansal (supra) that it is difficult to lay down any straight jacket approach in the matter and that a direction that the subsequent sentence would run concurrently or not, would essentially depend on the nature of the offence or offences and the overall fact situation. Understandably, the appellant was required to serve the default sentence as awarded with the direction that if the fine imposed had not been deposited, the default sentence or sentences would run consecutively. Reverting to the facts as obtained in the present appeal, we are of the comprehension, on an appreciation thereof as well as the duration of the appellant's custody, as is evidenced by the certificate to that effect, that the appellant is entitled to the benefit of the discretion contained in Section 427 of the Code. In arriving at this conclusion we have, as required, reflected on the nature of the transactions between the parties thereto, the offences involved, the sentences awarded and the period of detention of the appellant as on date. It is thus ordered that the substantive sentences of 10 months simple imprisonment awarded to the appellant in the two complaint cases referred to here in above would run concurrently. Needless to say, the appellant would have to serve the default sentences, if the fine by way of compensation, as imposed, has not been paid by him. The appeals are thus allowed to this extent. The appellant would be entitled to all consequential reliefs with regard to his release from custody as available in law based on this determination. ;