JAGAT NARAYAN, J. - (1.) THIS is a petition u/arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution against a decision of the Civil Judge, Jhunjhunu, setting aside the election of Inder Lal petitioner to the office of Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat Ajitgarh on the ground that he was disqualified under section 11 (g) of the Panchayat Act as he was convicted under section 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act for a contravention of rule 50 of the Rules framed thereunder. The case against the petitioner under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act was that on 11. 2. 62 he had exhibited for sale some articles of food without obtaining a licence as prescribed under rule 50 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules and was sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 11/ -. The judgment of the learned Magistrate goes to show that before the date on which he was found exhibiting the articles in question for sale he had applied for renewal of a licence and had deposited the necessary fees for renewal. But in fact he had never obtained any licence and so no action could be taken on his application for renewal. The Tribunal was of the opinion that the offence committed by the petitioner involved moral turpitude. THIS finding is challenged on behalf of the petitioner.
(2.) THE following four decisions were cited before me - Durga Singh vs. THE State of Punjab (l), Sahiram vs. Rajasthan State (2), Baleshwar Singh vs. District Magistrate & Collector, Banaras (3) & Mangali vs. Chhakki Lal (4) In the Punjab case (i) a police constable was convicted under section 34 (6) of the Police Act, 1861. THE finding of the learned Magistrate who convicted him was that he was found heavily drunk on the roadside in Sanjauli near the tunnel and abusing passers-by on 2. 10. 1945 at about 8 p. m. THE constable was dismissed and the question which arose for decision before the High Court was whether his case fell under proviso (a) to article 311 of the Constitution. THE relevant part of article 311 runs as follows: - "311. (1) No person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or an all-India Service or a civil service of a State or holds a civil post under the Union or a State shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. (2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him: Provided that this clause shall not apply - (a) where a person dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge; His case clearly fell under proviso (a ). The question as to whether the offence committed by the constable involved moral turpitude did not really arise for decision and the following observations made by the learned single Judge are obiter: - "the term'moral turpitude' is rather vague one and it may have different meanings in different contexts. The term has generally been taken to mean to be a conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals and contrary to what a man owes to a fellow-man or to society in general. It has never been held that gravity of punishment is to be considered in determining whether the misconduct involves moral turpitude or not. " In the Rajasthan case (2) the person concerned was convicted under the Customs Act of the former State of Bikaner and sentenced to fine for evasion of customs duty. It was held that the offence involved moral turpitude. This decision is also of no help as the circumstances of the present case are quite different. The Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and the Rules came into force in 1955 for the first time in this State. The petitioner does not appear to have intended to evade the payment of licence fee. On the contrary he applied for renewal of his licence and had deposited the fee for renewal before he was detected exhibiting certain articles for sale without a licence. No action could however be taken by the authorities on his application for renewal as he had not obtained a licence. In Baleshwar Singh's case (3) the person concerned was convicted under section 182 I. P. C. It was found that he made a false report to a public servant with the intention that the latter may use his power to the injury of annoyance of the person against whom the report is made. It was held that the offence involved moral turpitude. It was observed that the expression "moral turpitude" means anything done contrary to justice, honesty,, modesty or good morals. This observation is also much too wide. I am respectfully in agreement with the criteria laid down in Mangali vs. Chhakki Lal (4) by A. P. Srivastava, J. who dissented from the observations made by Tandon, J. in Baleshwar Singh's case (3 ). He observed that if those observations are followed literally every act punishable in law as an offence would involve moral turpitude. That however could not have been the intention of the framers of the law. A. P. Srivastava, J. held as follows - "from consideration of the dictionary meaning of the words 'moral' and 'turpitude' as well as the real ratio decidendi of the cases the principle which emerges appear to be that the question whether a certain offence involves moral turpitude or not will necessarily depend on the circumstances in which the offence is committed. It is not evrey punishable act that can be considered to be an offence involving moral turpitude. Had that been so, the qualification involving moral turpitude" would not have been used by the Legislature and it would have disqualified every person who had been convicted of any offence. The tests which should ordinarily be applied for judging whether a certain offence does not involve moral turpitude appear to be (1) whether the act leading to a conviction was such as could shock the moral conscience of society in general, (2) whether the motive which led to the act was a base one and (3) whether on account of the act having been committed the perpetrator could be considered to be of a depraved character or a person who was to he looked down upon by the society. " Applying the above test the offence committed by the petitioner did not involve moral turpitude. The petitioner was consequently not disqualified under sec. 11 (g) and the decision of the Tribunal setting aside his election is erroneous. I accordingly allow the writ petition, set aside the decision of the Tribunal and dismiss the election petition filed by Lachhu Ram respondent No. 1. In the circumstances of the case, I direct that parties shall bear their own costs of this writ petition. . ;