- (1.) THIS is an appeal with regard to the item relating to the sale of abadi land mentioned in the final award passed by the Jagir Commissioner, Jaipur on 29-4-60 and reviewed by him on 20-9-62.
(2.) THE counsel for the respondent has raised a preliminary objection to the effect that the appeal is time barred in view of the fact that the final award was passed on 29-4-60 and the present appeal has been filed on 12-12-62. His contention is that in this case the limitation will not run from 20-9-62 the date of review order, because in the review order the item relating to income from sale of abadi land which is the subject matter of the present appeal has not been discussed or varied. In this connection he relies on State versus Ranjeet Singh (Appeal No. 34/nagaur/60) decided by the Board of Revenue on 28-8-62 in which, under similar circumstances, it was observed as follows: "the items under contest have remained the same and did not even form part of the jagir of the Riya Thikana, the claim whereof has resulted in the present order in appeal. THE State Government's appeal cannot. , therefore, be taken to be within time about these items,, they having been determined as far back as 1957 and no appeal having been preferred by the State Government against that award. " He has further argued that a review order passed under sec. 40-A of the Rajas-than Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act is not at all appealable because the orders against which appeals can be preferred have been enumerated in sec. 39 (1) of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1955 (hereinafter called as the Jagir Act) which do not include a review order under sec. 40a of the Jagir Act. On the other hand the learned Government Advocate has argued that the review order dated 20-9-62 is the final award and, therefore, the appeal should be deemed to have been filed against that order. Thus the appeal having been filed against that order is within limitation. He contends that as the review of final award was initiated on 22-10-60 no appeal was preferred against the earlier award dated 29-4-60. He, however, concedes that the item of income from sale of abadi land which has been assailed in the present appeal was not the subject matter of review order dated 20-9-62. Nevertheless, he maintains that under Order 47, rule 7 C. P. C. the review order is appealable in view of fact that under sec. 39 (3) of the Jagirs Act the provisions of appeal provided in Rajasthan Tenancy Act have been made applicable to the Jagirs Act; and that sec. 208 of Rajasthan Tenancy Act makes the provisions of C. P. C. applicable to the Tenancy Act. In support of his contention, he has sought reliance from Mohanlal vs. Banshilal (AIR 1961 Rajasthan page l8) wherein it was held that a decree having once been passed, any subsequent order or direction fixing instalments, or for that matter re-fixing the instalments, is clearly a case of varying the decree or bringing into existence an amended decree and must be held appealable under sec. 96 Civil Procedure Code. He has, further, cited Sm. Soudamini Das versus Nabalak Mia Bhuiya (AIR 1931 Calcutta page 578) according to which if a decree is amended either by way of review or under sec. 206, the decree to be appealed against is the amended decree and no appeal should, therefore, lie from the original decree. It must be said at the outset that the rulings cited by the learned Government Advocate are not on all fours with the circumstances of the present case. In these cases, substantially the entire decrees were the subject matter of the review; whereas in the present case the items of the award which have been reviewed do not include the item now under appeal, as has been conceded by the learned Government Advocate. Moreover, the review order dated 20-9-62 does not mention how the figure of Rs. 831/65, being the income from sale of land (which is the subject matter of appeal before us) has been arrived at. Thus, for finding out the details of the figure of Rs. 831/65, we have to refer to the award dated 29-4-60. It can, therefore, be safely said that the award dated 20-9-62 is the final order so far as it relates to the items amended therein but it is not the final award in respect of the item assailed in the present appeal before us. Had the revised award dated 20-9-62 affected the item assailed in the present appeal, it could have been deemed to be the final award in this respect also, and the appeal would then have been maintainable, but as the State preferred no appeal against the award dated 29-4-60 within 90 days, in so far as it relates to the items unaffected by the subsequent review, it must be held to be barred by limitation. Moreover, it is pertinent to note that the proceedings for review were initiated on 22-10-60, i. e. after the period of limitation to appeal against the award dated 29-4-60 had expired and if the review order dated 20-9-62 had not been passed, the appellant could not have come up in appeal at all. Evidently, therefore, a remedy which had already been extinguished cannot be allowed to be revived under the cloak of a fresh order. We, therefore, reject this appeal as barred by limitation. .;