- (1.) THIS is a revision application under sec. 18 (3) of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953, against an order of the District Judge, Kota, rejecting a reference made to him under sec. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act by the Collector at his instance on the ground that it was barred by limitation.
(2.) THE award by the Collector was made on 21-1-61. On 23-1-61 the applicant applied for a copy of the award. THE copy was delivered to him on 13-4-61. On 1-5-61 he made an application to the Collector under sec. 18 (1) praying that a reference be made to the court. THE application was opposed on the ground that it was barred by limitation as it was not made within six weeks of the making of the award. THE Collector was however of the opinion that the applicant was entitled to exclude the period from 23-1-61 to 13-4-61 which was requisite for obtaining a certified copy of the award and held that the application was within time. He followed the decision of the Rangoon High Court in Burjorjee vs. Special Collector, Rangoon (AIR 1926 Rangoon to a 135 ). THE Collector accordingly forwarded the reference to the District Judge for disposal. Before the District Judge the applicant filed a written statement of his claim. In para 11 of it he stated that the reference was within limitation. A reply to his written statement was filed on behalf of the State. In para 11 of it it was expressly admitted that the reference was within limitation. On the pleadings of the parties 10 issues were framed but none of them was on the point as to whether the reference was within limitation. After the evidence on all the issues had been recorded an objection was taken on behalf of the State that the application for reference was barred by limitation. This objection was upheld by the learned District Judge and the reference was rejected as time-barred. Against the above order the present revision application has been filed. Two main contentions have been raised on behalf of the applicant. One is that the District Judge had no jurisdiction to go into the question as to whether the application for reference was within limitation or not. The other is that the applicant was not present when the award was made and it was not even communicated to him as provided under sec. 12 (2) and therefore the second part of clause (b) to the proviso to sec. 18 (2) is applicable and the application for reference was within limitation, A preliminary objection was taken by the learned Government Advocate that this revision application is not entertainable as an appeal lay under sec. 54 against the order of the learned District Judge rejecting the reference on the ground that the application for it was barred by limitation. I am unable to uphold this preliminary objection. Sec. 54 runs as follows: - "appeals in proceedings before Courts - Subject to the provisions of the Code applicable to appeals from original decrees, and notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any enactment for the time being in force an appeal shall only lie in any proceedings under this Act to the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan from the award, or from any part of the award, of the court, and any decree of the said High Court passed on such appeal as aforesaid shall be subject to further appeal in accordance with the provisions contained in secs. 109 and 110 and O. XLV of the Code. " It is clear from the wordings of the above section that what is appealable is an award by the District Judge. If the reference is rejected as invalid being made on a time barred application there is no award by the District Judge and hence no appeal lies to the High Court under sec. 54. I am supported in the view which I have taken by the following decisions - Dembeswar Sharma Vs. The Collector of Sibsagar (39 Indian Cases 637), Ghulam Muhyuddin Vs. The Secretary of State for India (24 Indian Cases 379), Nafis-ud-Din Vs. Secy, of State (AIR 1927 Lah. 858 (2 ). Coming now to the first contention raised on behalf of the applicant there is a conflict of judicial opinion on the question as to whether it is open to the District Judge to go into the question as to whether the reference was valid. In the following decisions it was held that the District Judge cannot go into the question of the invalidity of the reference: State of U. P. Vs. Abdul Karim (A. I. R. 1963 Allahabad, 556) (F. B.), Madansinghji Saheb Vs. State of Gujarat (A. I. R. 1963 Gujarat, 175), Kaliyanchand Vs. Kanchanbai (A. I. R. 1963 Madhya Pradesh, 220), Hari Kishan Vs. State of Pepsu (A. I. R. 1958 Punjab, 490 ). The view taken in the above cases is referred to as the Allahabad view as it was first taken by that High Court in Secretary of State Vs. Bhagwan Prasad (A. I. R. 1929 Allahabad, 769 ). A contrary view was taken in the following decisions - Mahadeo Krishna Vs. Mamlatdar of Alibag (A. I. R. 1944 Bombay 20 ), Subramania Vs. Collector of Coimbatore (A. I. R. 1946 Madras 184), Kochukunju Padmanabhan Vs. State of Kerala (A. I R. 1963 Kerala) (F. B.), Swami Sukhanand Vs. S. S. Samiti (A. I. R. 1962 Jammu & Kashmir 59 ). This is referred to as the Bombay view. The question as to which view is preferable came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in State of Rajasthan Vs. L. D. Silva (1958 R. L. W. 113 ). This Court followed the Bombay view. In that case the contention was that there was no award and therefore the reference was incompetent. The contention on behalf of the applicant is that the reference was a nullity in that case because there was no award and that case is thus distinguishable. In my opinion the question which arose for decision in that case was whether it was open to the District Judge to go into the question of the invalidity of the reference and the decision cannot be regarded as obiter on the question. In any case so far as the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act is concerned there is slight difference between its provisions and those of Indian Land Acquisition Act. Under the Rajasthan Act a Government department on whose behalf acquisition is being made can also apply for reference under sec. 18 (1) and under sec. 18 (3) a revision lies to the High. Court under sec. 115 C. P. C. against any order made by the Collector on an application for reference. That shows that the Collector making an award under sec. 12 is not regarded as an agent of the State as has been held to be the case under the Indian Land Acquisition Act, but is regarded as a judicial authority. Further in my opinion even if the Collector is regarded as an agent of the State he is a public agent and the scope of his authority is defined by the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and an act of the Collector cannot be regarded to be on behalf of the State if he exceeds the authority given to him. The Collector can only make a reference if the application for making it is filed within the limitation prescribed under sec. 18 (2 ). It is true that there is no express provision prohibiting him from making a reference on an application made beyond the period of limitation, but the Act confers on him authority to make a reference only if the application is made within the time so prescribed. I am accordingly of the opinion that so far as the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act is concerned the Bombay view is preferable and it must be held that the District Judge has jurisdiction to go into the question as to whether the reference made by the Collector is valid or not. Next it is contended that the State having admitted in its reply filed before the District Judge that the reference was within limitation it was not open to it subsequently to raise objection that the reference is made on a time barred application. I am unable to accept this contention. The facts on the basis of which the application for reference was alleged to be within limitation were not pleaded by the applicant. If those facts had been pleaded and they had been admitted then it would not have been open to the State to resile from them. But there can be no estoppel on a question of law. It was therefore open to the State to urge before the learned District Judge that the reference was made on a time-barred application and should not be entertained. The next argument is that the reference is within limitation because the applicant was not present when the award was made and no notice of the award was served on him as required by sec. 12 (2 ). An affidavit was filed by the applicant in this Court stating that he was not present when the award was made by the Collector on 21-1-61 and that his signatures were taken on the award as well as the order-sheet dated 21-1-61 on 23-1-61. Two counter affidavits have been filed on behalf of the State to prove that the award was signed by the applicant on 21-1-61. Much value cannot be attached to these affidavits. As I have mentioned above an objection was taken before the Collector when the application for reference was made that it was barred by limitation. Shri Rameshwar Dayal who represents the applicant was heard by the Land Acquisition Officer whose order dated 18-5-61 goes to show that it was not contended before him on behalf of the applicant that he was not present on 21-1-61. On the contrary what is mentioned in this order of the Land Acquisition Officer is - "besides the applicant noted the judgment under protest on 21-1-61 when it was pronounced and on 23-1-61 made an application to obtain copy of the judgment in which he stated that the copy of the judgment was being obtained for filing an appeal. " Further when the question of limitation was raised before the learned District Judge there also it was not contended on behalf of the applicant that he was not present when the award was made. What was contended was that he was entitled to exclude the time taken by him in obtaining a certified copy of the award. In these circumstances I am of the opinion that the applicant was present when the award was made on 21-1-61. Next it is contended that the applicant is entitled to exclude the time taken in obtaining a copy of the award by virtue of the provision contained in sec. 12 of the Limitation Act. Reliance is placed on Burjorjee vs. Special Collector Rangoon ( A. I. R. 1926 Rangoon 135 ). No reason is given in this decision for holding that the provisions of sec. 12 (2) of the Limitation Act are applicable to an application under sec. 18 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act. Sec- 29 of the Limitation Act runs as follows: - "sec. 29 - (1) Nothing in this Act shall affect sec. 25 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (IX of 1872 ). (2) Where any special or local law pres cribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the first schedule, the provisions of sec. 3 shall apply, as if such period were prescribed therefor in that schedule, and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law - (a) the provisions contained in sec. 4, sec. 9 to 18, and sec. 22 shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law; and (b) the remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply. (3) Nothing in this Act shall apply to suits under the Indian Divorce Act (IV of 1869 ). (4) Secs. 26 and 27 and the definition of "easement" in sec. 2 shall not apply to cases arising in territories to which the Indian Easements Act, 1882, (V of 1882) may for the time being extend. '
(3.) THE Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act 1953 is a local law prescribing a period of limitation different from the period prescribed under the First Schedule of the Limitation Act. THEre is no provision contained in the Rajasthan Act expressly excluding the application of sec. 4, sec. 9 to 18 and sec. 22 of the Limitation Act. THErefore the provisions of these sections of the Limitation Act are applicable to proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. THE only applications referred to in sec. 12 (2) of the Limitation Act however are those for leave to appeal and for review of a judgment. The section is not applicable to an application for a reference under sec. 18 (1) of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act. The applicant was therefore not entitled to exclude the time taken by him in obtaining a copy of the award. The application for reference made by him on 1-1-61 was therefore barred by limitation. In this connection the following decisions may be referred to: Nafis-ud-Din vs. Secretary of State (A. I. R. 1927 Lahore 858, (2), Kashi Prasad vs. Notified Area, Mahoba ( A. I. R. 1932 Allahabad 598 ) and Kunhibi vs. Land Acquisition Officer ( A. I. R. 1960 Kerala 80 ). Lastly it is contended that if the State thought that the reference made by the Collector was on a time barred application it should have filed a revision application against the order of the Collector making the reference under sec. 18 (3) and as it did not do so it could not raise the question before |the District Judge. I am unable to accept this contention. As I have held above the District Judge was competent to go into the question as to whether the reference was invalid. It was not necessary under the circumstances for the State to file a revision application against the order of the Collector under sec. 18 (3) because it could raise the question before the District Judge. Failure to file a revision application did not make the order of the Collector final in these circumstances. I accordingly hold that the order of the District Judge holding that the reference was invalid as it was made on an application which was barred by limitation is proper and dismiss the revision application. In the circumstances of the case, I direct that parties shall bear their own costs of this Court and the court of the District Judge. . ;