V.S. Kokje, J. - (1.) This revision application is directed against the decision of District Judge, Rajsamand, holding that the decree under execution was valid and executable. The facts of the case are that the plaintiff-Decree Holder had filed a suit against the defendant Judgment debtor for eviction from the premises rented out to him on the ground of default in payment of rent and personal need of premises for the plaintiff. The dispute was settled by the parties mutually and a compromise was filed in the Court. On the basis of compromise, a consent decree was passed on 8.2.90. Under the decree, the defendants had to pay a sum of Rs. 1,12,000/- as arrears of rent for the period from April, 1987 to May, 1990 (sic) Rs. 2,70,000/-. This total amount of Rs. 3,82,000/- plus rent for the period of 15 days was to be paid to the plaintiff on 15.6.1990. It was provided by the decree that if the amount was deposited as aforesaid, the defendant would not be evicted from the disputed premises and the property would belong to the defendant and in that event if a conveyance was needed, it shall be executed by the plaintiff at the expenses of the defendant. It the amount was not paid in accordance with the aforesaid terms, the plaintiff had the right to get the premises vacated immediately and would have night to recover the arrears of rent as also mesne profits. at the rate of Rs. 3000/- per month from 1.1.1988 till eviction on payment of Court fee. The plaintiff filed an execution application complaining that the defendant-judgment debtor had not performed his part of the consent decree and had not deposited the amount as per the decree within the time set out by the decree. The defendant-Judgment debtor objected to the execution on the ground that the Court while passing the decree has not recorded its satisfaction as to the existence of any ground under Section 13 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. According to the defendant-judgment debtor, therefore, the decree was not executable on the basis of various decisions rendered by the Supreme Court. It was also contended that before the suit was filed, the disputed premises were already sold by the plaintiff to the defendant for a sum of Rs. 2,70,000/- which amount was to be paid by (sic). It was contended that as the tenancy itself has come to an end prior to filing of the suit, the consent decree based on tenancy was not executable. It was also contended by the defendant-Judgment debtor that a sum of Rs. 80,000/- paid on 1.6.90 by the defendant to the plaintiff, was paid and received towards the sale of the property and not as any arrears of rent. It was further contended that no suit could have been brought within five years of the commencement of the tenancy on the ground of personal need of the landlord and, therefore, decree passed in any such suit was anility. The Executing Court dismissed the objections holding that it was clear from the decree itself that it was passed after (sic) that a default in payment of rent had been committed and as such, the Court granting the decree had satisfied itself that default has been committed in payment of rent. It was further held that the decree was not on the ground of personal need and, therefore, the arguments about the suit itself being pre-mature, was of no avail. As regards the transaction being one of sale of property, the Executing Court held that the receipt for the amount of Rs. 80,000/- clearly shows that money was accepted towards the decree and the decree referred to the amount which was due as arrears of rent. This objection is also, therefore, turned down. The revision petitioner aggrieved by the order of the District Judge has filed this revision application.
(2.) The learned counsel for the revision petitioner reiterated the above arguments in this Court and relied on certain rulings in support of the contentions. The case first' referred to was of Ferozi Lot v. Man Mal, AIR 1970 SC 794 , wherein the Court had held that the jurisdiction of the Court to pass a ,decree for recovery of possession of any premises depends upon its satisfaction that one or more of the grounds mentioned in Section 13(1) have been proved. Where the Court had proceeded solely on the basis of the compromise arrived between the parties, the court was not competent to pass the decree, such a decree would be a nullity. In Smt. Kaushalya Devi v. K.L. Bansal's case, AIR 1970 SC 838 , the same view was taken and it was held that the Court could not have passed the decree without satisfying itself that the ground of eviction as per law existed. In K.K. Chari v. R.M. Sheshadri, AIR 1973 SC 1311 , the same view was taken that the Court must satisfy that a statutory ground existed, but it was further stated in this decision that an order of eviction based on consent of the parties is not necessarily void if the jurisdictional fact viz. the existence of one or more of the conditions mentioned in Section 10 were shown to have existed when the Court made the consent order. Satisfaction of the Court, which is not doubt a pre-requisite for the order of eviction, need not be by the manifestation borne out by a judicial finding. If at some stage the Court was called upon to apply its mind to the question and there was sufficient material before it, before the parties invited it to pass an order in terms of their agreement, it is possible to postulate that the Court was satisfied about the grounds on which the order of eviction was passed. Before making an order for possession the Court is under a duty to satisfy itself as to the truth of the landlord's claim, if there is a dispute between the landlord and tenant. But if the tenant infact admits that the landlord is entitled to possession on one or other of the statutory grounds mentioned in the Act, it is open to the Court to act on that admission (sic) in favour of the landlord without further enquiry. A decision of the Supreme Court in Sudhir Kumar and Ors. v. Baldev Krishna Thapar and Ors., 1969 (3) SCC 611 was cited for the proposition that the compromise decree was not an executable decree, but some thing else. It was contended that the intention of the parties has to be ascertained as to know whether the compromise decree was a decree on a ground for eviction or was passed on some other arrangements between the parties. A decision of the Supreme Court in Rahnian Jeo Wangnoo v. Rani Chand and Others, AIR 1978 SC 413 was cited for the proposition that the statutory obligations of the Court have to be respected despite a consent decree between the parties. Sh. N.P. Gupta, learned counsel for the non-petitioner raised a preliminary objection that the impugned order was an appealable order and, therefore, no revision could be entertained against it. He further submitted that the consent decree made it clear that default was committed in payment of rent and the arrears of rent having been admitted, the default was, therefore, automatically proved. According to him no default can be found (sic) passed on one of the grounds of eviction mentioned in Section 13 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. A decision of the Supreme Court in Hiralal Moolchand Doshi v. Barot Raman Lal Ranchhoddas, JT 1993 (4) S.C. 97 was cited for the proposition that an admission by the tenant about the existence of a statutory ground, expressly or impliedly, will be sufficient and there need not be any evidence before the Court on the merits of the grounds before the compromise order is passed. If there is an admission of the tenant it will not be open to him to challenge its correctness as the admission made in judicial proceedings is absolutely binding on the parties. The learned counsel for the non petitioner also pointed out from the record of the execution case that the revision petitioner had obtained stay of his eviction on an undertaking to vacat the premises by a particular date. He could not, therefore, be allowed to challenge the decision. Reliance was pressed on decision of the Supreme Court in R.N. Gosain v. Yashpal Dhir, AIR 1993 SC 352 , that the law does not permit a person to both approbate and reprobate. No party can accept and reject the same instrument and that "a person cannot say at one time that a transaction is valid and thereby obtain some advantage, to which he could only be entitled on the footing that it is valid, and then turn round and say it is void for the purpose of securing some other advantage.
(3.) I have heard the learned counsel and perused the record. From the operative part of the decree, reproduced in the impugned order, it is clear that Rs. 1,12,000/- was admitted to be arrears of rent for the period April, 1987 to May, 1990. It could, therefore, be said that it was impliedly admitted that the tenant was in default of payment of rent. A decree on the ground of default in paying the rent was, therefore, perfectly valid and could not be assailed on the ground that the Court had not satisfied itself that a ground for eviction under the law existed. The controversy as regards the owner-ship of the property to be vested in the defendant-Judgment debtor, if amount as per the decree was paid, will have no effect on the dispute between the parties present. It is not for this Court to consider (sic) as to what would have happened if the Judgment-debtor had complied with or performed his part of the decree. As the amount as per the decree has not been paid by the tenant to the landlord, that contingency has to be ignored for the purpose of this case. The case of the decree holder is plain and simple that the decree has become executable against the Judgment-debtor because of his not having paid the amount mentioned in the decree in the stipulated time. The decree is, therefore, (sic) executable at the instance of the decree holder-landlord against the Judgment-debtor-tenant. The view taken by the Executing Court cannot be said to be without jurisdiction or perverse. The revision petition has no force, it is dismissed with costs. The Judgment-debtor shall vacate the premises within a month from (sic) shall pay to the non-petitioner a sum of Rs. 1000/- as costs of this revision. Revision rejected.;