KAN SINGH, J. - (1.) THIS bunch of 185 writ petitions before us raises identical questions about the vires of some provisions of the Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961 (Act No. 38 of 1961), hereinafter to be referred as the "act", and of the rules and bye-laws made thereunder, and therefore it can conveniently be disposed of together.
(2.) THE Act was passed by the Rajasthan State Legislature and came into force on 24. 11. 61, when it was first published in the Rajasthan Gazette. In exercise of its powers under sec. 36 of the Act, the State Government made the Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Markets Rules, 1963, hereinafter to be referred as the 'rules' which came into force on 6. 2. 64, on being published in the Gazette. THE bye-laws were made by the various market committees in exercise of their powers under sec. 37 of the Act. In 1964, one Bhikamchand and other traders questioned the validity of the Act, the rules and the bye-laws by 9 writ petitions various grounds, such as, that the Act was unconstitutional being in contravention of the fundamental rights of the traders under Art. 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution, that the notifications that were issued by the Government under sec. 3 of the Act for the establishment of the market areas were bad and that the bye-laws made by the market committees were invalid as they were not made with the previous sanction of the Director of Agriculture as required by sec. 37 of the Act. We came to the conclusion that the Act did not infringe the fundamental rights of the petitioners under Art. 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution, and was, therefore, not unconstitutional on that account, but we found that the bye-laws framed by the various market committees, in the cases before us, were invalid as the requisite previous sanction for making them had not been obtained as required by sec. 37 of the Act. In the result we allowed the writ petitions and restrained the State and other respondents from giving effect to the bye-laws as framed. Our judgment is reported as Bhikam Chand vs. State of Rajasthan (1 ). We will advert to the relevant observations from that judgment at appropriate place in this judgment. In order to rectify the defects in the law that came to light as a result of our judgment the Governor promulgated the Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Markets (Amending and Validating Provisions) Ordinance, 1965, (Ordinance No. 4 of 1965), on 26. 8. 65. This Ordinance was later on replaced by an Act of the same caption (Act No. 16 of 1965), which came into force on 29. 10. 65. By this Act certain amendments were also made in the Act, besides validating the defects therein. We will be reproducing the relevant provisions of the Act, as well as those of Act No. 16 of 1965, at the appropriate place in dealing with the points raised by the petitioners. This time the attack is based on fresh grounds which we will notice hereinafter. Shri M B. L. Bhargava, appearing for Messrs Chandan Mal Beharilal of Padampur, led the arguments on the side of the petitioners and to start with we propose to deal with the points argued by him and then we will be dealing with the points raised by other learned counsel in respect of other writ petitions argued by them. Shri Bhargava directed attention in his address to three sections in the Act, namely, secs. 3, 17 and 40. He argued that sec. 3 of the Act was bad as it suffered from the vice of excessive delegation of its functions by the Legislature thereby making the Government free to pick and choose either the commodities or the areas for which it may like to declare market areas. According to Shri Bhargava, the discretion with which the Government was vested in the matter of establishment of market areas was unfettered and unguided. He points out that it was the duty of the Legislature to lay down some principle or policy for the exercise of its discretion by the Government. As regards the validity of sec. 17 of the Act, Shri Bhargava submitted that here also the Legislature had not laid down any principle which may guide the executive in the matter of prescribing the maximum by the rules. In the result, the Government is left with uncontrolled power to prescribe any maximum fee in exercise of its rule making power. Such a power, according to Shri Bhargava, amounted to abdication of its essential legislative functions by the Legislature in favour of the Government. As regards sec. 40, Shri Bhargava submitted that the State Government has been empowered by issuing a notification in the official gazette to add to, amend or cancel any of the items of agricultural produce specified in the schedule of the Act, and this according to him, is again excessive delegation which is open to objection. The learned Advocate General contested the stand taken by Shri Bhargava and demurred that in view of our previous decision in Bhikamchand's case (1), it was no longer open to anybody to question the constitutionality of the Act. According to him, once a judicial verdict was given on the constitutionality of a statute it was not, thereafter, open to anybody to question its constitutionality. We do not find any substance in this objection of the learned Advocate General. The constitutionality of the Act was questioned before us previously only on the basis of Art. 19 of the Constitution and in these writ petitions the traders, who were not parties to the earlier writ petitions, are challenging the vires of the Act on altogether different grounds which, in our opinion, they are not disentitled to do. The relevant sections, whose validity we are to consider, run as follows: - Sec. 3. "'notification of intention of exercising control over purchase and sale of agricultural produce in specified area.- (1) The State Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, declare its intention of regulating the purchase and sale of such agricultural produce and in such area as may be specified in the notification; Provided that no area within the limits of a municipality shall be included in the area specified in such notification except after consultation with the municipal board or municipal council concerned, as the case may be. (2) A notification under sub-sec. (1) shall state that any objection or suggestion which may be received by the State Government within a period of not less than one month, to be specified in the notification, shall be considered by the State Government. " (Prior to Amendment) Sec 17 "power to levy market fees - The market committee may, subject to the provisions of rules and subject to such maxima as may be prescribed, levy market fees on the agricultural produce bought and sold by the licensees in the market:" (As amended by Act No. 16 of 1965) Sec. 17 "power to levy cess.- The market committee may, subject to the provisions of rules and subject to such maxima as may be prescribed, levy a cess on the agricultural produce bought and sold by the licensees in the market. " Sec. 40. "power of Government to amend the Schedule.- The State Government may by notification in the official Gazette add to, amend or cancel any of the items of agricultural produce specified in the Schedule. " In order to see whether the Act really affords any guidance in the matter of exercising the powers by the Government we may briefly refer to the historical background which persuaded the Legislature to pass this law. In all advanced countries of the world regulation of markets and trade practices was long recognised. In Great Britain, a Royal Commission was appointed as early as 1837, to investigate into the markets and on the basis of the recommendations of the Commission, Markets and Fairs Act was passed in 1847. This was followed by more than two dozen Acts. The aim of these Acts was to improve the standard of marketing services, to provide fair trading in the markets and to safeguard the health and sanitation of the users of the market. Control of markets in the United States of America began in 1899. In India also a Royal Commission on Agriculture reported in 1928 that marketing legislation was necessary. As an incentive to increased agricultural production its importance in a planned economy of a country, according to the Commission, could not be over-emphasised. The matter also received the attention of the marketing committee of the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture held in October, 1945, at Quebec. Its observations were as follows: "marketing is the crux of the whole food and agriculture problems. It would be useless to increase the output of food, and would be equally futile to set up optimum standards or nutrition, unless means could be found to move food from the producer to the consumer at a price which represents a fair remuneration to the producer and is within the consumer's ability to pay. Similar consideration apply to other agricultural products and to fish and forest products. " (Vide extract reproduced in a Government of India publication 'agricultural Marketing in India' - 1956 Edition, page-1) In various states of India several marketing laws have been enforced in the last 25 years or so. It appears that the State of Rajasthan wanted to come in line with other States of India and with this view enacted the Act. This will be evident from the Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the bill which became the Act. They are as follows: "without regulated markets it is difficult for Agriculturists to secure better and adequate prices for their produce. The Indian Central Committee has from its very inception attached great importance to the regulation and improvement of primary marketing in cotton and other agricultural produce. Legislation on the subject has already been enacted in the States of Bombay, Madras, Andhra, Punjab, Madhya Pradesh, Hyderabad, Madhya Bharat and Mysore. The Committee being convinced that there is no other single measure which could help the agriculturist in getting a better price for his produce than regulation of market, has at its meeting held in July, 1954 recommended the enactment of similar legislation in other States including Rajasthan. Government have considered the various aspects of the said recommendation and have arrived at the same conclusion. " We are not unmindful of the legal position that the Statement of Objects and Reasons cannot be utilised for the purposes of interpreting any substantive provision of the Act, but it is certainly permissible to look to the Statement of Objects and Reasons for the limited purpose of understanding the back ground and the antecedents leading to the legislation in question. In Bhikamchand's. case (1), we made the following observations about the scheme underlying the Act, in the light of its various provisions which we then surveyed: "a survey of the relevant provisions of the Act, the Rules and bye-laws shows that scheme of marketing in agricultural commodities specified in the Act is sought to be operated for better regulation of the trade of buying and selling of' agricultural commodities by introducing control of the various trading activities in specified areas and by in reduction of compulsory licencing of the trade in the commodities. " The Act follows the model of similar laws in other States. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in examining the scheme underlying the Madras Commercial Crops Markets Act, in Arunachala Nadar vs. State of Madras (2) observed as follows: "there is a historical background for this Act. Marketing legislation is now a well-settled feature of all commercial countries. The object of- such legislation is to protect the producers of commercial crops from being exploited by the middlemen and profiteers and to enable them to secure a fair return for their produce. In Madras State, as in other parts of the country various Commissions and Committees have been appointed to investigate the problem, to suggest ways and means of providing a fair deal to the growers of crop, and find a market for selling their produce at proper rates. Several Committees, in their reports, considered this question and suggested that a satisfactory system of agricultural marketing should be introduced to achieve the object of helping the agriculturist to secure a proper return for the produce grown by them. " "with a view to provide satisfactory conditions for the growers of commercial crops to sell their produce on equal terms and at reasonable prices, the Act was passed on 25th July, 1933. The preamble introduces the Act with the recital that it is expedient to provide for the better regulation of the buying and selling of commercial crops in the Presidency of Madras and for that purpose to establish markets and make rules for their proper administration, the Act, therefore, was the result of a long exploratory investigation by experts in the field, conceived and enacted to regulate the buying and selling of commercial crops by providing suitable and regulated market by eliminating middlemen and bringing face to face the producer and the buyer so that they may meet on equal terms, thereby eradicating or at any rate reducing the scope for exploitation in dealings. Such a statute cannot be said to create unreasonable restrictions on the citizen's right to do business unless it is clearly established that the provisions are too drastic unnecessarily harsh and over-reach the scope of the object to achieve which it is enacted. " Their Lordships had also extensively quoted from the Report of the Royal Commission of Agriculture in India, appointed in 1928. In Jan Mohammad Noor Mohammad Bagban vs. The State of Gujrat and another (Writ Petition No. 111 of 1964) decided on 18. 8. 65, appearing in the Blue Print, their Lordships of the Supreme Court made a survey of the Bombay and Gujarat Acts and observed as follows: "the Act was, as is clear from its Preamble and this review of its provisions, enacted with a view to provide satisfactory conditions for the growers of agricultural produce and to sell their produce on equal terms and at reasonable prices. The ordinary cultivator in our country suffers from many handicaps; he is generally illiterate, and often ignorant of the prevailing prices in the market of agricultural produce. Establishment of regulated markets is a welknown expedient for ameliorating the condition of the agricultural producers by eliminating the middle man and bringing the consumers in direct contact with the producers and thereby securing an ordered plan of agricultural development. The Legislature has, by the Act, attempted, with this object in view, to set up machinery for declaring certain areas as markets and for setting up market yards in which the business of selling and buying agricultural produce may be carried on. " The Act, therefore, has a clear cut policy in providing for the better regulation of buying and selling of agricultural produce in the State of Rajasthan. The scheme permeates through the various provisions of the Act which are comprehensively designed to carry out that policy. In Jan Mohammad's case it was contended that the powers conferred by secs. 5 and 6 of the Gujrat Act were unfettered, wide and unguided, and on that account the fundamental rights of the petitioner under Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution were infringed. Sec. 5 of the Gujarat Act empowered the Director to declare his intention to regulate the purchase and sale of agricultural produce in a specified area after inviting objections from local authorities and other persons and by sec. 6 the Director was empowered, after considering the objections and suggestions, to declare the area or part thereof a market area for the purposes of the Act in respect of all or any of kinds of produce specified in the notification. In repelling the argument that wide and arbitrary powers were conferred on the Director, their Lordships observed that the powers and performance of duties being for the regulation of buying and selling of agricultural produce and, as the preamble to the Act and the scheme of the Act clearly indicated this purpose, it could not be held that the Director acquired wide and arbitrary powers or that there was no guidance to him in exercising his powers. The following observations from Jan Mahammad's case may be quoted with advantage: "sec. 5 of the Gujarat Act authorises the Director to declare his intention to regulate purchase and sale of agricultural produce in a specified area after inviting objections or suggestions from the local authorities functioning in the area, and from other persons. By sec. 6 the Director, after considering the objections and suggestions received within the period specified in the notification, is authorised to declare the area or part thereof a market area for the purposes of the Act in respect of all or any of kinds of produce specified in the notification. The object of the Act being to ameliorate the condition of agriculturists and to do away with the middlemen, who it is a matter of common knowledge, make large and unconscionable profits out of the transactions carried out through them, declaration of intention to regulate trade in agricultural produce in a specified area, after hearing the objections and suggestions of interested parties, cannot be regarded as imposing unreasonable restrictions on the right to carry on trade. " "the argument that the authority conferred upon the Director is wide and arbitrary, became no principles are indicated for guidance has no force. The Director is appointed by the State Government to exercise such powers and perform such functions and' duties of the conferred or imposed on him by or under the Act, and the exercise of the powers and the performance of the duties is for the purpose of regulating the purchase and sale of agricultural produce and thereby doing away with malpractices in the trade. The preamble to the Act and the scheme of the Act clearly indicate that the powers conferred upon the Director are to be exercised for the purpose of regulating buying and selling of agricultural produce and for that purpose to establish markets for sale and purchase of agricultural produce. The powers under sec. 6 are to be exercised after giving an opportunity to persons interested to raise objections or to make suggestions to the proposed introduction of control on sale and purchase of agricultural produce. It is only after the objections and suggestions are received and considered by the Director in the light of the object and purpose of the Act, and he is satisfied that it is in the interest of the producer and the general public that there should be regulation of the trade in agricultural produce in the specified area that he may proceed to declare the market area. " Shri Bhargava, learned counsel for the petitioners invited our attention to Hamdard Dawakhana vs. Union of India (3), Vasanlal Maganbhai vs. State of Bombay (4), Virendra Kapur vs. University of Jodhpur (5), Thakur Madho Singh vs. The State of Rajasthan (6) and Thakur Shiv Kalyan Singh vs. Bhur Singh (7 ). The principle enunciated in all these cases is that the Legislature can delegate certain functions to its administrative agents, having laid down the broad principles of its policy in the legislation. It can then leave the details to be supplied by the Administrative Authority by delegated legislation and the delegate completes the legislation by supplying details within the limits prescribed by the statute. It has also been held that in dealing with the challenge to the vires of any statute, on the ground of excessive delegation, it is necessary to enquire whether the impugned delegation involves the delegation of an essential legislative function or power and whether the Legislature has enunciated its policy and principle and given guidance to the delegate or not (vide Vasanlal Maganbhai vs. State of Bombay (4 ). It has also been held in the last mentioned case that in every case it would be necessary to examine the relevant provisions of the statute with a view to seeing whether the delegation was intra vires or not. As to what is sufficient enunciation of policy by the Legislature will depend upon the language of each statute. Sometimes the statement contained in the preamble to the Act may itself afford a good basis for holding that the legislative policy has been sufficiently indicated as was held in Harishanker Bagla vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (8 ). We had already surveyed the various provisions of the Act in Bhikam Chand's case (1), and had observed that the enactment adumbrated a scheme of marketing in agricultural commodities for better regulation of the trade of buying and selling of the agricultural commodities by providing for the control of the various trading activities in specified areas by introduction of the system of compulsory licensing of the trade. We have also referred above the conclusions reached by their Lordships of the Supreme Court regarding the scheme underlying the Madras and the Bombay Acts which are prototypes of our legislation. That being so it cannot be postulated that sec. 3 of the Act gives uncontrolled discretion to the Government in the matter of specifying marketing areas or the agricultural commodities. The discretion will always be guided by the policy underlying the Act. Sec. 3 of the Act, therefore, does not suffer from the vice of excessive delegation as the discretion of the Government is not unguided. In Jan Mohammad's case their Lordships were considering delegation of powers in favour of the Director and they upheld the validity of the section on the ground that the Director was to exercise his powers according to the scheme of the Act. In Rajasthan, the Government itself is the repository of the power. As observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Matajog Dubey vs. H. C. Bhari (9) a discretionary power is not necessarily a discriminatory power and abuse of power is not to be easily assumed where the discretion is vested in the Government and not in a minor official. Viewed in the light of the above observations, the power given to the State Government by sec. 3 in the matter of selecting particular areas or particular agricultural produce is not arbitrary and unbridled. Even though this is a progressive piece of legislation, it may not be possible for the Government to apply it to the entire State all atonce. It was in order to enable the Government to introduce the scheme gradually that the discretion to select particular areas has ben given to it. Similarly, the discretion to select particular agricultural produce had to be left to the Government because it could not be possible for the State Legislature to specify it for particular areas without necessary inquiry into details. It is common knowledge that different varieties of cereals and commercial agricultural crops are grown in different areas. The State Government is in the best position to select particular agricultural produce for a particular area. There is, therefore, no substance in the argument that sec. 3 gives unbridled powers to the State Government in the choice of the area of agricultural produce.
(3.) REGARDING the vires of sec. 17 of the Act it was submitted that the Legis-lature had not laid down any principle which may guide the Executive in the matter of prescribing the maximum fee in the rules that may be framed under sec. 36 of the Act. It was thus pointed out that this amounted to abdication of an essential legislative function by the Legislature in favour of the Government. In elaboration of his argument the learned counsel urged that though the exaction has been termed as fee and not as tax, yet in reality it was nothing but tax. In inviting attention to secs. 18 and 19 of the Act, it was pointed out that a fund was to be created for the market committee under sec. 18 and under sec. 19 the fund could be expended for the various objects set out thereunder. The combined effect of these two sections, according to the learned counsel, was that the fee was not necessarily to be utilise for rendering service to those who were to pay the fee. Secs. 18 and 19 of the Act are as follows: Sec. 18. ''market committee fund - (1) All moneys received by a market committee shall be paid into a fund to be called "the market committee fund" and all expenditure incurred by the market committee under or for the purposes of this Act shall be defrayed out of the said fund. (2) Any surplus remaining with the market committee 'after such expenditure has been met' shall be invested as may be prescribed in this behalf. (3) Every market committee shall pay to the State Government the cost of any additional or special staff employed by the State Government in consultation with such market committee for giving effect to the provisions of this Act in the market area for which such market committee is established. (4) The Director shall determine the cost of such additional or special staff and shall, when the staff is employed for the purposes of more than one market committee, apportion such cost among the committees concerned in such manner as he thinks fit. (5) The decision of the Director, determinating the amount payable by any market committee, shall be final. " Sec. 19. "purposes for which the fund shall be expended.- Subject to the provisions of sec. 18, the market committee fund shall be expended for the following purposes, namely: (1) the acquisition of a site or sites for the market; (2) the maintenance and improvement of the market; (3) the construction and repair of buildings necessary for the purposes of such market and for the health, convenience and safety of the persons using it; (4) the provision and maintenance of standard weights and measures; (5) the pay, pensions, leave allowances, gratuties, compensation for injuries resulting from accident, compassionate allowance and contributions towards leave allowances, pensions or provident funds of the officers and servants employed by it; (6) the expenses of and incidental to elections; (7) the payment of interest on the loans that may be raised for the purposes of the market committee and the provision of sinking fund in respect of such loans; (8) the collection and dissemination of information regarding matters relating to crop statistics and marketing respect of agricultural produce notified under sec. 4; (9) the payment of the cost referred to in sub-sees (3) and (4) of sec. 18, (10) any propaganda in favour of agricultural improvement; and (11) the carrying out of the purposes and provisions of this Act and the rules and bye-laws made thereunder. " Learned counsel for the petitioners invited our attention to Hingir-Rampur Goal Company vs. State of Orissa (10), The Corporation of Calcutta vs. Liberty Cinema (11), The Maharaja Kishangarh Mills Ltd. , vs. Municipal Board Kishangarh (12), Ram Sahai vs. Commissioner S. T. (13) and Dhaniram vs. The Janapad Sabha, Jajgir (14 ). These decisions pointed out the essential distinction between a tax and fee. It has been held that in order to constitute an imposition a fee, one of the essential requisite is that there must be corelation between the fee collected and the service intended to be rendered. This is because, a fee is levied essentially for services rendered and as such there is an element of quid pro quo between the person who pays the fee and the public authority which imposes it. Where this co-relation is wanting the imposition in substance will be a tax and not a fee. This Court had occasion to deal with the essentia] distinction between a fee and a tax at a great length in The Maharaja Kishangarh Mills Ltd. , vs. Municipal Board Kishangarh (12 ). It was pointed out therein that in legislative enactments the distinction is not always kept in mind and what is called a fee is really a tax meant for raising revenues. It was pointed out that constitutionally speaking a fee was also a tax for the purposes of Art. 265 of the Constitution, for no fee could be levied without the authority of law. So far as taxes were concerned, they were always for raising the revenue. But in so far as fees were concerned they have to be divided in two parts. Some fees are really taxes though they are called fees in name, such as, court-fees etc. There are other fees which are really fees properly so-called as they are coreleted to the services to be rendered. It was also pointed out as to what should be the criteria for seeing whether a particular levy is a tax or a fee. It was observed in Maharaja Shri Umaid Mills Ltd. , vs. State of Rajasthan (15), that it should be seen whether the law under which the fees are charged is one for raising revenue primarily. The following passages from this judgment may be quoted with advantage: "authorities on public finance recognize the distinction between a tax and a fee. Generally speaking, a tax is an impost levied by the State for purposes of raising revenue. The person, who has to pay the tax, has no option but to do so provided the tax is validly imposed, and cannot object to it on the ground that the State does not render him any particular service in lieu of the tax. A fee, on the other hand, is not generally meant to augment general revenues. It is levied for some service rendered by the State to the particular person concerned, and the levy generally takes place when the particular person ask for permission to do something for which regulations exist. As the levy is not meant to augment the general revenue of the State, it is fixed generally at such a level as to meet the expenses of the services rendered by the State in connection with the matter for which the fee is levied. " "this distinction, however, is not always kept in mind rigorously in legislative enactments, and many a time what is called a fee is really a tax meant for raising revenues. Further, constitutionally speaking, a fee is also a tax for the purposes of Art. 265 of the Constitution for no fee can be levied without the authority of law. So far, therefore, as a tax is concerned, there is no difficulty, for it is meant for raising revenue, and must be governed by the authority of law as provided in Art. 265. So far as fees are concerned, they have to be divided into two parts. There are some fees which are really taxes though they are called fees. In their case, all the incidents of a tax apply, and the limitations to which fees are subject do not apply. As an example of this kind, mention may be made of court-fees under the Court-fees Act. Though, it may be. said that court-fees are charged from parties who come to court, it is still true that the Court-fees Act, generally speaking, is a measure for raising revenue for the State Then there are fees strictly so called, which are not meant for raising revenue, but for meeting the expenses of the departments of the Government created for regulating professions, trades, callings and employments from which licence fees are levied. " "in order to see whether the licence fees levied under the Factories Act are a tax or fees strictly so called, and if the latter whether the State of Rajasthan is entitled to make a charge according to the schedule prescribed in the rules, it has to be seen whether the law, under which the fees are charged, is a law for raising revenue primarily. The Indian Factories Act under sec. 6 of which these fees are charged is not a law primarily for raising revenue. It is law for regulation of factories, and incidentally, in one section out of 120, it mentions levy of fees for purposes of licensing and registration and renewal of licences. Considering the Act as a whole, the intention of the framers of the Act was to levy certain fees under sec. 6 in order to meet the expenses of supervision, which became necessary in view of the various regulatory provisions of the Act, and the Rules framed thereunder. It cannot be said, therefore, that the fee levied under sec. 6 is a tax meant for purposes of raising revenue. " Now, if we keep in view the scheme of the present Act, the kind of service that will be rendered in implementation of the Act, will be the provision for better facilities of marketing. The objects enumerated in sec. 19 are primary for advancement of the under-lying purposes of the Act from which those using the market including the licensees are to benefit. It has not been pleaded that the probable income that would accrue will not have a reasonable relations with the expenditure incurred for the purposes of the Act. It cannot, by any means, be said that the Act is meant for raising the revenues primarily. Thus, we are unable to hold that the fee contemplated in sec. 17 of the Act will be anything but a fee properly so-called. Moreover, a clear direction has been laid down by the Legislature that the market committee has to prescribe the fee subject to a maximum to be prescribed by the Government under the rules and the Government will necessarily be keeping in view the purposes of the Act in laying down the maxima in the rules, because the rules making power could be exercised by the Government only for the purpose of carrying out of the provisions of the Act. Therefore, in laying down the maxima the Government will have to see that the exaction retains the essential feature of a fee, that is, it must have a corelation with the services to be rendered by the market committee to those who participate in buying and selling of the commodities in the market regulated by the market committee. Fees that have to be prescribed by the rules are prima facie not to be excessive. Therefore, in our view section 17 does not suffer from the infirmity of excessive delegation of any essential legislative function and is consequently not bad. Coming now to the attack against the validity of sec. 40. Provisins of sec. 40 of the Act are in pari materia with the provisions of sec. 29 of the Bombay Agricultural Marketing Act. Sec. 29 of the Bombay Act was challenged before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Mohammad Hussain vs. State of Bombay (15-a), on the ground that it gave a completely unregulated power to the State Government to include any error within the schedule without any guidance or control whatsoever. Their Lordships said that, though sec. 29 itself did not lay down any criteria for determining which crop shall be put into the schedule or which shall be taken out therefrom, yet in the words of their Lordships the guidance was 'writ large in the various provisions of the Act itself. Their Lordships referred an earlier case of Edward Mills Co, Ltd. Beawar vs. State of Ajmer (16), in which sec. 29 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, gave power to the Government to add to either part of the schedule any employment in respect of which it was of the opinion that minimum wages should be fixed. It was held in that case that the legislative policy being apparent on the face of the enactment, the power has been given to the Government to carry out effectively the purposes of the Act and the Government were to decide with reference to local conditions. The same reasoning applies to sec. 40 of the Act. Learned counsel for the petitioner attempted to distinguish these cases by pointing out some difference in the definition of the verm "agricultural produce. " He emphasised that in Rajasthan the term "agricultural produce" has been defined to include all produce, whether of agriculture, horticulture, animal husbandry or otherwise as specified in the schedule. The words "otherwise as specified in the schedule" no doubt tend to widen the scope of the definition, but sec. 40 has to be utilised only in keeping with the underlying purposes of the Act. If anything which is wholly unconnected with agricultural produce is sought to be included, then it may be a ground for striking down the item to be so included, but thereby we cannot strike down the section itself. To repeat the words of their Lordships in Mohammad Hussain's case (15), the policy of the Legislature is writ large on the Act and there is no reason to think that the powers under sec. 40 would be abused. Thus, the contention of the learned counsel about the vires of sec, 40 also fails. Now we take up the contention of the learned counsel which was directed against the validity of the rules. At the fore-front of his arguments, on this breach of the case, learned counsel submitted that the rules which were required to be placed by the Government before the Rajasthan Legislative Assembly in accordance with sec. 36 (5) of the Act having not been so placed, the same have become invalid. Sec. 36 (5) runs as follows - "sec. 36 (5) - All rules finally made under this Act snail be laid, as soon as maybe after they are so made, before the House of the State Legislature, while it is in session, for a period of not less than fourteen days which may be comprised in one session or in two successive sessions and it, before the expiry of the session in which they are so laid or of the session immediately following the house of the State Legislature makes any modification if any of such rules or resolves that any such rule should not be made, such rule shall thereafter have effect only in such modified form or be of no effect, as the case may be, so however that any such modification or annulment shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done thereunder. " According to the learned counsel this section was mandatory and when the delegate did not carry out the mandate its act was rendered null and void. He placed reliance on Narendra Kumar vs. The Union of India (17), R. V. Sheer Metalcraft, Ltd. , (18) and Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd. Rampur vs. The Municipal Board Rampur (19 ). In the first case, in exercise of the powers under Essential Commodities Act, 1955, the Central Government were required first to determine certain principles and specify them by a notified order and also to lay them before both Houses of Parliament. This having not been done the Supreme Court held that the restrictions were not in the saving clause of Art. 19 of the Constitution. This was a case of double default and we are unable to take any guidance as to what would happen if properly framed rules have not been placed before the house of the Legislature. In other words, there is nothing to show in this judgment as to whether such provisions for placing the rules before the house of the Legislature are mandatory or only directory. ;