DWARKA PRASAD, Actg. C. J. - (1.) - In a suit for ejectment by a landlord on the ground inter-alia of defaults in the payment of rent, the trial court passed an order under sub-section (3) of Section ) 3 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') on April 26, 1977 determining the amount to be deposited by the tenant under the provisions of Section 13 (3) of the Act. The trial court had determined the rent upto March 31, 1977. The rent for the month of April, 1977 was to be paid by the tenant under the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act upto May 15, 1977, but the same was deposited in court on June 28. 1977. The landlord plaintiff, therefore, applied to be trial court for striking off the defence of tenant against eviction. The trial court dismissed the application, while the first appellate court allowed the plaintiff's appeal vide its order dated November 29, 1982 and directed that the defence of the defendant-tenant against eviction be struck off.
(2.) IN this revision petition two arguments have been advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner. His first submission is that after the order under Section 13 (3) of the Act was passed by the trial court on April 26, 1977, the tenant filed an appeal on the ground that rent for the month of January, i 972 should also have been included in the determination made under Section 13 (3) of the Act while determination had been made in respect of rent from February 1, 1972 upto March 31, 1977 by the trial court. The appeal filed by the tenant was allowed on October 28, 1978 and he was allowed to deposit rent for the month of January, 1972 together with interest thereon. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the order passed by the trial court under Sect ion 13 (3) of the Act stood modified by the order passed by the appellate court on October 28, 1978 and as such even if a default was made in depositing the rent for the month of April, 1977, the same could have been deposited by the tenant upto November 13, 1978 when the period of 15 days from the date of the appellate order expired. This argument prevailed with the trial court, but the appellate court did not accept the same. The second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the court could extend the period of payment of rent for the month of April, 1977 by such further time not exceeding 15 days as providing in sub section (4) of Section 13 of the Act and as the trial court was closed for summer vacation from May 29, 1977 to June 26, 1977 and the tenant had submitted the tender for payment of rent on the opening day in the trial Court i. e. on June 27, 1977, the rent was actually deposited on June 28, 1977 on the basis of the tender filed on June 27, 1977. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that if the trial court would have exercised discretion vested in it under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act in a judicious manner, the rent for the month of April, 1977 should be deemed to have been deposited within time, if the period of payment for making requisite deposit be extended by a period of 15 days, which was permissible under Sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act. As regards the first contention learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay vs. M/s. Amritlal Bhogilal and Co. (1 ). It was held in that case that if an appeal is provided against an order passed by a tribunal, the decision of the appellate authority in the operative decision in law. If the appellate authority modifies or reverses the decision of the tribunal, it is obvious that it is the appellate decision that is effective and can be enforced. It was also observed that as a result of the confirmation or affirmance of the decision of the tribunal by the appellate authority the original decision merges in the appellate decision and it is the appellate decision alone which subsists and is operative and capable of enforcement. However, the aforesaid decision was explained by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in their subsequent decision in State of Madras vs. Madurai Mills Co. Ltd. (2), where in it was observed as under :- "but the doctrine of merger is not a doctrine of rigid and universal application and it cannot be said that where ever there are two orders, one by the inferior Tribunal and the other by a superior Tribunal, passed in an appeal or revision, there is a fusion or merger of two orders irrespective of the subject matter of the appellate or revisional order and the scope of the appeal or the revision contemplated by the particular statute. In our opinion, the application of the doctrine depends on the nature of the appellate or revisional order in each case and the scope of the statutory provisions conferring the appellate or revisional jurisdiction. " In the present case the appeal was filed by the tenant-defendant and the appellate order only modified the order passed by the trial court dated April 26, 1977 in respect of rent for the month of January, 1972 and interest thereon. As such looking to the nature of the appellate order dated October 28, 1978 and the subject-matter thereof, it cannot be said that the order of the trial court dated April 26, 1977 was not operative during the period subsequent thereto, merely because an appeal has been preferred by the defendant-tenant. The appellate court had modified the order passed by the trial court only in respect of the rent for the month of January, 1922 and in other respects the order passed by the trial court was not disturbed nor it was sought to be disturbed. In this view of the matter, the first contention advanced by the learned counsel cannot be accepted and the defendant-tenant was bound to deposit rent for the month of April, 1977 in accordance with the provisions of Section 13 (4) of the Act by the 15th of the next succeeding month or within such time not exceeding 15 days, as may be extended by the Court. As regards the other submission advanced by the learned counsel the two courts below have decided the question of extension of time for depositing the rent for the month of April, 1977 on the ground that existence of sufficient cause was necessary to be proved by the tenant before the court could exercise its discretion in favour of the tenant for extending the period prescribed in subsection (4) of Section 13 of the Act, it may be pointed out that undoubtedly the Court has a discretion in the matter of extension of time and the discretion has to be exercised judicially. But the provisions of Section 13 (4) of the Act are not para-materia with the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act and the existence of sufficient cause need not be proved to the hilt. Sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act reads as under:- "13. Eviction of tenants - (4) The tenant shall deposit in court or pay to the landlord the amount determined by the court under Sub-section (3) within fifteen days from the date of such determination, or within such further time, not exceeding three months, as may be extended by the court. The tenant shall also continue to deposit in court or pay to the landlord, month by month the monthly rent subsequent to the period upto which determination has been made, by the fifteenth of each succeeding month or within such further time, not exceeding fifteen days, as may be extended by the court, at the monthly rate at which the rent was determined by the court under sub-section (3 ). " In Dwarka Das Vs. Smt. Dropadi (3) the learned Judge of this court pointed out that the omission of the expression 'sufficient cause' in sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act is significant, as the legislative intent was that the power of extension vested in the court under Section 13 (4) of the Act should be exercised liberally, if the tenant on account of forget fulness or for any other reason was unable to make payment of rent or make a deposit thereof by the 15th of the next succeeding month.
(3.) IN Lalchand Vs. Santram 4) it was held that the court has complete discretion in the matter of extension of time for depositing or making payment of monthly rent during the pendency of the suit. Similarly in Jagannath Vs. Jodharam (5) the learned Judge of this court observed that while exercising discretion under Section 13 (4) of the Act the court should not be conservative and strict and unless exceptional reasons warranted, generally the court should allow maximum time by extending it on the slightest bonafide ground. Similar observations were made in Ramkishore Vs. Roopesh Kumar (6), wherein it was held that beneficial provisions contained in Section 13 (4) of the Act should be construed in favour of the tenant as that provision is beneficial legislation for a tenant. ;