- (1.) THIS is a writ application under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.
(2.) THE Facts giving rise to it are as follows: Non-petitioners Nos. 1 to 3 Surta, Misru and Jetia filed an application under sec. 6 of the Rajasthan Relief of Agricultural Indebtedness Act, 1957 which will hereinafter be referred to as the 'act', in the Debt Relief Court, Sojat (Civil Judge, Sojat ). THE present petitioners who were shown as creditors, submitted their claim for Rs. 2287/7 -. THE Debt Relief Court allowed their claim for Rs. 1020. 59 N. P. only and rejected it for the remaining amount. Aggrieved by that order dated 17th March, 1960, the petitioners submitted a revision petition under sec. 17 of the Act before the District Judge, Pali (non-petitioner No. 5 ). THE learned District Judge rejected the revision application on the 22nd July, 1961 on the ground that it was time-barred. The petitioners contention is that the learned District Judge had wrongly refused to exercise his jurisdiction in not deciding the revision application on merits and that he had also committed an error, which is apparent on the face of the record, in dismissing the revision application as time-barred. It is pointed out that the petitioners had submitted an application for obtaining the copy of the judgment of the Debt Relief Court on the very day, i. e. 17th March, 1960 on which it was pronounced. The requisite copy was given to the petitioners on 14th May, 1960. The revision application was presented on 28th July, 1960. Thus, the revision application was presented after 133 days from the date of the impugned judgment, but the court had taken 58 days in supplying the copy of the judgment to the petitioners. The petitioners were entitled to deduction of this period of 58 days under sec. 12 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. If that period is deducted, the revision application was presented within 75 days. The period prescribed by sec. 17 of the Act for filing the revision application was 90 days and thus the revision was well within time. It is urged that the petitioners had argued before the learned District Judge that the time requisite for obtaining the copy of the judgment should be excluded in computing the period of limitation prescribed for the revision application but this argument was summarily rejected and even the authorities cited by the petitioners in support of their contention were not looked into. It is, therefore, prayed that the judgment of the District Judge, Pali dismissing the revision application as time barred should be set aside and that court should be directed to readmit the revision application and decide it on merits. The writ application is not contested on behalf of the respondents Nos. 4 and 5, i. e. , the Debt Relief Court and the District Judge. On behalf of the non-petitioners Nos. 1 and 3, it is urged by their learned counsel that sec. 12 of the Limitation Act could not be invoked by the petitioners, because no period for filing the revision application was prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act. It may be observed that this argument is not tenable in view of the pronouncement of their lordships of the Supreme Court in Vidyacharan Shukla vs. Khubchand Saghel (1 ). In that case, their lordships had occasion to consider sec. 29 (2) of the Indian Limitation Act, which runs as follows: "sec. 29 (2) - Where any special or local or law prescribes for any suit, limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the first schedule, the provisions of sec 3 shall apply, as if such period were prescribed therefor in that schedule, and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law - (a) the provision contained in sec. 4 sec. 9 to 18, and sec. 22 shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law, and (b) the remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply. " A question arose before their lordships whether sec. 29 (2) of the Limitation Act would apply only when a period of limitation is prescribed under the Limitation Act and a different period of limitation is prescribed in some other Act or whether it would also apply when no period of limitation is prescribed under the Indian Limitation Act, that is when the Limitation Act is silent about the period of limitation specific period of limitation is prescribed under the special Act. It was held that "sec. 29 (2) would apply even to a case where a difference between the special law and Limitation Act arose by the omission to provide for a limitation to a particular proceeding under the Limitation Act. " The question raised by the learned counsel for the non-petitioners, thus stands concluded by the observations of their lordships of the Supreme Court in the said case. It is true that no period of limitation for a revision under the Rajasthan Relief of Agricultural Indebtedness Act No. 28 of 1957 is prescribed by the Limitation Act and 90 days period of limitation is prescribed only by sec, 17 of the Act, by virtue of sec. 29 (2) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, the provisions of sec. 12 of the Indian Limitation Act would be attracted. It was conceded by the learned counsel for the non-petitioners that the first argument advanced by him would no longer be tenable in view of the pronouncement of their lordships of the Supreme Court in Vidyacharan Shukla's case (1 ). It was, however, urged by him that sec. 12 (2) of the Indian Limitation Act could not apply in terms, since it applies only to an appeal, an application for a review of judgment, but not to a revision application. With regard to this argument, it may be pointed out that in Nagendra Nath Dey vs. Sureschandra Dey (2), it was observed by their lordships of the Privy Council as follows: "there is no definition of appeal in the Civil Procedure Code, but there is no doubt that any application by a party to an appellate court, asking it to set aside or revise a decision of a subordinate court, is an appeal within the ordinary acceptation of the term, and that it is no less an appeal because it is irregular or incompetent. " The real question which arises for our determination in the present case is, whether the term 'revision' used by the legislature in sec. 17 of the Act was meant to convey the kind of revision-application which is contemplated by sec. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code or it was used in the sense of an appeal. In order to appreciate this question it would be proper to reproduce sec. 17 of the Act. It runs as follows - "sec. 17 - Revision of order of Debt Relief Courts - Any person aggrieved by an order of a Debt Relief Court may within ninety days of such order, apply to the District Court for revision of the order on any of the following grounds - (a) that the order is contrary to law; (b) That the court has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by Haw or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it by law; (c) that the instalments fixed under sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 11 are inequitable; but subject to the orders of the District Court on such application and further subject to the provisions of sec. 18, the order of the Debt Relief Court shall be final. Explanation - For the purposes of this section, and Secs. 18, 18-A and 19, the District Court shall be deemed to be the Court of the District Judge within whose civil jurisdiction the Debt Relief Court is situate. " It would also be proper to reproduce here sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure in order to understand the difference between the two. It runs as follows : "sec. 115 - Revision. The High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate Court appears; (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit. " A mere glance at the two sections would show that while under sec. 115 C. P. C. a discretionary power has been given to the High Court to call for the record of any case decided by any court subordinate to it, in which no appeal lies thereto, and if it appears to the High Court that the subordinate court has exercised jurisdiction not vested in it by law or has failed to exercise jurisdiction so vested or has acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity it may make such order in the case as it thinks fit, sec. 17 of the Act gives a right to the party to file an application for the revision of the order whereby it feels aggrieved. In other words, it is not merely a discretionary power of the District Court to interfere in revision analogous to the powers given to the High Court under sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but a definite right has been given by the legislature to the aggrieved party to file a revision application either on the ground that the impugned order is contrary to law or that the court below has exercised the jurisdiction not vested in it by law or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it by law. It is note-worthy that while the provisions of clauses (a) and (b) of sec. 17 of the Act are very similar to the provisions of sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the legislature has made a clear departure in providing clause (c) under which a revisio-nal court can interfere if the instalments fixed by the court under sub-sec. (3) of sec. 11 of the Act are inequitable. It may be pointed out here that under sec. 11, sub-sec. (3) of the Act, if it is found by the Debt Relief Court that the debts as determined under sec. 10 of the Act are not found to have been satisfied, it should fix instalments for the re-payment of the remaining debts in such manner as may be prescribed and may in case of default, order payment of simple interest at a rate not exceeding four per cent if the debt is unsecured and three percent if it is secured. The manner in which the instalments are to be fixed is prescribed by the Rules. So it is laid down under sec. 17 of the Act that if the District Court finds that the instalments fixed under sub-sec. (3) of sec. 11 are inequitable, it may interfere in the matter. It is common ground between the parties that while entering into the question regarding the fixation of instalments, the revisional court will have to enter into the questions of fact also. It is, therefore, clear that the so called revisionary powers given to a District Court under sec. 17 of the Act are not merely revisionary powers, but they also include powers given to an appellate court to a limited extent. In our opinion this revision would, therefore, be covered by Sec. 12 of the Indian Limitation Act. In Standard Type Foundary vs. Chebolu Venkataramaniah (3), it was observed in very similar circumstances as follows: "it is difficult to say that the remedy by way of revision is essentially different from the remedy by way of appeal, though in the former case, the grounds of interference may be less vide. " It was further observed that: "sec. 12 (2) of the Limitation Act is applicable even to a case where the appeal of application need not be accompanied by a copy of the decree objected to. " It is obvious that these observations lend support to the view which we have expressed above. We are of opinion that the District Court committed an error in dismissing petitioners' revision application as time-barred and not excluding 58 days which were admittedly taken by the petitioners obtaining the copy of the order whereby they felt aggrieved. The writ application is, therefore, allowed and the order of the District Judge, Pali, dated 22nd July, 1961, is hereby quashed. The file may be sent back to that court with direction to re-admit the revision application and decide it afresh on merits. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs. .;