SHARMA, J. - (1.) CHALLENGE in this appeal is to the order dated January 23, 2006 of learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition of the appellants whereby the acquisition proceedings of the appellants' land under the provisions Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 (for short, "1959 Act") were called in question.
(2.) CONTEXTUAL facts depict that the appellants filed writ petition before learned Single Judge being aggrieved by the process initiated by the respondents for acquisition of land of appellants bearing khasra No. 383 measuring 14 bighas and 16 biswas situated at Madrampura. First notice was issued on January 25, 1975 under Section 52 (2) of 1959 Act indicating purpose of acquisition for improvement and purposes of Jaipur town extension of civil lines area for construction of buildings. Second notice issued under Section 52 (2) of 1959 Act on August 23, 1975 indicated the purpose of acquisition of land for extension of civil lines and planning of housing scheme. Appellants submitted objections to the notices. The same were not considered but instead the respondents proceeded to issue notices under Sections 52 (1) and 52 (5) of 1959 Act respectively on February 8, 1984 and February 18, 1984 stating the fact of acquisition of land for Jaipur Development Authority. The writ petition filed by the appellants seeking quashing of the entire proceedings of acquisition was dismissed by the learned Single Judge as indicated above. The rival submissions advanced before us gave rise to the following issues: (i) Whether there was an inordinate and unexplained delay between publishing a notice of acquiring land and the actual declaration? (ii) Whether acquisition is not in conformity with the public purpose? (iii) What is the effect of doctrine of Eminent Domain? (iv) Whether improvement scheme has not been formulated? Inordinate & Unexplained Delay The first contention of learned counsel for the appellant is tat there has been inordinate and unexplained delay of nine years between publishing a notice with intent of acquiring land under Section 52 (2) of 1959 Act and the actual declaration under Section 52 (1) of 1959 Act. Sections 52 (2) and 52 (1) are akin of Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. The Land Acquisition Amendment Act, 1984 has made it crystal clear that the distance and time between issuance of notification under Sections 4 and 6 of Land Acquisition Act should not be more than one year. Although there is no mandatory requirement of issuing notification under Section 52 (1), the exercise of power under Section 52 (1) has to be within a reasonable period. Reliance is placed on Sharda Devi vs. State of Bihar (2003) 3 SCC 128, wherein their Lordships of Supreme Court held as under: (Para 25) ". . . Though, no limitation is provided for making a reference under Section 30 of the Act, needless to say, where no period of limitation for exercise of any statutory power is prescribed, the power can nevertheless be exercised only within a reasonable period; what is reasonable period in a given case shall be depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. " Reliance is also placed on Mansaram vs. S. P. Pathak (1984) 1 SCC 125, wherein it was indicated as under: (Para 12) "further, where power is conferred to effectuate a purpose, it has to be exercised in a reasonable manner and the reasonable exercise of power inheres, its exercise within a reasonable time. " Refuting the contentions learned counsel for the respondents canvassed that there was no delay on the part of the State Government. The petitioner itself was guilty of delaying the proceedings from 1975 to 1984 by making various representations objecting to the acquisition proceedings thereby tremendously increasing the costs of development. A look at the impugned judgment goes to show that the learned Single Judge considered the submissions in regard to delay in para 24 thus: ". . . The delay between 1975 to 1984 is explained by the various representations and objections filed by the petitioner itself and it is very clear that the petitioner could stall the finalization of declaration under Section 52 (1) of the Act upto 1984 though the report of the land acquisition officer recommending the land acquisition while deciding the initial objections of the petitioner company was given way back on 29. 4. 1976. The State Government cannot be faulted and cannot be said to have slept over the matter between 1975 to 1984. "
(3.) WE are in complete agreement with these observations. Indisputably the appellants made various representations objecting the acquisition proceedings between 1975 to 1984 and if time was consumed in deciding the representations it cannot be held that there was delay on the part of the State Government. In our considered opinion the statutory power was exercised by the State Government within a reasonable period. WE therefore, reject the first contention of learned counsel for the appellants. Public Purpose The second submission of learned counsel for the appellants is that the issue whether the notification declared under Section 52 (1) is for public purpose or not is a justiciable issue. The word `public Purpose' according to learned counsel, is of definite import and has distinct legal connection. There can be change in public purpose, but nexus with the public purpose must remain unchanged. It is important to note that the word public purpose was first construed by Privy Council in Hambai's case (1914 LR 42 IA 44 ). The Constitution Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the ratio of Hambai's case in State of Bombay vs. R. S. Nanji (1956 SCR 18) and observed as under: " In Hamabai's case the observation of Batchelor, J. to the effect " General definitions are, I think, rather to be avoided where the avoidance is possible, and I make not attempt to define precisely the extent of the phrase `public purpose' in the lease; it is enough to say that, in my opinion, the phrase, whatever else it may mean must include a purpose, that is, an object or aim, in which the general interest of the community, as opposed to the particular interest of individuals, is directly and vitally concerned" received the approval of Privy Council. " ;