- (1.) THIS second appeal has been filed against the judgment and decree of the Revenue Appellate Authority, Udaipur, dated 5-4-63, whereby he accepted the appeal against the judgment and decree of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Nimbahera dated 25-1-61 and held that the plaintiff-appellant; was not entitled to recover the arrears of rent as the relationship of the lesser and lessee between the plaintiff and the defendant had ceased to exist by the operation of sec. 43 (2) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act.
(2.) BRIEFLY stated the facts leading to this second appeal are that the plaintiff-appellant brought a suit against the defendant-respondent for arrears of rent amounting to Rs. 116/10/- in 1957. It was stated in the plaint that the suit land had been mortgaged by the defendant respondent to the plaintiff-appellant in 1929 and further that the same was given on lease by him to the defendant-respondent immediately thereafter. The defendant-respondent having failed to pay the arrears of rent for three years, the aforesaid suit was filed in the court of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Nimbahera, on 21-3-57. The trial Court decreed the suit. Having felt aggrieved by this order, the defendant-respondent filed an appeal in the court of the learned Revenue Appellate Authority. The main argument advanced by the learned counsel for the defendant-respondent in that court was that the mortgagee-plaintiff had enjoyed the fruits of the mortgaged land for more than 20 years and as such he was not entitled to receive any further amount now, in view of sec. 43 (2) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act which lays down that a usufructuary mortgage of any land made before the commencement of this Act or in pursuance of the provision contained in sub-sec. (1) shall upon the expiry of the period mentioned in the mortgage deed, or 20 years from the date of the execution thereof which ever period is less, be deemed to have been satisfied in full without any payment whatsoever by the mortgagor and the mortgage debt shall accordingly be deemed to have been extinguished and thereupon the mortgage land shall be re-deemed and possession thereof shall be delivered to the mortgagor free from all encumbrances. In view of this provision of law, the learned Revenue Appellate Authority accepted the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court. Hence this second appeal. The facts of the case are not in dispute. The learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant has, however, attacked the order of the lower appellate court on the ground that sub-sec. (2) of sec. 43 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act was incorporated by sec. 7 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Amendment Act No. 12 of 1961 which came into force on 5-4-1961. It was argued that the above provision of law does not have retrospective operation and, therefore, the appellant's case cannot be governed by this sub-section. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the defendant-respondent contends that the plain meaning of sub-section 2 of sec. 43 is capable of no other interpretation. Under this section, a usufructuary mortgage made before the commencement of this Act shall upon the expiry of 20 years from the date of the execution thereof be deemed to have been satisfied in full without any payment whatsoever by the mortgagor and the mortgage debt shall accordingly be deemed to have been extinguished. The land must thereafter be delivered to the mortgagor free from all encumbrances. If the mortgagee does not deliver the land to the mortgagor, he shall be deemed! to be a trespasser and shall be liable to ejectment under sec. 183 as provided in sub-section (3 ). The learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant cited Mahadeolal Kenodia vs. the Administrator General of West Bengal (A. I. R. 1960 Supreme Court 936) which lays down the principles to be applied for the interpretation of statutory amendments and argued that the statutory provisions creating substantive rights are ordinarily prospective and that they are retrospective only if by express words or by necessary implication the Legislature has made them retrospective. It may however be observed this authority further goes on to say that the intention of the Legislature should always be gathered from the words used by it, giving to the words their plain, normal, grammatical meaning. It also lays down that if in any legislation, the general object of which is to benefit a particular class of persons, any provision is ambiguous so that it is capable of two meanings, one which would preserve the benefit and another which would take it away, the meaning which preserves it should be adopted. In view of this well established rule of interpretation, we do not see how the contention of the learned counsel for the defendant-respondent can be refused. The meaning of sub-sec. (3) of sec. 43 is plain and simple. By virtue of this, after the lapse of 20 years, the mortgage debt must be deemed to have been extinguished and thereafter the continuation of the mortgagee in possession of the land must be deemed to be in the capacity of a trespasser. As such, we fail to understand how he can claim any rent for the period falling after the redemption of the mortgage. The argument that the new section came into force in April, 1961, and is, therefore, not applicable to this suit which was commenced in 1957 has no validity as the present proceedings are strictly speaking in continuation of the suit and the decree of the learned Sub-Divisional Officer has not yet become final. As stated above, there is no ambiguity about the rigour of the provisions of sec. 43 (2) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act which seeks to extinguish the mortgages referred to there after the lapse of 20 years. In view of this, we are of the opinion that no ground has been made out for interference in the impugned order of the lower appellate court. .;