ASHOK KUMAR MATHUR, J. - (1.) IN this bunch of writ petitions, similar question of law is involved, therefore, they are disposed of by one single order. The list of the cases disposed of is annexed in the schedule.
(2.) FOR convenience of disposal of these writ petitions, the facts of one case are taken up, Petitioner in this case was appointed as Gram Sewak by order dated 24 -11 -1979 Ann. 1 in the pay scale of Rs. 295 -8 -335 -10 -395 -15 -500. Initially the appointment of the petitioner was for a period of three months and thereafter it was extended from time to time, It is alleged that the extension was given to the petitioner with the concurrence of the Selection Commission constituted under Section 86(6) of the Rajasthan Panchayat Samitis and Zila Parishads Act. But the services of the petitioner came to be terminated by the order dated 17 -1 -1983 Ann. 3. The contention of the petitioner is that the Panchayat Samiti is an industry, therefore, before terminating the petitioner's services, compliance of Section 25F of the Industrial Dispute Act (here in after referred to as the Act) is mandatory and the same has not been done in this case and, therefore, the order of termination is liable to be set aside. The respondent has filed a reply and has stated that the Panchayat Samiti is not an industry, therefore, Section 25F of the Act is not applicable to this case. Learned counsel for the petitioner has cited before me an identical case S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 270/83 Shantilal v. State of Rajasthan and Ors. decided by Hon'ble Jain, J. on January 9, 1985, in which this Court held that Panchayat Samiti is an Industry and for non -compliance of Section 25F(a)&(b) of the Act the order is bad and the same has been quashed. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that the Division Bench of this Court in D.B. Special Appeal No. 2/75 Panchayat Samiti Kotdi v. Bheroolal decided on 5 -9 -1984 has held that the Panchayat Samiti is an industry. Learned counsel has further cited before me the decision of this Court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 536/83 Devaram and Ors. v. State decined by Hon'ble Sharma, J. on 28 -7 -1985 and it was held that the termination in similar matters has been held to be bad and number of writ petitions were allowed by this single order.
(3.) MR . Maheshwari, Additional Government Advocate has invited my attention to Director Postal Services (South) Kerala v. K.R.B. Kaimal 1984 Lab. and Ind. Cases 28 State of Punjab v. Shri Kuldip Singh 1983 Lab. and Ind. Case 83 Bijoy Kumar v. State of Bihar 1983 Lab. and Ind. Cases 198 and contended that since there are service rules governing the appointment of these persons, therefore, these services rules would govern them rather than Section 25F of the Act. I am afraid this contention is not open in view of Section 25J of the Act. Section 25J of the Act reads as under: 25J. Effect of laws inconsistent with this chapter - -(1) The provisions of this chapter shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law (including Standing Orders) made under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946; Provided that where under the provisions of any other Act or rules orders or notifications issued thereunder or under any standing orders or under any award, contract of service or otherwise, a workman is entitled to benefit in respect any matter which are more favourable to him than those to which he would be entitled under this Act, the Workman shall continue to be entitled to the more favourable benefits in respect of that matter, not with standing that he receives benefits in respect of other matters under this Act; (2) For the removal of doubts, it is here by declared that nothing contained in this Chapter shall be deemed to effect the provisions of any other law for the time being in force in any settlement of industrial dispute but the rights and liabilities of employers and workmen in so far as they relate to lay -off and retrenchment shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter. A perusal of Section 25J would show that it starts with non -obstante clause, it clearly says that any other rules or provisions contrary to this shall not be applicable. I had an occasion to go through all the cases cited by the Additional Government Advocate but in view of the direct mandate of Section 25J, I am unable to agree with the learned Additional Govt. Advocate that the service rules would govern service condition of petitioner and not the Act. Therefore, this contention is over ruled.;