- (1.) THIS appeal has been filed by the Government Advocate against the order of the Deputy Collector Jagir, Jaipur, dated 18-5-63 in a case relating to the Jagir Bejupada under sec. 39 of the Rajasthan Land Reforms & Resumption of Jagirs Act hereinafter to be referred as the Jagir Act. The respondents have filed cross-objections.
(2.) A preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the respondents that the appeal was barred by limitation, as it had been filed on 14-10-63 viz. 149 days after the pronouncement of the final award and that no application under sec. 5 of the Limitation Act had been preferred by the appellant. In reply, the learned Government Advocate, referred to Para 2 of the appeal in which it has been averred that the Government Advocate had been informed about the decision on 24-7-63 by the Legal Adviser (Jagir) and, therefore, the limitation should run from the said date. If this is accepted, the appeal is within time. He also invited our attention to the affidavit filed by Shri Rameshwar Prasad, Accountant, Revenue 'a', Jagir Department, Civil Secretariat Jaipur, wherein it has been deposed that the State Govt. was not informed of the decision dated 10-5-63 (it should actually be 18-5-63) by the Deputy Collector Jagir, Jaipur, but the same came to the notice of the State Government on 24-7-63 through the Legal Adviser attached to his court. It was, therefore, contended that the Deputy Collector Jagir, having failed to comply with the express provisions of law contained in sec. 33 of the Jagir Act, the period of limitation would commence from the date the Government received the intimation thereof. In this connection, a reference was also invited to Bajrang Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan (RLW 1964 Page 476) in which it was held that sec. 39 would apply, in terms, in cases where the Jagir Commissioner pronounces his decision before the parties, or if he adjourns his decision to some other date, then the parties or their pleaders should be informed of that date. In cases, where the parties are not informed of the date of the decision, sec. 33 of the Jagir Act would come into play and the period of limitation would commence from the date the communication about the decision is received by the party under sec. 33 of the Jagir Act. This authority seeks to harmonize the provisions of sec. 33 and 39 of the Jagir Act. It was further observed therein that when the legislature provided 90 days time for filing an appeal from the date of the decision under sec. 39, apparently it had in its mind the basic principles which have to be followed by a Civil Court in pronouncing its judgment and which are embodied in O. 20 R. 1 of the Civil Procedure Code. It is provided in that Order that after the case has been heard, the court shall pronounce judgment in open court either atonce, or as soon thereafter as may be practicable, on some future day; and when the judgment is to be pronounced on some future day, the court shall fix a day for that purpose, of which due notice shall be given to the parties or their pleaders. If day is fixed by a court for the pronouncement of the judgment and the judgment is actually pronounced on that day, then the period of limitation would commence from that day whether any of the parties cares to appear in the court or not. The same kind of situation must have been contemplated by the legislature when it provided the period of 90 days from the date of the decision in sec. 39 of the Jagir Act. An examination of the proceedings of the case before us, leading to the pronouncement of the impugned order, in the light of the observations made above, would, however, seem to tilt the balance against the State instead of in favour of it. It is found from an examination of the order sheet that the Jagirdar as well as the Government Adviser were present in the court of the Deputy Collector Jagir on 20-12-60. , when the case was adjourned to the following day for the examination of the file relating to Amar Singh Jagirdar of Bejupada, at the request of the Government Adviser. On the following day, however, the Government Adviser does not seem to have made an appearance. The case was then adjourned to the 22nd and thereafter to the 29th and then to the 31st December, 1962. On the 31st, the case was adjourned to the 25th January, 1963 and thence to the 28th Feb. , 1963 and thence again to the 20th March, 1963 and finally to the 18th May, 1963 when the final award was pronounced. As the dates were fixed regularly we are afraid, the learned Government Advocate cannot justifiably claim the benefit of the latitude provided under sec. 33 of the Jagir Act. In coming to this decision, we are fortified by the rule laid in Thakur Singh vs. Bharon Lal (AIR 1956 Rajasthan 113) which is pari materia with the present case. In that case also, a plea was raised that no notice of the judgment had been given to the applicants. The facts of that case were that when it was put up before the Court on 20-5-53, the Court issued a notice to the counsel for the defendants-applicants intimating that 28-5-1953 had been fixed for arguments. But the counsel for the defendants applicants noted down on the notice that he had no concern with the case and, therefore, his clients be personally informed. When the Court took up the case on 21-5-1953, it held that the notice to the counsel was a notice to the defendants and as no leave had been obtained by him for withdrawing from the case under O. 3, R. 4, C. P. C. , the notice to the counsel was sufficient, in the circumstances of the case, and proceeded to hear arguments by the counsel for the plaintiffs and fixed 29-5-1953 for judgment. On that day, however, judgment could not be pronounced and the case was adjourned to 30-5-1953. Similarly, on 30-5-1953, the case was adjourned to 6-7-1953 and thence to 8-7-1953 when the judgment was ultimately pronounced. A similar plea was raised by the applicant in that case also. Rejecting the same, it was observed by Sharma J. that all the dates for the delivery of the judgment were fixed in the Court and if the defendants or their counsel had attended the court in pursuance of the notice of 28-5-1953 they would have had notice of the various dates of the delivery of judgment, fixed in that case. In the circumstances of the case, no separate notice was necessary to the parties of the dates fixed for the delivery of the judgment. Such a notice would have been necessary if the judgment had been reserved without fixing any particular date for its delivery, at the time the case was taken up in court on the various dates fixed. It was observed that when particular dates for the delivery of the judgment were fixed in court, the parties ought to have appeared on those dates and if they had done so, they would have had notice of the dates fixed for the delivery of the judgment. It was, therefore, held that no breach of O. 20, R. 1 had been committed in that case. The situation in the case before us is more or less similar. In Thakur Singh Vs. Bhairon Lal (AIR 1956 Rajasthan 113), the counsel had declined to appear before Court while in the instant case the counsel made no such formal request and in fact was present on 20-12-1962. As regards the non-appearance of the counsel in that case, it was held that as the pleader was not allowed to withdraw by the Court, there was no necessity to send any notice to the defendants and as no appearance was made on 28-5-1953 in response to the notice, the court was perfectly justified in proceeding ex-parte with the case, if at all the present case is on a weaker footing. In this case, the Legal Adviser did not indicate any lack or termination of interest by him. In fact, he asked for an adjournment to examine the file relating to the case of Amar Singh which was granted. On the date fixed, however, he remained absent and thereafter the progress of the two cases is almost similar. If the responsibility of informing the parties in such cases is laid on the courts, it would, in our opinion, be tantamount to casting the responsibility for the prosecution of a case on the court, instead of the party. It is the duty of a party to properly prosecute its case and if it fails to do so, it must take the consequences which follow and cannot take shelter behind the provisions of law which properly seek to protect the litigant public from the laches of the courts. In order to merit this protection, it must be proved that the court had made a default and the party had done all that it was' required to do. We find that in the instant case, there is nothing on record beyond the affidavit of an accountant of the Secretariat in support of the statements of the learned Government Advocate that the State Government was notified of the decision on 24-7-1963. Even this affidavit has been carelessly drawn up and suffers from the defect that the date of decision mentioned in this affidavit is 10-5-1963 and not 18-5-1963. Nothing has been done to show why the Government Adviser failed to attend the court on 21-12-62 as ordered by the learned Deputy Collector Jagir on the preceding day. A number of adjournments was made thereafter and the Government Adviser chose to remain absent on all those days. If he had chosen to put in an appearance on the 21st December, 1962, or any other date fixed thereafter in court, he would have kept track of the day fixed for the delivery of the judgment. Under the circumstances, therefore, we are of the opinion that the appeal was not filed within limitation and cannot be entertained. The cross-objections are also dismissed for the reason that the appeal itself is time learned. .;