BALIA, J. - (1.) THIS appeal is directed against the order of learned Single Judge dated 13. 07. 2000 by which the writ petition No. 4182/92 filed by the appellant was dismissed by holding that there is delay of 15 years in filing the writ petition as the seniority list was prepared in 1976.
(2.) THE background of the writ petition which emerges from the facts narrated and about which there is no dispute is that the petitioner-appellant was initially appointed as temporary L. D. C. in the Municipal Council, Bhilwara on 15. 06. 1972. He worked on that post continuously until March 4, 1976 when his temporary services were brought to an end. THE said termination order was subject matter of S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 489/76. In the said proceedings termination order was found to be invalid. During the pendency of the said writ petition, the petition came to be appointed substantively on the recommendations made by the Commission on being selected on the post of LDC by the Commission, in pursuance of which he joined the service. Notwithstanding the substantive fresh appointment having been given to the petitioner, he continued with the writ petition. The said writ petition came to be allowed on 3. 7. 1984. The termination of petitioner's services by order dated 4. 03. 1976 was quashed as it was found to be illegal. Since the petitioner was already in service, the question of reinstatement was not germane. However, the petitioner's name in the order dated 3. 7. 1984 Annex. 1 to the writ petition appears along with Rameshwar Lal, Manohar Singh and Shantilal and who were held entitled to pay and allowance as admissible at the relevant date between the period of termination of their service and their appointment in persuance of recommendation made by R. P. S. C. as if no order of termination was made on March 4, 1976 and they were held entitled to the benefits and allowances between the period wen they were relieved of the charge and the fresh appointments were made in their favour. The petitioners Suresh Chandra and Abdul Rashid, who were appointed afresh, were deemed to have been continued in service. All these cases were taken in appeal by the Municipal Council, Bhilwara. The appeal was dismissed on merit when the Division Bench found setting aside of the order of terminating the service of incumbents to be reasonable and proper. The order of Division Bench was made on 31. 07. 1989. In pursuance of said order, the petitioners made representation for consequential benefits about the emoluments and also for fixation of their proper place in seniority by considering them to be in continuous service from the date of their initial appointment. So far as the grant of relief of giving the benefit of selection scale with effect from the date of initial appointment as per the Government order which came into being on 25th January 1992 was extended to the petitioners. However, the petitioner's position in seniority as per last published list during the pendency of aforesaid lis was not disturbed. No reply either was given to the petitioner's representation about assignment of proper seniority in consequence of their services which were held continuous.
(3.) THE fact about said list is that on 19. 3. 1983 the provisional seniority list of Lower Divisional Clerks was published inviting objections within 15 days and after considering the objections, the final seniority list was published on 12/13. 06. 1984 in which seniority of petitioner was determined by considering him to be substantively appointed on 31st Jan. , 1977. It may be noticed that both, provisional seniority list as well as final seniority list, were published even before the decision of the learned Single Judge was rendered by which the termination order in respect of the petitioner was held to be invalid which was passed in 1976. Thus, as on the date seniority list was published, the order terminating petitioner-appellant's service had not been set aside and the petitioner was in service as on that date only in consequence of subsequent appointment in pursuance to recommendation made by RPSC on being regularly selected. Apparently, until the termination order was set aside and its consequential effect could be considered, the petitioner's appointment as on the date of publication of the seniority list was only in pursuance of appointment given after selection made by the Commission. Therefore, the objections, if any, raised and decided by the respondents by 12. 01. 1984 have no relevance for the purpose of considering effect on seniority as a result of setting aside of termination order by this Court with certain direction about consequential relief. Hence representation which arose out of the claim founded to claim consequential benefits of setting aside the termination order of March 1976 and April 1976 with direction of the Court that the termination order shall be deemed to have been never passed with giving all the benefits for the period between which the appellant remained out of service as a result of termination order could not be denied consideration on the ground that seniority list has been published after considering objection which were invited against provisional seniority list. The arrears of wages having been confined to 50%. In other respects, the Division Bench confirmed the order of learned Single Judge as noticed above. The Division Bench order came into existence in July 1989. These facts, which have not been noticed by the learned Single Judge, clearly goes to show that the finding that the writ petition has been filed after 15 years of publication of seniority list suffers from gross latches was unfounded. Perhaps 15 years period was also taken into consideration by including the period during which the petition had remained pending hearing before this Court. The writ petition was decided in the year 2000 but the same has been filed in 1992 and the delay of 15 years has been taken into consideration with reference to the date when the matter was being heard and decided. Apparently, 8 years' period during which petition could not be heard by this Court, could not be part of latches, if any, attributed to the petitioner- appellant. ;