- (1.) THIS is writ application under Art. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India by Shri Lakhpatrai who is Manager of the Central India Machinery Manufacturing Company Limited, Bharatpur. It is directed against an order of the Payment of Wages Authority, Bharatpur, dated the 4th of July, 1962.
(2.) THE opposite parties have not cared to appear in this Court in spite of service of notices on them and, therefore, the application has been heard ex parte. The petitioner's case is, that he is Factory Manager of the Central India Machinery Manufacturing Company Limited, Bharatpur, which is a public limited company. Respondent No. 1 Om Prakash was employed as a helper to a welder by the said company. He abstained from work without notice to the petitioner on 29th May, 1961 and continued to remain absent without leave till 31st May, 1961. He had also committed serious misconduct in the factory on 29th May, 1961 and was, therefore, given a show cause notice for disciplinary action against him. During the pendency of the enquiry, he was suspended from 31st May, 1961 to 6th June, 1961. On 24th June, 1961 his services were terminated under clause 23 (1) of the Standing Orders which had come into force on 4th June, 1961. On 14th December, 1961 Shri Surajbhan Gupta, General Secretary of Cimmco Mazdoor Union, Bharatpur, filed, on behalf of Shri Om Prakash, an application under sec. 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, and it was alleged by him that Om Prakash's wages for the months of June, July, August, September and October, 1961, were wrongly deducted by the petitioner. This application was contested by the petitioner on the ground that the Payment of Wages Authority, (which will hereinafter be referred to as the Authority) had no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the application since it was already admitted by Om Prakash that his services were terminated on 24th June, 1961, that an industrial dispute on that question was already raised by the Cimmco Mazdoor Union, Bharatpur, that the Government of Rajasthan had already referred that industrial dispute to the Industrial Tribunal Rajasthan, Jaipur, for adjudication and hence the Authority was not competent to decide that question. This objection was turned down by the Authority and the petitioner was directed to pay an amount of Rs. 260/- to Om Prakash. Learned counsel for the petitioner has very candidly conceded before us that he does not question the jurisdiction of the Authority to decide the dispute between the parties regarding wages for the period between 31st May, 1961 and 24th June, 1961, i. e. , for the period preceding the termination of the services of Om Prakash. But, it is contended, that for the period commencing from 25th June, 1961 there was no authority left in the Payment of Wages Authority to decide the dispute between the parties, because the relationship of an employer and employee had come to an end on 24th June, 1961. It is strenuously urged by learned counsel that the Authority had no jurisdiction to enter into the question whether the services of Om Prakash were terminated rightly or wrongly. In support of his contention, learned counsel has referred to a decision of this Court in Maharaja Shri Umaid Mills Ltd. Vs. Collector, Pali (l ). In that case, certain workmen of the Maharaja Shri Umaid Mills Ltd. had presented an application before the Payment of Wages Authority and it was alleged by them that the employer had unlawfully deducted from their wages the amount of "attendance-prize" which they were entitled 1;o receive every month. The question which arose for determination was whether the abolition of what was called attendance-prize by the employer amounted to deduction of wages within the meaning of the Payment of Wages Act. It was urged before the Court that the Payment of Wages Authority had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter. After reviewing a few cases, it was observed by the learned Judges as follows: "summing up the whole position therefore, we may say that where the essential question is really not as to what the wages of the persons aggrieved were nor that there was any delay in the payment of those wages nor still that there was any unlawful deduction from such wages but the question is whether the wages fall rightly to be governed by a contract relied upon by the employer as the subsisting contract, or whether it falls to be governed by an earlier contract relied upon by the employed persons, and the validity of the subsisting contract is challenged, and the question is which of these two contracts would or should govern the relationship of the parties, then the Authority under the Act in question has no jurisdiction to decide which of the contracts should regulate the rights of the parties. " Learned counsel has next referred to Manager, Codialabail Press V. K. Monappa (2) in which it was observed as follows: "it seems to me that even if retrenchment compensation payable under sec. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act can be regarded as wages and I think it has that character an order for its payment could be made under sec. 15 only when the retrenchment is not disputed or is clearly indisputable. But if the employer who admits the termination of the employment disputes that the termination was by the process of retrenchment,- there being no provision in the Payment of Wages Act for an adjudication on that matter, the foundation for a complaint under sec. 15 that Wages though due were withheld would be unavailable, since the purpose of the Act is to enforce payment of wages. In a case where the facts admitted by the employer clearly establish the liability to pay the wages audit is complained that there is non-payment or incomplete payment. . . . . . . . . . . " It is obvious that the principles in both the authorities cited by learned counsel for the petitioner support his contention. It appears from the impugned order of the Payment of Wages Authority that it has relied upon the decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court in A. V. D' Costa, Divisional Engineer, G. I. P. Railway Vs. B. C. Patel (3) in support of its view that it had jurisdiction to decide the question whether the termination of Om Prakash's services was wrongful. In the said case, a person was employed by the Railway Administration as a carpenter on daily wages. He presented an application before the Payment of Wages Authority and it was urged by him that his position was not that of a casual labourer, but he, was a temporary employee and was entitled to be on the scale of Rs. 55-150 plus the allowances admissible. The question arose whether the Payment of Wages Authority had jurisdiction to decide that matter. In those circumstances, it was observed by their lordships as follows: "the Authority set up under sec. 15 of the Statute in question is undisputably a tribunal of limited jurisdiction. Its power to hear and determine disputes must necessarily be found in the provisions of the Act. Such a tribunal, it is undoubted, cannot determine any controversy which is not within the ambit of those provisions. " After making these observations; their lordships proceeded to examine the relevant provisions of the Payment of Wages Act and it was held that the Payment of Wages Authority had no jurisdiction to decide the said dispute. It is doubtful if respondent No. 2 before us viz Payment of Wages Authority had carefully gone into this case, because it does not support the view expressed by it. On the contrary, it was clearly pointed out by their lordships that the Authority set up under sec 15 of the statute is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction, and its power to hear and determine disputes is limited by the provisions of the Act. The said Authority has also referred to K. P. Mushran Vs. B. G. Patil (4), Payment of Wages Inspector M. B. Government Vs. Bramhodatta Bagrodia (5) and Jay Gujarat Prakashan Ltd. Vs. Hari Prasad Hargovindas Pandya (6), but none of these cases lend support to the conclusion arrived at by the Authority. The only case, which may be taken to lend support to it is Union of India Vs. Baburam (7), but the view expressed by the learned single Judge in that case has not been accepted in Manager, Codialabail Press's case (2), referred to above, and we also feel that some of the observations made therein run counter to the views expressed by their lordships of the Supreme Court in A. V. D. Costa, Divisional Engineer's case (3), referred to above. On the contrary, it may be pointed out that in A. R. Sarin Vs. B. C. Patil (8), it was held that "the jurisdiction of the Payment of Wages Authority did not extend to determining the question as to whether the contract has terminated as alleged by the employer or the contract was still subsisting as alleged by the Servant. Again in Vishwanath Tukaram Vs. the General Manager, Central Railway (9), it was held by a Full Bench of that Court that "the Payment of Wages Authority had no jurisdiction to decide whether the services of an employee were rightly or wrongly terminated by the employer or whether his dismissal was lawful or unlawful. " In Kannappan (M.) Vs. Hoe and Company, Madras (10), it was held by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court following the views of the Bombay High Court that "the Payment of Wages Authority had no jurisdiction to go into the question as to whether the retrenchment or dismissal was lawful or unlawful. " We respectfully agree with the view taken in Viswanath Tukaram Vs. General Manager, Central Railway (9), Kannappan (M.) Vs. Hoe & Co. , Madras (10) and Manager, Codialabail Press Vs. K. Monappa (2) referred to above, and hold that where it is asserted by the employer that the services of the employee were terminated by him either by dismissal or removal or otherwise, the Payment of Wages Authority has no jurisdiction to enter into the question whether the employee's removal or dismissal or the termination of his services was lawful or not. We find that, in the present case, it was expressly pleaded before the Payment of Wages Authority by the petitioner that it was admitted by Surajbhan Gupta on behalf of Om Prakash that the services of Om Prakash were terminated by the petitioner. A copy of the written statement presented on behalf of the Cimmo Mazdoor Union, Bharatpur, before the Industrial Tribunal on 11th January, 1962, (Annexure 4) was also put up before the Authority. In paragraph 6 thereof, it was clearly admitted that the management had issued charge-sheet and dismissed thirty workers including Om Prakash. In paragraph 8, it was urged that the dismissal was illegal and unjust and in paragraph 10 thereof, the Industrial Tribunal was requested to order the reinstatement of all the workers including Om Prakash. In our view when it was expressly pointed out to the Authority that it was not disputed by the Cimmco Mazdoor Union, Bharatpur, which was representing Om Prakash, that Om Prakash's services were terminated and when it was further pointed out that a dispute arising out of the termination of his services along with the services of certain other workers was referred to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication and when it was also pointed out that the Industrial Tribunal was seized of the subject matter of dispute and the matter was pending before it, the Payment of Wages Authority ought to have stayed its hands and should not have proceeded to decide this question. The Authority has thus clearly exercised jurisdiction which was not vested in it and we feel constrained to set aside its order with regard to the payment of wages for the period commencing from 25th June, 1961. We might make it clear that we should not be understood to lay down that the petitioner had terminated the services of Om Prakash rightly. That question is still pending before the Industrial Tribunal and it will be for that Tribunal to decide it. The writ application is, therefore, partly allowed and while the order of the Payment of Wages Authority for payment of Rs. 48/- for the period between 31st May, 1961 and 24th June, 1961 is upheld, its order for the payment of the remaining amount i. e. Rs. 212/- for the period subsequent to 24th June, 1961 is quashed. Learned counsel does not press for costs and, therefore, the petitioner is left to bear his own costs. . ;