DWARKA PRASAD GUPTA, J. - (1.) THESE three appeals have been filed against the judgment passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court on 30 -9 -1978 disposing of 4 writ petition filed by the appellant, Maharaja Gaj Singh of Jodhpur. As common questions of law have been raised in these three appeals, it would be proper to dispose them of by a common order.
(2.) THE undisputed facts are that the father of the appellant was the erstwhile Ruler of former State of Jodhpur. In the year 1949 the then Jodhpur State integrated with other princely States to form the United State of Rajasthan. At the time of merger of the former State of Jodhpur with the other States, a covenant was entered into by the father of the appellant as the Ruler of the covenating State and the Union of India, wherein amongst other things it was provided that the ex -Ruler shall be entitled to full ownership, use and enjoyment of all private properties belonging to him at the time of making over of the administration of the State to the Union. Some agricultural lands, besides other immovable and movable properties were included in the list of private properties agreed upon between the ex -Ruler and the Union Government. After the death of Maharaj Hanwant Singh, the appellant inherited the properties which were declared to be his private properties, including agricultural lands and continued to remain in possession of such lands as the landholder thereof. With a view to require the 2 lands held by the Ex -rulers by the former princely States, the Rajasthan Land Reform (Acquisition of Land Owners' Estate) Act, (here in after referred to as 'the Act') was enacted. Under Section 6(2) of the Act, khatedari rights were conferred on the Ex -rulers in respect of such lands which were in their personal cultivation on the date of vesting. On December 9, 1970 the Sub -divisional Officer, Jodhpur issued a notice under Rule 10 of the Rajasthan Tenancy (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Government Rules, 1963 (here in after called 'the Ceiling Rules') whereby the appellant was required to file a declaration in respect of lands in his possession within one month, for the purpose of determination of the ceiling limit applicable to the appellant and the land in excess of the ceiling area in his possession. Similar notices were issued to the appellant by the Sub -divisional Officers of Sojat and Pali Sub -divisions of Pali district in respect of the lands held by the appellant in those sub -divisions. The validity of the notices issued by the Sub -divisional Officers were challenged by the appellant in this Court by filing writ petitions. The learned Single Judge held that the lands belonging to the former Ruler of Jodhpur could be brought within the ambit of the provisions of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act only if the ex -Ruler could be treated as the holder of tenancy rights in respect of such lands as contemplated under the Tenancy Act and as khatedari rights were conferred on the appellant in respect of the lands under his personal cultivation with effect from September 1, 1964, as provided in Section 6(2) of the Act, the lands in possession of the appellant would fall within the ambit of the provisions of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act with effect from September 1, 1964. It was further held by him that the notices requiring the appellant to file the requisite declarations in respect of the lands held by him were valid, so far as they related to the lands in respect of which khatadari rights were conferred on him under Section 6(2) of the Act and that the appellant was bound to comply with the said notices. However, the learned Single Judge held that as khatedari rights were conferred on the appellant with effect from September 1, 1964 it could not be presumed that he was holding the lands in his possession as a tenant thereof with effect from February 25, 1959. In that view of the matter, the third paragraph of the notices was held by the learned Single Judge to be invalid and was quashed. The learned Single Judge also held that the offending parts of the impugned notices were severable from the rest of the contents of the said notices and as such the valid parts of the notices could stand separately even after the third paragraph of these notices was quashed.
(3.) IT was submitted by the learned Counsel for the appellant in these appeals that the learned Single Judge was not justified in holding that the third paragraph of the impugned notices was severable. According to the learned Counsel, the entire notices formed an integrated whole and as such the notices given by the Sub -divisional Officers sought to have been completely quashed and the remaining parts thereof, namely, the other two paragraphs could not have been held as valid even though the third paragraph of the notices was quashed by the learned Single Judge. Thus, the only argument which has been advanced in these appeals relate to the question of severability of the third paragraph of the impugned notices from the remaining two paragraphs.;