JUDGEMENT
CHAUHAN, J. -
(1.) THE contest between the landlord, the appellant before us and the tenant, the respondent before us, over the fixation of the provisional rent, has brought the parties before this court. Vide Order dated 18. 7. 2003, passed by the Additional District Judge No. 9, Jaipur City, the learned Judge has fixed the provisional rent of the building at the rate of Rs. 7000/- per month-- a provisional rent which is too little according to the appellant.
(2.) THE brief facts of the case are that the appellant No. 1 was a partnership firm which owned a "pital Factory" ( a brass factory) situated on the Jhotwara Road in Jaipur. THE said firm manufactured semis of Non-ferrous metals. Subsequently, the said firm was converted into private limited company by the name of Coventry Metals (Rajasthan) P. Ltd. In this Company the ex- partners of Appellant No. 1 had also become Directors and share holders of the defendant respondent Company. THErefore, the Appellants had let out the "pital Factory", on 1. 3. 1970 to the defendant Company at a nominal rent of Rs. 1, 050/- per month. Subsequently, a registered lease deed was executed on 23. 1. 1972. THE suit premises were let out for a period of twenty-two years, which expired on 28. 2. 1992. Although, the defendant company had closed down the manufacturing process, but due to the nominal rental being paid by them for a large area of 48,816 sq. feet. , the defendant company did not hand over the premises to the appellants. On 18. 7. 2000, the appellants filed a suit for fixation of standard rent on the ground that the rental value in the area had increased phenomenally, and the standard rent needed to be determined. In order to buttress their case, the appellants had produced a number of lease deeds. On the other hand, the defendant respondents had filed their written statements and had denied the appellants' averments. After hearing both the parties, the learned Judge has determined the provisional rent as aforementioned. Thus, this appeal before this Court.
Mr. O. P. Garg, the learned counsel for the Appellant has contended that firstly, the suit for fixation of standard rent was filed under the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (henceforth to be referred to as "the Old Act", for short ). The Rent Control Act, 2001 (henceforth to be referred to as 'the New Act', for short) came into effect much later. Although according to Section 32 of the New Act suits filed under the Old Act were to be decided under the provision of the Old Act, still the learned Judge has applied the New Act to the present suit. Thus, he has committed a grave illegality. Secondly, the impugned Order is a non-speaking order as it has not assigned any reason for calculating the provisional rent to be at the rate of Rs. 7000/- per month. Thirdly, the learned Judge has ignored the large number of lease deeds submitted by the appellants in order to substantiate his case that the rental value in the vicinity had increased phenomenally and even the provisional rent should be reasonable. Considering the phenomenal increase in the rental value in the vicinity, according to the learned counsel, the provisional rent of Rs. 7000/- is too little.
On the other hand, Mr. A. K. Bhandari, Sr. Advocate and the learned counsel for the respondent, has vehemently argued that learned Judge has rightly applied the provisions of the New Act. According to the learned counsel, Section 6 (3) of the Old Act clearly states that the court should consider "other relevant considerations" while determining the provisional rent. After the coming into force of the New Act, one of the relevant considerations would be the revised rent decided under Section 6 of the New Act. Therefore, the learned Judge has rightly applied the criteria for the revision of the rent under the New Act for determining the provisional rent under the Old Act. Secondly, that at the stage of determining the provisional rent, a summary trial is held. Hence, there is no need for the court to pass a reasoned order. Thirdly, the rent determined under Section 7 (1) is only interim in nature. In case the provisional rent is too little, at the time of final determination of the standard rent, the court is empowered to direct that the standard rent be paid from a retrospective date. Thus, the appellant's interest is not adversely affected by the impugned Order.
We have heard the learned counsels for the parties and have perused the impugned Order.
A plethora of legal issues have arisen for the determination of this court: firstly, what is the consequence of repeal of Old Act and the re-enactment of the New Act on the same subject- matter? Secondly, can the New Act be read indirectly into the Old Act? Thirdly, was the learned Judge legally justified in reading the New Act into the Old Act?
(3.) SECTION 6 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1955 (henceforth, to be referred to as 'the Act of 1955', for short) deals with the consequence of repeal of a State Act and states as under: Effect of Repeal-- (1) Where any Rajasthan law repeals any enactment hitherto made or thereafter to be made then unless a different intention appeals the repeal shall not-- a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or d) affect any fine, penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred n respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, fine penalty , forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such fine, penalty, forfeiture or punishment, may be imposed, as if the repealing law had not been passed. 2) the provisions of this section shall also apply upon the expiry of withdrawal of any Rajasthan law [ as if such law had not expired or, as the case may be, had not been withdrawn]: Provided that the provision contained in clause (a) of sub- section (1) shall not apply.
Thus, consequence of the repeal of an Act is not to obliterate the Old Act. Instead, a legal fiction is created that the repeal of the Old Act would not affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed. They shall continue as though the Old Act were still continuing notwithstanding its express repeal.
In the case of State of Punjab vs. Harnek Singh ( (2002) 3 SCC 481), the Hon'ble Supreme Court dealt with the General Clauses Act, 1897 and observed as under: The General Clauses Act has been enacted to avoid superfluity and repetition of language in various enactments. The object of this Act is to shorten the language of Central Acts, to provide as far as possible, of uniformity of expression in the Central Acts, by giving definition of series of terms in common use, to state explicitly certain convenient rules for construction and interpretation of the Central Acts, and to guard against slips and oversights by importing into every Act certain common form clauses, which otherwise ought to be inserted expressly in every Central Act and has to be read in such Act unless specifically excluded. Even in cases where the provisions of the Act do not apply, courts in the country have applied its principles keeping in mind the inconvenience that is likely to arise otherwise, particularly when the provisions made in the Act are based upon the principles of equity, justice and good conscience.
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