- (1.) AS a similar preliminary objection has been raised on behalf of the State in these two special appeals, it is proposed to dispose of the same by this common order.
(2.) IT has been contended an behalf of the State that the special appeals are not maintainable against the revisional orders under the Sales Tax Act. IT has been argued that the proviso governing sec. 10 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act is subject to the clause ''except as otherwise provided by or under this Act or by any other law or enactment for the time being in force in the whole or any part of Rajasthan and subject to any rules made in that behalf. " In this connection, attention has been invited to secs. 13, 14 and 19 of the Sales Tax Act. IT has been contended that under sec. 13 (4) of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, every order passed in appeal is final, subject to the powers of reivision conferred by sec. 14 and of any reference made to the High Court under sec. 15. Sec. 14 provides that the Board of Revenue may on being moved by the assessing authority, call for and examine the record of any proceedings under this Act and if it considers that any order is illegal or erroneous, it may pass such order as it thinks fit. IT further provides that the Board of Revenue may, on application for revision of an order by a dealer, under this Act, made within six months of the date of the order, call for the record of the proceedings in which the order complained against was passed and after examining the record, subject to the provisions of this Act pass such order not prejudicial to the assessee, as it thinks fit. Sec. 19 Jays down that "save as is provided in sec. 14, no assessment made and no order passed under this Act or the Rules made thereunder by the assessing authority, appellate authority or the Board of Revenue shall be called into question in any Court, and save as is provided in secs. 13 and 14, no appeal or application for revision shall lie against any such assessment order. " It has been contended that the intendment of the legislature was to exclude the jurisdiction of Civil Courts as well as further special appeals when it was laid down that no assessment made by the assessing authority, appellate authority or the Board of Revenue shall be called in question in any Court save as is provided in sec. 14. The argument is that the clause, "no appeal or application for revision shall lie against any such assessment order" save as is provided under secs. 13 and 14, takes away the power of appeal or revision except in the limited manner laid down in the aforesaid two sections. In support of this contention, reliance was placed on Karim-miya Hamdumiya Soniwal Vs. Jafarali Bawamiya and others (AIR 29) 1942, Bombay 279), wherein a finding recorded under sec. 60 of the Mussalman Wakf Act being final for the purposes of the Act it was held that no appeal lay from a decision of the District Court, on an enquiry under sec. 6-C. It was argued that the right of appeal is a creation of statute and it is to the statute alone that court must look to determine whether such a right exists or not and that there is nothing wrong if the right of appeal to the highest tribunal in the State is circumscribed by certain well defined restrictions as was held in Kishenalal etc. Vs. Sohanlal ( AIR 1954 Raj. 138, Full Bench ). To support this contention, attention was invited to sec. 15 Sales Tax Act which is almost parallel to sec. 12 of the Land Revenue Act and it was asserted that a reference made to the High Court under sec. 12 of the Land Revenue Act in respect of a matter falling under the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act would not be maintainable as there exists a special provision in this regard under sec. 15 of the Sales Tax Act. From this premise, it was contended that a special appeal against an order in revision passed under sec. 14 of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, was not maintainable, as there was no such provision under the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, and sec. 19 of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act definitely barred any further appeal against an order made in revision under sec. 14. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, drew our attention to Bachan Singh Vs. Bheru (RRD 1963 page 135) and argued that sec. 222 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act was pari materia with sec. 19 of the Sales Tax Act. It lays down that no appeal shall lie from any decree or order passed by any revenue court except as provided in this Act. It was urged that the provisions relating to appeals under the Rajasthan Tenancy Act were laid down in sec. 223, 224 and 225 and no special appeal was provided in the Tenancy Act as was the case in the Sales Tax Act. But it did not mean that it would take away the right of a party to make a special appeal against the decision of a single Member, to a Bench consisting of two and more Members, as provided under sec. 10 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act. We are inclined to agree with this view. As was held in RRD 1963 page 135 referred to above, sec. 222 and subsequent secs. 223, 224, 225 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act do not deal with the manner in which the highest revenue Court, viz. the Board of Revenue, is to exercise its appellate or revisional jurisdiction. That matter has been dealt in sec. 10 (1) of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act and the Rules framed thereunder, which provide that unless there is a special provision in special enactment, an appeal will be available from a single bench to a larger bench. The Tenancy Act under which the proceedings arose in that case does not prohibit such a special appeal and, in fact, does not deal with the matter at all. The same is the case with the Sales Tax Act. It does not prohibit such special appeals and, in fact, it does not deal with the matter at all. The special appeal provided for u/s. 10 is, in fact, a continuation of the process of the disposal of a revision by a single Member of the Board of Revenue. It circumscribes the revisional authority of the Board of Revenue to the extent laid down therein. It is well settled that in interpreting a statute, the courts must not add anything which is not in the statute itself nor subtract something which is found therein and they must place due meaning upon every word thereof without straining the language in any way. Examined in this perspective, the clause, "except as otherwise provided by or under this Act or by any other law or enactment for the time being in force in the whole or a part of Rajasthan and subject to any rules made in that behalf " would, obviously mean that unless there is a specific provision to the contrary, the jurisdiction of the Board shall be exercised in the manner laid down in sec. 10 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act. The implication of the proviso which is appended to sec. 10 (1) of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act is that the Board has not exhausted its revisional remedies until a special appeal has been heard. It cannot, however, be denied that the provisions of sec. 10 (1) of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act are subject to the provisions not only of this Act, but of any other Act in force for the time being as well as the rules made in that behalf. But unless there is a specific provision of law impinging on sec. 10 (1), the provisions of this section will continue to govern the manner in which the jurisdiction vested in the Board has to be exercised. It clearly lays down that the jurisdiction vested in the Board under any law may be exercised by the Chairman or a single member or a Bench of the Board, consisting of two or more Members, and, that, in case the jurisdiction has been exercised by only one Member, the aggrieved party can invoke the powers of a Bench consisting of more than one Member to seek redress by way of special appeal against such an order. It may, however, be observed that the appellate power invoked to be exercised under this provision is not by way of an appeal under the provisions of the Sales Tax Act nor is it in any in conflict with the provisions laid down therein, but it is only an appeal, to examine whether the learned Member sitting singly has exercised the jurisdiction of revision vested in the Board, properly or not. Our attention was also drawn to M/s Madho Behari, Mohan Behari vs. State Of Rajasthan - (F. B.) cited as 1963 RRD 318 and it was urged that this reference was heard by a Full Bench of the Board of Revenue, on receipt from a D. B. consisting of two learned Members of the Board of Revenue, despite the fact that there is no such specific provision under the Sales Tax Act for a reference being made by a D. B. of the Board of Revenue to a Full Bench. It was argued that this reference was entertained by the Full Bench under sec. 11 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act which empowers the Chairman or any other Member of the Board sitting singly for the disposal of any case or proceedings to refer any question of law or custom having the force of law or of the construction of any document arising before him in such case or proceeding for the opinion of a Bench. It was averred that although sec. 11 empowers only the Chairman or any other Member of the Board, in the case cited above, a reference made by a D. B. was duly entertained. This would go to show that where there is no specific bar against the exercise of powers by the Members of the Board of Revenue in the Manner laid down in the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, their jurisdiction is to be governed by the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act and the rules made thereunder. The result of the foregoing discussion is that we find the preliminary objection to be untenable and direct that the special appeals may now be heard on merits. .;