SHARMA, J. - (1.) THE petitioner has approached this court to set aside the orders dated December 10, 1992, December 26, 1992 and August 12, 1996 and to declare that the petitioner's land is not liable to acquisition under the provisions of Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 (for short `1976 Act' ). In case of non-petitioners take possession of the land during the pendency of writ petition the same may be restored to the petitioner.
(2.) CONTEXTUAL facts depict that agricultural land bearing khasra No. 27 measuring 50 Bigha 30 Biswa situated in village Ramchandrapur Tehsil Ladpura District Kota was partitioned between the petitioner and Narendra Singh, Harcharan singh, Guruvachan Singh, Satyendra Singh, Jaswinder Singh, Kulwant Singh, Gurmeet Singh, Sukhdev Singh, Hakim Singh and Nichander Singh co-sharers. The petitioner filed returned under the provisions of 1976 Act. He also filed application under Section 20 of the 1976 Act of February 6, 1992 before the Additional Director (respondent No. 2) for staying the proceedings till decision of the application. The respondent No. 2 sent his report after site inspection to the Director stating therein that the land was being used for agricultural purposes, crops is standing and according to master plan no other specific use of this land is proposed. However, the competent authority on the premise that entire land was entered in the khatedari of Bhag Singh on March 9, 1976 and without waiting for decision on application, passed the order under Section 8 (4) of 1976 Act on December 10, 1992. The entire land except 2000 sq. meter was declared surplus. The petitioner did not receive any information of this order, therefore, no objection could be filed. Thereafter the order dated December 26, 1992 was passed under Section 9 of 1976 act. The petitioner came to know about the orders dated December 10, 1992 and December 26, 1992 only on December 23, 1993 when he obtained the copy of the record from Halka Patwari. After obtaining certified copies of the orders the petitioner preferred separate appeals on January 18, 1994 along with application under Section 5 of Limitation Act. the Divisional Commissioner dismissed both the appeals vide order dated August 12, 1996. Although the Divisional Commissioner held that the land was not covered under the definition of vacant land and not liable for acquisition but dismissed the appeals on the ground of delay. Since notifications regarding acquisition were published in the Gazette on February 11, 1993 and April 7, 1993 and also that vide order dated August 20, 1993 the Competent Authority had already handed over the possession of the land in question to UIT. Hence, the petitioner preferred instant writ petition assailing the impugned orders on the ground that the order August 20, 1993 was only inter-departmental correspondence and no physical possession was actually taken over and the land was continuously in cultivatory possession of the petitioner and his family members. The petitioner also contended that since he was common citizen it was not possible to have knowledge about the Gazette notifications, therefore, the delay in filing appeals ought to have been condoned. The respondents in their reply denied he averments made in the writ petition and averred that the impugned orders were rightly passed. The petitioner was physically dispossessed from the land he had knowledge of the orders. I have heard rival submissions and scanned the material on record as well as the case law cited by learned counsel for the parties. A look at the impugned order dated August 12, 1996 of the Divisional Commissioner goes to show that the land in dispute was not found covered under the definition of vacant land and not liable to acquisition in view of the ratio indicated in Smt. Atia Mohammadi Begum vs. State of U. P. (AIR 1993 SC 2465 ). Still the appeals were dismissed on the ground of delay. From the material on record, I notice that facts incorporated in the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act supported by affidavit were not controverted by the respondents. I also notice that actual physical possession of the land was never taken. As per Khasra Girdawari the land was in he cultivatory possession of the petitioner. In my opinion the observation in regard to presumption of knowledge was wholly unfounded in view of the ratio indicated in Ram Sumiran vs. DDC (AIR 1985 SC 606), wherein their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that in a country like ours where there is so much poverty, ignorance and illiteracy, it would not be fair to presume that everyone knows that on death of a respondent, the legal representatives have to be brought on record within a certain time. Making such observation the delay of six years was condoned. In these circumstances it cannot be presumed that the appellant, who is common citizen of our country, had any knowledge of the Gazette Notification particularly when no actual physical possession was taken of the land in question and only departmental order dated August 20, 1993 was issued. In such a situation, the delay of only 14 months in filing appeals against the impugned orders ought to have been condoned. The relief sought in the appeals by the petitioner ought not to have been denied on technical ground. The Divisional Commissioner in my opinion committed illegality in dismissing the the appeals on the ground of delay. In view of the observations made by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ram Sumiran vs. DDC (supra) and uncontroverted affidavit filed in support of the application under Section 5 Limitation Act, I condone the delay in filing the appeals and remand the case to the Divisional Commissioner Kota to decide the appeals afresh on merits. Till the appeals are decided the parties shall maintain status quo. The writ petition stands allowed as indicated above without any order as to costs. . ;