UDAI BIR SINGH SIKARWAR Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN THRO PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
LAWS(RAJ)-2016-11-51
HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN
Decided on November 29,2016

Udai Bir Singh Sikarwar Appellant
VERSUS
State Of Rajasthan Thro Public Prosecutor Respondents

JUDGEMENT

Sabina, J. - (1.) Petitioner has filed this revision petition under Section 397 read with 401 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 challenging the order dated 20.8.2016 whereby charges were framed against the petitioner by Special Judge in F.I.R. No. 143 dated 11.4.2000 registered at Police Station Kotwali, Sawaimadhopur, District Sawaimadhopur and the application for discharging the petition was dismissed.
(2.) Learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner has been falsely involved in this case. In fact there was no evidence against the petitioner qua commission of offence in question. Petitioner had not misused his power nor had given any undue benefit to himself or anybody else. In support of his argument learned Counsel has placed reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in C.K. Jaffer Sharief v. State (Through CBI), (2013) 1 Supreme Court Cases 205 wherein, it was held as under: Adverting to the facts of the present case it has already been noticed that the only allegation against the appellant is that he had prevailed upon RITES and IRCON to take the four employees in question on deputation for the sole purpose of sending them to London in connection with the medical treatment of the appellant. It is also alleged that neither RITES nor IRCON had any pending business in London and that none of the four persons had not performed any duty pertaining to RITES or IRCON while they were in London; yet the to and fro air fare of all the four persons was paid by the above two Public Sector Undertakings. On the said basis it has been alleged that the accused appellant had abused his office and caused pecuniary loss to the two Public Sector Undertakings by arranging the visits of the four persons in question to London without any public interest. This, in essence, is the case against the accused-appellant. A fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence with regard to the liability of an accused which may have application to the present case is to be found in the work Criminal Law by K.D. Gaur. The relevant passage from the above work may be extracted below: Criminal guilt would attach to a man for violations of criminal law. However, the rule is not absolute and is subject to limitations indicated in the Latin maxim, act us non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea It signifies that their can be no crime without a guilty mind. To make a person criminally accountable it must be proved that an act, which is forbidden by law, has been caused by his conduct, and that the conduct was accompanied by a legally blameworthy attitude of mind. Thus, there are two components of every crime, a physical element and a mental element, usually called act us reus and mens rea respectively. It has already been noticed that the appellant besides working as the Minister of Railways was the Head of the two Public Sector Undertakings in question at the relevant time. It also appears from the materials on record that the four persons while in London had assisted the appellant in performing certain tasks connected with the discharge of duties as a Minister. It is difficult to visualise as to how in the light of the above facts, demonstrated by the materials revealed in the course of investigation, the appellant can be construed to have adopted corrupt or illegal means or to have abused his position as a public servant to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage either for himself or for any of the aforesaid four persons. If the statements of the witnesses examined under Section 161 show that the aforesaid four persons had performed certain tasks to assist the Minister in the discharge of his public duties, however insignificant such tasks may have been, no question of obtaining any pecuniary advantage by any corrupt or illegal means or by abuse of the position of the appellant as a public servant can arise. As a Minister it was for the appellant to decide on the number and identity of the officials and supporting staff who should accompany him to London if it was anticipated that he would be required to perform his official duties while in London. If in the process, the Rules or Norms applicable were violated or the decision taken shows an extravagant display of redundance it is the conduct and action of the appellant which may have been improper or contrary to departmental norms. But to say that the same was actuated by a dishonest intention to obtain an undue pecuniary advantage will not be correct. That dishonest intention is the gist of the offence under Section 13(l)(d) is implicit in the words used i.e. corrupt or illegal means and abuse of position as a public servant. A similar view has also been expressed by this Court in M. Narayanan Nambiar v. State of Kerala, (1963) Supp. (2) SCR 724 while considering the provisions of Section 5 of Act of 1947. If the totality of the materials on record indicate the above position, we do not find any reason to allow the prosecution to continue against the appellant. Such continuance, in our view, would be an abuse of the process of Court and therefore it will be the plain duty of the Court to interdict the same.
(3.) Learned Counsel has next placed reliance on decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Yogesh alias Sachin Jagdish Joshi v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 10 Supreme Court Cases 394 wherein, it was held as under: Chapter XVIII of the Code lays down the procedure for trial before the Court of Sessions, pursuant to an order of commitment under Section 209 of the Code. Section 227 contemplates the circumstances where under there could be a discharge of an accused at a stage anterior in point of time to framing of charge under Section 22.8. It provides that upon consideration of the record of the case, the documents submitted with the police report and after hearing the accused and the prosecution, the Court is expected, nay bound to decide whether there is sufficient ground to proceed against the accused and as a consequence thereof either discharge the accused or proceed to frame charge against him. It is trite that the words not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused appearing in the Section postulate exercise of judicial mind on the part of the Judge to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. However, in assessing this fact, the Judge has the power to sift and weigh the material for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The test to determine a prima facie case depends upon the facts of each case and in this regard it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down a rule of universal application. By and large, however, if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him gives rise to suspicion only as distinguished from grave suspicion, he will be fully within his right to discharge the accused. At this stage, he is not to see as to whether the trial will end in conviction or not. The broad test to be applied is whether the materials on record, if unrebutted, makes a conviction reasonably possible. See : (State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh and Prafulla Kumar Samal) ;


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