- (1.) THIS revision application is directed against the order dated 28-5-74 of the Additional District Judge, Churu, confirming in appeal the order of the Munsif, Ratangarh, dated 17-5-73 striking out the defence of the petitioner against eviction under sec. 13 (6) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' ).
(2.) HARIBUX Non-petitioner instituted a suit for ejectment and for arrears of rent on 25-1-72 in the Court of Munsif, Ratangarh against Hiralal tenant and Roopsingh defendant No. 2 as surety. The eviction was sought inter alia on the ground of default under sec. 13 (1) (a) of the Act. On the first date of hearing the petitioner defendant asked for sometime to deposit the arrears of rent. The learned Munsif by his order dated 21-3-72 allowed him time to deposit Rs. 1383. 90 paise on or before 22-4-72. He also directed him to deposit rent for the subsequent months from 22 4 72 onwards within 15 days of each month. The defendant paid in the Court Rs. 1100/-on 22-4 72. For the balance of Rs. 283. 90 paise he again prayed for time and the learned Judge allowed him one months time. Within that time the said balance was paid. No dispute has been raised with respect of these payments. According to the plaintiff the rent for subsequent months was not paid in time. It was neither deposited in accordance with the requirement of section 13 (4) nor in terms of the order passed by the learned Munsif. It is admitted between the parties that the month of tenancy started from Shukla 9 of every Hindi month. The controversy that had arisen is with regard to the payments for the months Baisakh Shukla 9 (corresponding to 22-4-72} to Sravan Shukla 8 (corresponding to 18 7 72 ). The tenant deposited Rs. 120/- by tender No. 47 on 12-7-72 for the period 22-5-72 to 21-7-72. No payment appears to have been made for the month Baisakh Shukla 9 to Jeth Shukla 7, that is, 22-4-72 to 20 5-72. On 21-7-72 the plaintiff submitted an application that the rent has not been paid in accordance with sec. 13 (4) of Act and as such the defence against eviction be struck out. On 21 8-72 the defendant submitted an application, that on 22-6-72 the sent the amount of rent by money order but it was not accepted. The Courts were closed in June, 1972. Though the Courts re opened after the summer break on 2-7-72 but then he fell sick and as such he could not deposit the amount on 2-7 72 and could get the rent of two months deposited on 12-7-72. He prayed that in the circumstances of the case the delay be condoned. It was then found that the rent for the period 22-4-72 to 20-5-72 was not deposited at all. The defendant then made an application on 16 12 72 that the sum of Rs. 120/- deposited by him by tender No. 47 dated 12 7-72 should be treated to have been for the period from 22-4 72 to 19-6 72 by another tender No. 74 on 7 8 72 the amount of Rs. 60/- was found to have been deposited from Asadh Sukhla 9 to Sravan Sukhla 8. The learned Munsif found that the defendant had not deposited the amount of rent according to the requirement of sec. 13 (4) of the Act. He, therefore, struck out the defence against eviction. The matter was taken up in appeal and the learned lower appellate Court elaborately discussed the law and held that it was not within the power of the Munsif to extend time. He found that the defence was rightly struck out under sec. 13 (6) of the Act. Learned counsel for the petitioner, while conceding that there has been a delay in making deposit, has strenuously urged that sec. 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to the provisions of this Act. He placed reliance on sec. 29 (2) of the Act. There is no manner of doubt that the provisions of sec. 5 were applicable to the matter relating to appeal and revision. But the contention that it applies to the matter relating to deposits under section 13 (4) is, in my opinion, fallacious. Under sec. 13 (1) no decree can be passed against a tenant so long he is ready and willing to pay the rent. There are certain exceptions contained in certain clauses of sec. 13 (1 ). If the Court is satisfied on one of the grounds then the landlord can seek eviction of the tenant. Sec. 13 (l) (a) deals with the default on the part of the tenant. If the tenant has not paid or tendered rent for a period of six months he is liable to be evicted. If the Court is satisfied a decree can be passed against him. Sec. 13 (4) is again a protection to a tenant. If a landlord files a suit for eviction of tenant on the ground of default as envisaged under section 13 (l) (a), the legislature gives an additional opportunity to the tenant to deposit arrears of rent with interest on the first date of hearing He is also required to deposit rent for the subsequent months within 15 days of each month. Thus sec. 13 (4) is an additional benefit to the tenant. If a tenant wants to avail protection he must deposit the rent strictly in accordance with the provisions of sec. 13 (4 ). It is not a matter where the benefit can be extended for any reason howsoever good it might be. In my opinion sec. 13 (4) does not contemplate extension of time by the Court. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on Mrs. Gouri Bose vs. Sukumar Ghose (l) and Sikharani Debi vs. Nibaran Kumar Das (2 ). Suffice it to say the Calcutta decisions have no application to the case on hand. The law in Calcutta empowers the Court to extend time. Sec. 17 (2) A and (2)B are reproduced below : " (2a) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (i) of sub-section (2), on the application of the tenant, the Court may, by order. (a) extend time specified in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) for the deposit or payment of any amount referred to therein; (b ). . . . . . . . . (2b) No application for extension of time for the deposit or payment of any amount under clause (a) of sub-section (2a) shall be entertained unless it is made before the expiry of the time specified therefore in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2 ). . . . . . . . . . . . " The language of sub-sec. (2a) and (2b) is quite simple and there is no ambiguity in it. On an application being made by the tenant the Court may extend time. The Calcutta decisions further say that it should be given for good reasons as envisaged by sec. 5 of the Limitation Act. On the other hand Mr. Bapna for the Non-petitioner placed reliance on Messrs. Janta Cycle and Motor Mart, Kanpur vs. Asstt. Commissioner (J) III Sales Tax Kanpur Range, Kanpur (3 ). It is sales-tax case decided by the full bench of the Allahabad High Court. In that case the tax was not deposited in time and for the delayed deposit an application was made to condone the delay under sec. 5 of the Limitation Act. Oak C. J. observed as follows : "under this provision, delay may be condoned if a party makes delay in filing an appeal or moving an application. But no such situation arose in the present case. The petitioner made delay in depositing the admitted tax. The appeal itself was filed within time. The Assistant Commissioner rightly held that there was no room to give the appellant the benefit of Section 5. Indian Limitation Act. " Again Pathak J. observed - "the petitioner urges that the Assistant Commissioner (Judicial) should have considered his application for condonation of delay in depositing the balance of the admitted tax. The application was made under sec. 5 of the Limitation Act read with sec 9 (6) of the U. P. Sales Tax Act. Sec. 9 (6) provides: "sec. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908; shall apply to appeals under Act. " and Sec. 5 reads : "any appeal or application. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . to which this section may be made applicable by or under any enactment for the time being in force may be admitted after the period of limitation prescribed therefor, when the appellant or applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. " Sec 5 provides for condoning the delay in filing an appeal or application. Sec. 9 (6), U. P. Sales Tax Act, applies sec. 5 to appeals. Sec. 5 is not attracted when the question arises whether the delay in depositing the admitted tax should be condoned. It seems to me that the application made by the petitioner for condonation of the delay in depositing the entire amount of the admitted tax is not maintainable under sec. 5 of the Limitation Act read with sec. 9 (6) of the U. P. Sales Tax Act. " Reliance has also been placed on Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co , Ltd. vs. Hem Chand (4 ). Their Lordships observed : "if the landlord fulfills the conditions mentioned in clause (a) of the proviso to sub-sec. (1) of sec. 14 and the tenant also makes a default in deposit or payment under sec. 15 the Controller is bound to pass an order, for recovery of possession and cannot refuse the landlord's prayer for eviction. The default under sub sec, (2) of sec. 14 thus vests an indefeasible right in the landlord and is not merely procedural. " Their Lordships were of the opinion that the condonation of delay will have the effect of condoning the default of the tenant. That apart, it was also held that the Rent Controller has no inherent power and no jurisdiction to condone the delay in deposit of the amount directed to be paid or deposited under sec. 15 so as to wipe off the default that has occurred. I respectfully agree with this view.
(3.) I accordingly hold that the petitioner had not deposited the amount of rent as required by sec. 13 (4) of the Act. His defence against eviction has been rightly struck out by the Munsif and upheld by the lower Appellate Court. I find no force in this revision application and it is hereby dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. .;