- (1.) THE following reference has been made to us by one of our colleagues sitting singly - "whether the revision application in sales tax cases which were started prior to the coming into force of the Amendment Act No. 9 of 1965 should continue to be heard and disposed of by a Bench of the Board composed of a Single Member?"
(2.) UNDER sec. 14 of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954, (Act No. 29 of 1954) as originally enacted, the power of revision in sales tax cases vested in the Commissioner. However, sec. 14 of the Act was amended by Act 37 of 1960 so as to substitute the Board of Revenue for the Commissioner. This amendment came into force on 24. 10. 1960, and since then revisions in sales tax cases are being heard by the Board of Revenue. The manner of exercise of its revisional jurisdiction in sales tax cases was not laid down in the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954, and the Board followed the same procedure in such cases as has been laid down in revenue matters under the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 and the rules made thereunder. Sec. 10 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, provides as follows - "10. Jurisdiction of the Board how exercised - (1) Except as otherwise provided by or under this Act or by any other law or enactment for the time being in force in the whole or any part of the State and subject to any rules made in the behalf, the jurisdiction of the Board may be exercised - (a) by the Chairman or any other member of the Board, sitting singly, or (b) by a Bench of the Board, consisting of two or more members. Provided that a party aggrieved by a decision of a Single Member shall have the right to make a special appeal to a bench consisting of two or more members of the Board within one month from the date of the decision of single member. (2) Subject to any rules made in that behalf, the Chairman may distribute the business of the Board and make such territorial or other divisions of its jurisdiction as he may deem fit. (3) Every order made or act done under sub-sec. (1) or in accordance with the distribution or division made under sub-sec. (2), shall be deemed to be the order or act, as the case may be, of the Board. " Rules 8 and 9 of the Rajasthan Revenue Courts Manual Part I prescribe the type of cases which may be heard and disposed of by a Member sitting singly and by a Division Bench. These two rules as they stood before the 20th June, 1963 are reproduced below - "8. Class of cases heard by a Member sitting singly - The following class of cases may he heard and disposed of by a member sitting singly - (i) Miscellaneous applications; (ii) Applications for setting aside an order of dismissal for default by the Board or an ex parte decision given by the Board, (iii) Applications for review of the orders and judgment passed by a single member of the Board, (iv) references, (v) Applications for transfer of cases. 9. Class of cases heard by a Division Bench - -The following class of cases shall be heard and disposed of by a Division Bench - (i) All decrees or orders coming under the consideration of the Board on appeal; (ii) Revisions when the lower Court's decree or order is to be modified or reversed; With effect from the 20th June, 1963, Rules 8 and 9 were amended so as to bring revisions within the jurisdiction of a member sitting singly. As a result, revisions in sales tax cases have been heard by members sitting singly since 20th June, 1963. The Rajasthan Taxation Laws (Amendment) Bill, 1965 was published in the Rajasthan Gazette on the 25th March, 1965. Clause 9 of this Bill ran as follows : "9. Amendment of sec. 14 Rajasthan Act 29 of 1955. In sec. 14 of the Sales Tax Act: (d) After sub-sec. (2), the following new sub-sections shall be added, namely: (3) Any member of the Board of Revenue sitting alone shall have the power to hear and dispose of an application for revision under this section, and his order in such cases shall, subject to the provisions of section 15, be final and no appeal shall lie therefrom to any other bench of the Board of Revenue notwithstanding anything contained in sec. 10 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 (Rajasthan Act 15 of 1956 ). (4) No order under this section shall be passed without giving the dealer as also the authority whose order is sought to be revised or their representatives, a reasonable opportunity of being heard. " The Bill manifested the intention to make specific provision for the manner of exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the Board of Revenue in sales tax cases as distinguished from cases falling under the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956. The intention was that sales tax cases should be heard by Members of the Board sitting singly whose decision should be final. However, the law as actually enacted on 27. 4. 1965 was radically different as would appear from sec. 9 of Rajasthan Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1965 (Act 9 of 1965): "amendment of sec. 14, Rajasthan Act 29 of 1965 - In sec. 14 of the Sales Tax Act: (d) after sub-sec. (2), the following new sub-sections shall be added, namely: (3) Where an application for revision has been made under sub-sec. (1) or sub-sec. (2), it shall be heard and disposed of by a bench of not less than two members of the Board of Revenue. (4) Where such members are equally divided in opinion as to the order to be made in such a case, the case shall be referred to another member and decided in accordance with the opinion of the majority of the members including such other member who heard it. " The question that arises is whether in case in which the lis commenced before the 27th day of April, 1965, the revisional jurisdiction of the Board should be exercised in the manner laid down in sec. 10 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956, read with Rules 8 and 9 of the Rajasthan Revenue Courts Manual part I, or whether all applications for revision pending in the Board of Revenue on 27. 4. 1965 as well as the applications which may be filed thereafter should be heard in Division Bench as provided in sec. 9 of the amending Act (Act 9 of 1965 ). The arguments of the learned Advocate General fall into four parts: (a) That it was competent for the Legislature to make a specific provision for the manner of exercise of jurisdiction by the Board of Revenue in sales tax cases as distinguished from the general provisions of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956. (b) That sec. 10 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act itself envisages that specific provision for the manner of exercise of jurisdiction by the Board of Revenue may be made by any other law for the time being in force; (c) That the provision made by Sec. 9 of the Rajasthan Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1965 (Act 9 of 1965) for the manner of exercise of jurisdiction by the Board of Revenue is a matter of procedure and is therefore effective immediately. (d) that the aforesaid amendment affecting the mode of revisions by the Board of Revenue does not abolish or impair any right, and that in any case revision is not a right on the same footing as an appeal. The contention of the counsel for the assessee, on the other hand, is that the amendment seeks to take away the right of special appeal to a Division Bench which was available when the revision was heard by members sitting singly. They say that such a right cannot be taken away without express provision or necessary implication and according to them, the amending law does not manifest any intention by clear declaration or necessary implication that it has retrospective effect. They add that unless the amending Act manifestly repeals the previous law, the provisions of the repealed law as well as the new law co-exist side by side in so far as they are not in conflict with each other, and that in sales tax cases in which the lis commenced before the amendment of the law the procedure of hearing revisions as under the repealed law should continue to be followed. They have also raised the contention, though half-heartedly that there cannot be two different modes of hearing revisions by the Board of Revenue for sales tax cases, on the one hand, and the generality of revenue matters on the other, such a discrimination being repugnant to the spirit of the Constitution. This contention is devoid of merit. Sec. 10 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 is itself hedged with qualification that specific provision may be made for the manner of exercise of jurisdiction by the Board of Revenue by any other-law, and such a specific provision will override the general provisions embedded in sec. 10 of the Act, on the principle that the special provision would override the general provision. As regards the alleged discrimination from such a specific provision, I think it is no discrimination but a reasonable classification made in pursuance of a policy of the Legislature that sales tax revisions should be heard in a particular manner. The first question is whether a revision under the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act 1954, is a right or a claim to relief in the same manner as an appeal. On this point, there is no conclusive authority. Sec. 14 of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act. 1954, as amended by sec. 9 of Act 9 of 1965 provides the manner in which the Board of Revenue may be moved to call for the record of any proceedings under the Act, so that it may examine the record and pass an order as it thinks fit, keeping in view the limitations laid down in sec. 14. Revision under sec. 14 of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954 is therefore a right of the Board of Revenue and not the right of the assessing authority or the assessee. But then the right of the Board of Revenue to revise an order of the lower authority gives rise to the right of the assessing authority to have a reference made to the High Court in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 15. Thus, unless the Board has exercised its revisional jurisdiction no reference to the High Court can be made. In this sense, revision by the Board of Revenue is a part of the integrated process by which the assessing authority or the assessee may eventually have the law declared by the High Court, and to take away the process of revision would tantamount to a deprivation or the right of moving the High Court. In this view of the matter, revision by the Board of Revenue is a part of the process of seeking relief, though it may not stand on the same footing as an appeal, and neither the assessee nor the assessing authority can be deprived of the avenue of relief by way of revision. In any event, it would not be necessary in the present case to decide whether revision is a right like an appeal, since I am taking the view that so far as the present controversy is concerned the amendment of sec. 14 of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act does not amount to any deprivation or impairment of the revision available under sec. 14. The learned counsel for the assessee have cited a number of well-known rulings in support of their contention. The first ruling relied upon by them is AIR 1953 Supreme Court 221 (Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh. In this case, the dispute was whether the amendment of sec. 22 of the C. P. & Berar Sales Tax Act was retrospective in its effect or not. Under the original provision, an assessee could bring an appeal before the prescribed authority after paying such amount of tax or penalty or both as the assessee may admit to be due from him. Under the amended provision, the assessee could bring an appeal only if he had paid the tax or the penalty imposed on him. Their Lordships held that since the amended provision put a clog on the right of appeal it was not retrospective as, they held, that there was no manifest intention or necessary implication in the amending law to make it retrospective. Their Lordships observed that a right of appeal is not merely a matter of procedure. It is a matter of substantive right. This right of appeal from the decision of an inferior tribunal to a superior tribunal becomes vested in a party when proceedings are first initiated in and before a decision is given by, the inferior court. Such a vested right cannot be taken away except by express enactment or necessary implication. An intention to interfere with or to impair or imperil such a vested right cannot be presumed unless such intention be clearly manifested by express words or necessary implication. The fact that the existing right of appeal continues to exist must, in its turn, necessarily imply that the old law which created that right of appeal must also exist to support the continuation of that right. As regards the date of commencement of the lis, their Lordships observed that whenever there is a proposition by one party and an opposition to that proposition by another, a lis arises. In assessment cases, if the authority is not satisfied as to the correctness of the return and calls for evidence, surely a controversy arises involving a proposition by the assessee and an opposition by the State. For the purpose or the purpose of the accrual of the right of appeal, the critical and relevant date is the date of initiation of the proceedings and not the decision itself. The Supreme Court reiterated the foregoing principles in A I. R. 1957 Supreme Court 540 - Garikapati Veeraya vs. N. Subbiah Choudhry, which is summed up by them as follows: (i) That the legal pursuit of remedy, suit, appeal and second appeal are really but steps in a series of proceedings all connected by an intrinsic unity and are to be regarded as one legal proceeding. (ii) The right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but is a substantive right. (iii) The institution of the suit carries with it the implication that all rights of appeal then in force are preserved to the parties there to till the rest of the career of the suit. (iv) The right of appeal is a vested right and such a right to enter the superior Court accrues to the litigant and excists as on and from the date lis commences, and although it may be actually excerised when the adverse judgment is pronounced such right is to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding and not by the law that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of the filing of the appeal. (v) This vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment, if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise. In 1959 S. T. C. 117, the case of Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh (A. I. R. 1953 S. C. 221) was followed and it was held that the amendment of sec. 12 (2) of the Madhya Bharat Sales Tax Act, which made the admissibility! of application for revision by the Commissioner of Sales Tax conditional on the payment of full assessed tax was an impairment of an existing right and was, therefore, not retrospective in its effect, there being no express provision or necessary intendment that it was retrospective in its nature. In 1962 S. T. C. 853, it was held by the Madhya Pradesh High Court that a right of revision under sec. 22 (5) of the C. P. and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947, was in the nature of a vested right, which could not be taken away or impaired, save by express words or necessary implication. In 1963 S. T. C. page 507, another case decided by the Madhya Pradesh High Court, it was ruled that the amendment of sec. 19 (1) of the C. P. and Berar Sales Tax Act 1947, which had the effect of enlarging the period of limitation of reopening of an assessment, was not applicable to the cases in which the period of limitation under the repealed law had expired. As against the rulings of the Madhya Pradesh High Court cited above, on the question whether revision is a right, Mootham C. J. , observed in A. I. R. 1958 Allahabad 409, that there was no authority for the proposition that an application in revision stood on exactly the same footing as an appeal, and that both were vested rights which could be taken away only by express enactment or necessary intendment. This was a case in which under the old law the High Court could call for the record of a proceeding in the Small Cause Court and pass appropriate orders, and the record of a case had been so called by the High Court. The Full Bench comprising of Mootham C. J. , Bhargava, J. and Chaturvedi J. , held that the High Court continued to have jurisdiction to decide those cases in which the record had been called from the lower courts under the old law, even though the old had been amended subsequently and the High Court divested of the power of revision. This ruling does not materially help towards the decision of the present reference before us. The above quoted observation of Mootham, C. J. with regard to applications or revisions being on a different footing than the appeal was not endorsed in terms by other two judges and the case was decided on the other grounds. As I have said above, it is not necessary in this reference to make a definite pronouncement whether a revision is a vested right like an appeal. The amendment of sec. 14 of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954 by sec. 9 of Act 9 of 1965 does not abolish revision by the Board of Revenue but merely modifies the manner of exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the Board of Revenue in sales tax cases. Under the procedure in force before the amendment of Act 9 of 1965, sales tax revisions were heard by Members of the Board sitting singly and an aggrieved party could take a special appeal to a Division Bench. The modified procedure prescribed by Act 9 of 1965 is that application for revision in sales tax cases should be heard and disposed by a Division Bench. The right of a special appeal to the Division Bench was contingent on the application for revision being by a Member sitting singly. Again, under the old procedure a party had the opportunity of being heard by three Members, first by one Member sitting singly and then by a Division Bench in special appeal, while the party has now the opportunity of being heard only by two Members of the Board sitting in Division Bench. The right of relief by way of revision by the Board of Revenue remaining in Act, does this change of procedure of hearing revisions by the Board of Revenue put a clog on the remedy itself or impair the remedy in any manner ? If the answer to this question is in the negative, it should follow that the amendment brought about by sec. 9 of the Act 9 of 1965 in the provisions of sec. 14 of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954, would be applicable not only to the cases in which the lis arises after the amendment but also to all cases coming up the Board in revision. In other words, if the contentions of the learned counsel for the assessee are negatived, the Board would exercise its revisional jurisdiction in all sales tax cases in Division Bench as from the date of commencement of Act of 1965, viz. , 27th April, 1965. The learned Advocate General has invoked two authorities in support of his contentions, which are pointed and specific as against the rulings of a general nature cited by the learned counsel for the assessee. The first is a decision of our own High Court in the case of Murlidhar and others vs. Kishorilal and others (A. I. R. 1959 Rajasthan 246 ). In this case, a suit had been filed in the Court of the Civil Judge, Alwar, in accordance with the provisions of the United States of Matsya Civil Ordinance with the provisions of the United States of Matsya Civil Courts Ordinance, 1948. The appeal from the decree of the Civil Judge lay under that Ordinance to the District Judge. The Ordinance was repealed by the Rajasthan Civil Courts Ordinance, 1950, and by virtue of sec. 6 of the latter law, an appeal against the decree of the Civil Judge lay to the High Court. It was contended before their Lordships that the appellate provision of the Matsya Ordinance should apply to the case and not the provisions of the Rajasthan Ordinance, that is to say, the appeal from the decree of the Civil Judge should lie to the District Judge and not the High Court. Their Lordships repelled this contention, and observed that a distinction had to be drawn between this "right of appeal" as such and the "forum of appeal. " They went on to say that it cannot be an invariable rule that a party should have a right of appeal to the identical forum in every case to which at the date of institution of the suit he had the right of appeal, if in the meantime that forum had been abolished and some other forum had been substituted, so long as the right of appeal itself has not been taken away or otherwise prejudicially affected. Legislative changes which involve change of forum affect largely the procedure to be followed by the litigant without taking away his substantive right of appeal, and the litigant cannot be heard to say that he must have his appeal heard by the particular court which was empowered to hear the same when the suit was instituted and not by any ether court substituted by the legislative change. In coming to this conclusion their Lordships took into account the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Garikapatti vs. Subbiah Choudhary (A. I. R. 1957 S. C. 440), and drew a distinction between the right of appeal and the forum of appeal, and proceeded to distinguish between the right of appeal as such and the forum of appeal. In the present reference before us, there is not even a change of forum since the Board of Revenue remains the forum of revision under the old as well as the amended law, and the only change is with regard to the constitution of benches for the disposal of the revisions. Another case cited by the learned advocate General is A. I. R. 1961 Kerala 226 (Full Bench), wherein the Kerala High Court had held that the right to have an appeal heard by a particular number of judges is not a vested right, and a change in the procedure of the court in hearing appeals which formerly provided for hearing by a bench of two judges and later provided for hearing by a single judge only, has retrospective effect. They have further held that where a decision is given by a single judge or by,two or more judges of the High Court, the decision will be the decision of the High Court, and it cannot be said that the variation in the number of judges hearing the case and rendering the decision, will in any way prejudice the right of the appellant to have a decision by the High Court. His right was only to appeal to the High Court and not to a bench consisting of a particular number of Judges. • With all respects, I think that the observations of the Kerala High Court are logical and conclusive, and that in the present reference, there is no prejudice to the assessee in having his application for revision heard and decided by the Board of Revenue in the manner provided by the amending law (Act 9 of 1965 ). I would return the reference with the following opinion. Revision applications in sales-tax cases started prior to the coming into force of the Rajasthan Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1965 (Act 9 of 1965), would be heard and disposed of by a Division Bench of the Board of Revenue, as provided in sec. 9 thereof, just as this procedure would apply to cases in which the lis started on dates subsequent to the coming into force of that Act. Per Shri Gajendra Singh -This is a reference made by one of the Members sitting singly and hearing revision under the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954. The circumstances under which this reference arose may be briefly summarised as under: U/s 14 of the Rajasthan Act, 1954 revisions were to be heard in sales tax cases by the Board of Revenue i. e. in accordance with the constitution of the Board as laid down in the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act; a Member sitting singly would hear the revision in the first instance and an aggrieved party u/s 10 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act could file a special appeal to a Bench consisting of two or more Members. By the Rajasthan Taxation Laws Amendment Act, 1965 this arrangement of hearing revision petitions was changed, by providing that an application for revision should be heard and disposed of by a Bench of not less than two Members of the Board of Revenue and in case there was a difference of opinion, then the matter could be referred to another Member and decision taken in accordance with the opinion of the majority of the Members. As a result of this amendment of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, a question arose whether this amendment would have retrospective effect i. e. it will apply to all those cases in which lis started prior to the amendment or it would apply to only those, where a lis in the matter started subsequent to the amendment. This point was disposed of in a case in which I was a party, in which I took the view that the amendment could not be given retrospective effect as it would curtail the right of special appeal allowed by the present rules of hearing revisions in the Board of Revenue as there was no express enactment or intendment of the legislature to curtail this remedy of the aggrieved party. Shri G. B. K. Hooja another Member did not agree with the view taken by myself in this case and he made this reference to this larger Bench for deciding this important point of law. The reference was in the following terms: "whether the revision applications in Sales Tax cases which were started prior to the coming into force of the amendment Act No. 9 of 1965 should continue to be heard and disposed of by a Bench of the Board composed of a Single Member. " As far as the simple point that requires to be answered by this larger Bench in the present reference is whether the manner of hearing revision petitions in the Board as required by the amendment Act, could be given retrospective effect pending revision applications or that may be presented in future or in which the lis have started prior to the amendment of the Act should continue to be heard by a Member sitting singly. The learned Advocate General, who appeared before us contended that the amendment under the Rajasthan Taxation Laws Act, 1965 only, affected the manner of exercise of jurisdiction by the Board of Revenue and did not in any way impair a right of the party and that revision in any case is not a vested right on the same footing as an appeal.
(3.) THE counsel for the assessees on the other hand argued that revision petition and the manner in which it has to be heard was a vested right of the parties together with a special right of appeal and since this right was not expressly curtailed by the amending Act and that there was no necessary implication for curtailment of the right that could be gathered from the provision made in the amendment Act, the right of the party to be heard in revision together with a right of special appeal cannot be taken away by the present amendment. The question for determination now before us is what is the nature and scope of the right of revision. Is it a vested right of the parties to come up in revision ? The Advocate General's argument was that revision is not a vested right and in any case it was not a right on the same footing as an appeal. I however do not agree with the argument advanced by the Advocate General. He has cited no authority in support of his contention. On the other hand the counsel for the assessees have cited number of rulings in support of their contention : Hussain Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh reported in A. I. R. 1953 S. C. p. 221. In that case the C. P. and Barar Sales Tax Act was amended, which took away the right of appeal from an assessee unless he paid the tax of the penalty imposed on him instead of the previous one in which an assessee paid the admitted amount to the assessing authority. Their Lordships took the view that the right of appeal was a substantive right from an inferior tribunal to a superior tribunal and was a vested right in the party and the course of right was determined when the lis in the present case started i. e. when the notice was served on the party and this vested right cannot be taken away except by express enactment or by necessary intendment by the legislature. In another ruling of Garikapati Veerya vs. N. Subbiah Choudhary, reported in A. I. R. 1957 S. C. p. 540 it was observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the legal pursuit of a remedy suit, appeal and second appeal are really but steps in a series of proceedings all connected by an intrinsic unity and are to be regarded as one legal proceeding. The vested right of appeal cannot be taken away except by a subsequent enactment, if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise. In 1959 S. T. C. at p. 170 the principle of law laid down in Hussain Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh was followed and it was held that the amendment of sec. 12 sub-sec. 2 of the Madhya Pradesh Sales Tax Act which made the admissibility of application for revision by the Commissioner of Sales Tax conditionally of payment of full assessed tax was an impairment of the existing right and was therefore not retrospective in its effect, because there was no express provisions or necessary intendment that it was not to be treated as retrospective in nature. Similar, view was taken that a right of revision was a vested right, in 1962 S. T. C. at p. 853 by the Madhya Pradesh High Court. Taking the above judicial pronouncement into consideration I therefore, come to the conclusion that not only appeal, but a revision is also a vested right. Sec. 14 of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954 in sub-sec. 2 clearly recognises, the right of the assessing authority as well as an assessee or a dealer to move the Board of Revenue to call for and examine the record of the proceedings under the Sales Tax Act and to consider the illegality, impropriety or erroneous nature of the order. For an assessee the limitation period for filing this application for revision is 3 years and for an assessee the limitation prescribed for filing such application is only 6 months. In view of this express provision of law it is clear that both, assessing authority as well as a dealer has a statutory right to move the higher tribunal for consideration of their case and to get the legality and propriety of the order passed by the subordinate authority tested. In view of this clear provision I cannot take any other view but to hold that the right of a revision is a vested right of the parties i. e. both of a dealer as well as of a assessing authority and it is on the same footing as an appeal. Any right whether by way of appeal, revision or application or review that is provided by a statute is a rested right of a party and has to be respected unless and until this right is taken away by express enactment or by necessary intendment. It is a well settled law and requires no further discussion at this stage that a vested right of a party cannot be taken away by the legislature unless it is done so by an express enactment or by necessary implication in the amending Act. The learned authors Craies and Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes and number of case law completely supports this proposition of law. It is clear that the amendment Act 1965 does not take away or impair this right of revision whether of a dealer as well as of an assessing authority, and this right is preserved intact. It only seeks the manner in which this right of revision has to be exercised by the parties under the unamended Act. This right of revision, an aggrieved party could exercise before a Member sitting singly and if he was not satisfied with his decision he could certainly file a special appeal to a Division Bench which had the right of either confirming the decision of the single Bench or reversing or modifying the order passed by that Bench. Thus the Division Bench exercised the jurisdiction in cases of special appeal as a superior Court sitting in judgment over the decision of a Member passed in a Bench sitting singly. Clearly, therefore, under the old law a petitioner who invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the Revenue Board had a right of special appeal in addition to his right of revision. This right he exercised at the very inception when the lis in a case was started and a notice was served on the assessee by the authority. The career of the case was marked in accordance with the unamended Act when the lis , started. The present amendment no doubt by providing the disposal of revision applications by Division Benches snatched away or impaired this right of special appeal of an applicant, who invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the Board of Revenue. It is true that instead of the revision being heard by a single Member, a provision was made that it was to be heard and disposed of by a Division Bench and in cases of difference of opinion by a third member, but there is nothing in the Act to show that this amendment was also intended to take away the right of special appeal of the parties. There is neither express provision of taking away the right of special appeal nor it can be inferred from the language of the present amending Act, that the right of special appeal was deliberately taken away by the legislature. If one has to examine the proposals incorporated in the draft of the Rajasthan Taxation Laws which became Act of 1965, it will appear that the members of the Board of Revenue sitting alone was to hear the appeal and his decision was to be final and no appeal would lie from him to any other Bench of the Board, notwithstanding anything contained in sec. 10 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956. From the language of that bill it will be clear that the legislature clearly took away the right of special appeal in that draft, but when that bill came for consideration before the legislature and the language was changed and the Rajasthan Taxation Laws Amendment Act, 1965 became the law. The language of sec. 9 of the Rajasthan Taxation Laws Amendment Act, if carefully perused it will appear therefrom that it does not take away the right of special appeal. As such it cannot be given a retrospective effect. No doubt new cases would continue to be governed in which the lis started after the amending law came into force by the present amended provisions of the Taxation Act. The learned Advocate General tried to argue that the amendment of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act only changed the forum and the manner of hearing revisions, but did not affect the right of revision of the parties. He cited two authorities Murlidhar vs. Kishorilal reported in A. I. R. 1959 Rajasthan page 246 in which their Lordships held that the appeal from the decree of the Civil Judge lay to the High Court and not to the District Court. In that case there was no doubt that forum of appeal was only changed from the District to the High Court, but the right of appeal was kept intact. In the present case it is true that the forum of hearing revision has been changed, but at the same time the right of special appeal which the party exercised prior to the amendment has been taken away. Under the old amended Sales-tax Act, a party exercised not only the right of revision, but a right of special appeal, if he was aggrieved by the order passed in the hearing of a revision. Therefore, that ruling of the Government Advocate General has no application to the present case. Similarly the other ruling cited by the learned Advocate General was A. I. R. 1956 Keral page 226, in which their Lordships only held that a right to have an appeal heard by a particular number of judges is not a vested right and a change in the procedure of hearing appeal at retrospective effect. This case has no bearing to the present case because in that case special appeal was not provided. ;