CHAUHAN, J. - (1.) THE appellant has challenged the order dated 16. 8. 2003 passed by the Additional District & Sessions Judge No. 3, Jaipur City, Jaipur whereby the learned court has determined the provisional rent as Rs. 5,000/- per month.
(2.) THE brief facts of the case are that the plaintiff- respondent has filed a suit for determination of the standard rent against the appellant with regard to the Shop bearing No. SP-4 situated at Chandpole Anaj Mandi, Jaipur. THE respondent had claimed that in the year 1997, the said shop was let out to the appellant for a rental value of Rs. 500/- per month. Subsequently, the rent was enhanced to Rs. 800/- per month. It was further claimed that initially the shop belong to M/s. Sridhar & Company, a partnership firm. But subsequently, after the partition of the partners, the said shop came into the respondent's share in the year 1982. THE respondent further claimed that the present valuation of the shop is Rs. 15,30,000/ -. THErefore, the rental value of the shop comes out to Rs. 15,000/- per month. Hence, the rent of Rs. 8,00/- is too little. He further claimed that the shops in the nearby vicinity are fetching a rent of Rs. 10,000/- to Rs. 15,000/- per month. THE appellant filed their written statement and denied the averments made by the respondent. After hearing both the parties, vide order dated 16. 8. 2003 the court fixed the provisional rent as Rs. 5,000/- per month. Hence, this appeal before this Court. Mr. Lokesh Sharma, the learned counsel for the appellant, has argued that the learned court has not considered the contention raised by the appellant. Instead, it has relied on the evidence produced by the respondents and has relied on the valuation report submitted by the respondent. On the other hand, Dr. P. C. Jain, the learned counsel for the respondent, has argued that a provisional rent is an interim rent decided by the Court prior to the final determination of the standard rent. According to Section 7 (5) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 (henceforth to be referred to as `the Act', for short), in case the court comes to the conclusion while finally determining the standard rent that the provisional rent was on the excessive side, the same can be adjusted in the finally determined standard rent. Hence, no prejudice is being caused to the appellant. We have heard both the learned counsels for the parties and have perused the impugned order. The words "provisional rent" have not been defined in the Act. However, the word "provisional" means "interim, for the time being, temporary, subject to variation, and not final. " Thus, a "provisional rent" is an interim, a temporary assessment of the rent to be paid by the tenant to the landlord. It is subject to the final determination of the standard rent by the court. This is apparent from Section 7 (5) of the Act, which stipulates that "all amounts paid as provisional rent shall be adjusted towards payment of the standard rent finally determined. " Keeping in view the nature of the determination, this court in Sohan Lal vs. Badri Narain & Ors. (RLW 2000 (2) Raj. 1221) has held, "such determination of the rent which is provisional in nature does not finally determine the rights of the parties and such provisional rent shall ultimately be subject to the final determination of the standard rent to be fixed by the court under Section 6 of the Rent Act. " Sections 6 and 7 of the Act are supplementary to each other. Under Section 6 of the Act, either the landlord or the tenant can file an application for fixation of standard rent for the premises. Once the application has been filed, the court is duty bound to "forthwith" make an order fixing the provisional rent for the premises in question. The word "forthwith" clearly indicates that the court must exercise its power of determining the provisional rent within a reasonable time. In the case of Tripath Sansnath vs. Tripathi Bhagwat Nath and Ors. (AIR 1966 All. 615) their Lordships of the Allahbad High Court had said, "the word "forthwith" means within a reasonable period. It is, therefore, necessary for the Court, while proceeding with the trial under the Rule to decide the suit within a reasonable period. What is a reasonable period shall depend upon the circumstances of each case. " In fact, no time frame can be prescribed for such determination. But because a statutory duty has been imposed on the Court, the courts are expected to perform the duty as soon as possible.
(3.) SINCE Sections 6 and 7 of the Act are co-extensive, the same factors which are used for determining the standard rent under Section 6 should be applied for determining the provisional rent under Section 7 of the Act. Section 6 (3) of the Act lays down these factors as "having due regard to the prevailing rent or standard rent for similar premises in the same locality, the various amenities (such as electricity, water connection, sanitary fitting and the like) attached to the premises, the cost of construction, maintenance and repairs thereof, the special reasons, if any, proved by the plaintiff and other relevant considerations. " These factors have not been listed in hierarchy of importance. The facts have to be considered in a holistic manner. Section 7 (1) warrants that such a determination should be done in a "summary manner". Thus, the court need not meticulously examine the evidence. In the case of V. N. Vasudeva vs. Kirori Mal Luhariwala (AIR 1965 SC 440), their Lordships of the Supreme Court had held, "for the purpose of such an interim order it is not necessary that there should be a full trail. " In fact, since the determination is only a stop-gap arrangement, the court should consider the existence of a prima facie case in favour of the parties. Such a determination can be made on the basis of the affidavits produced by the parties and on the basis of other documentary evidence produced by them. Since the determination is only for the time being, the scope of interference in provisional rent is rather narrow. An order determining the provisional rent can be interfered with when the order is arbitrary, is based on no evidence, or on irrelevant evidence, or is assessed while ignoring evidence available on record, or suffers from jurisdictional or procedural defect, or is mala fide, or is biased, or shocks the conscience of the court. This court has been reluctant to interfere with such orders in case the above factors have not been established. (Refer to Vinod Kumar Sharma vs. Sajjanmal Lodha (SBCMA No. 2075/2004 decided 21. 4. 2005), Man Mohan Das Mundra & anr. vs. Mrs. Shiv Kunwar & Ors. (SBCWP No. 8338/2004 decided on 8. 2. 2006), Mahesh Bhatiya & Ors. vs. Sarogi Mansion Estate Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. (2004 (3) DNJ (Raj.) 1047) = (RLW 2004 (4) Raj. 2397), Kamlesh Jain vs. Mahesh Koolwal (SBCMA No. 426/2004 decided on 21. 8. 06 ). ;