DAVE, C. J. - (1.) WE have before us an appeal under sec. 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, which is directed against the judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court dated 27. 1. 65 by which the learned Judge allowed a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution, presented by respondents Smt. Nirmala Devi and Smt. Mariam, and quashed an order of the Civil Judge, Hanumangarh, dated 21. 1. 64, by which the learned Civil Judge had held that the appellant Salauddin Khan was entitled to challenge the co-option of respondents Smt. Nirmala Devi and Smt. Mariam to the Municipal Board of Nohar.
(2.) ELECTION to the Municipal Board Nohar took place on 31. 12. 63, and the appellant Salauddin Khan was elected as a member from Ward No. 10. In accordance with sec. 9 (5) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959, hereinafter to be referred as the "act", respondents Smt. Nirmala Devi and Smt. Mariam were co-opeted as members of the Board at a meeting of the elected members of the Board held on 14. 1. 64. Aggrieved of the co-option, the appellant filed an election petition before the Civil Judge, Hanumangarh on 21. 1. 64, under sec. 40 of the Act. The respondents raised a preliminary objection that no election petition could lie to challenge the co-option of members under sec. 34 of the Act. The learned Civil Judge repelled this plea and came to the conclusion that an election petition under sec. 34 of the Act could lie even against a co-opted member. The learned Single Judge held on a consideration of the provision of the Act and the Rajasthan Municipalities (Appointment of Members Counsellors by Co-option) Order, 1959 that sec. 34 of the Act did not contemplate any challenge to the co-option of any person by an election petition. He also considered the provisions of sec. 36 (2) of the Act and reached the conclusion that an election petition can be presented by an elector of the ward, but as co-option is not held on ward wise basis sec. 36 (2) did not contemplate that co-option should be challenged by means of an election petition under sec. 34 of the Act. Thus, two questions arise for our consideration, namely: - (1) Whether co-option of members by the elected members of the Board is an election within the meaning of sec. 34 of the Act, so that the same could be challenged by an election? (2) Whether Salauddin Khan being an elected member of the Board could file an election petition under sec. 36 (2) of the Act? As the appeal can be disposed of on the consideration of the second question only, we do not propose to express any opinion on the first question whether co-option is an election within the meaning of sec. 34 of the Act. For the purposes of considering the question whether the appellant could file the election petition, we assume, for the sake of argument, that co-option is also an election within the meaning of sec. 34 of the Act. Sec. 36 lays down as to who can present an election petition and it runs as follows - "sec. 36. Presentation of petition.- (1) An election petition shall be presented within thirty (2) days from the date on which the result of the election in question is announced by the returning officer. The petition may be presented by any candidate at such election or by any elector of the Ward. " Sub-sec. (1) lays down the period within which an election petition could be presented and there is no dispute on the point that the election petition was filed within the prescribed period. Sub-sec. (2) of this section lay down that the petition may be presented by: (i) any candidate at such election, or (ii) by an elector of the ward. Appellant Salauddin was certainly not a candidate at such an election by which in the context will be meant the co-option. The only question is whether the words "by any elector of the ward" can at all apply to co-option which is not from any ward at all, but is made by an electoral college consisting of all the elected members of the Board. The words "by an elector of the ward" can in the very nature of things apply only to the election of members on ward-wise basis. It is for such an election that it is provided that an elector of the ward can file an election petition to challenge the election of any person from that ward. The plain language of sec. 36 (2) leads to the position that a co-option can be challenged only by any candidate and the words "any elector of the ward" cannot take within its ambit an elected member of the Board who participated at the co-option. The right to challenge an election by filing election before a Tribunal is not a general or natural right of any person, but has to be conferred by and derived from the relevant statute. Therefore, the appellant has to show as to under what provision of the Act he is entitled to file the election petition to challenge the co-option of respondents Nos. 1 and 2. Sec. 36 (2) of the Act obviously does not confer any right on the appellant as an elected member of the Board who participated at the co-option. Mr. Chandmal Lodha for the appellant strongly contended that the underlying intention of the Legislature was to provide for an election petition for challenging election to the Board including co-option thereto and, therefore, we should construe sub-sec. (2) of sec. 36 of the Act in such a way that an elector of the Municipal area or, at any rate an elected member who participated at the co-option may be taken to have the right to present the election petition. In Mr. Lodha's view, the words "of the ward" following the word "elector" occurring in sub-sec. (2) of sec. 36 of the Act will be superfluous in the case of a co-option, though they will be alright in the case of an election from a ward and, therefore, in the case of a co-option we should ignore the words "of the ward". Having considered the matter we are unable to accept this line of reasoning. This kind of interpretation leads to an odd result, namely, that in a certain contingency the words "of the ward" will be taken to be existing in the section and for certain other contingency the same words will be taken to be non-existing. We have not come across such a canon of interpretation. Mr. Lodha placed reliance on Aswini Kumar Ghose Vs. Arabind Bose (1) and Tirath Singh Vs. Bachittar Singh (2 ). From Aswini Kumar Ghose's case he relied on the following observations occurring in para 26 of the judgment: - "it is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute as being inapposite surplusage, if they can have appropriate application in circumstances conceivably within the contemplation of the statute. " On the basis of this observation Mr. Lodha urges that though normally words in a statute are not to be overlooked as surplusage, they can be so regarded as redundant or surplusage if they cannot have appropriate application in circumstances conceivably within the contemplation of the statute. From this, Mr. Lodha maintains that as the Legislature could not have contemplated in enacting sec. 36 (2) of the Act that co-option should not be challenged at the instance of an elector and the words "of the ward" occurring in the sub-section have to be treated as redundant in the case of a challenge to a co-option as distinct from an election from any ward. To our mind, the observations do not help the learned counsel. It cannot be said that the words do not have application in circumstances conceivably within the contemplation of the statute. The circumstances conceivably within the statute were to provide for an election on ward-wise basis and in doing so the right of challenge was given to an elector of the ward for challenging the election from that ward. The passage undoubtedly emphasises the normal principle of interpretation that the words occurring in a statute are not to be ignored as surplusage. It is a sound consideration to be kept in view that the Legislature in its wisdom is economical in using its words and does not waste them and, therefore, every ward included in the piece of legislation has to be given effect to. Where the words of a statute are free from ambiguity they have to be interpreted as they are. The problem of inter-pretation will arise only when there is an ambiguity and there the Court has to make an effort to get at the true legislative intent. The language of sec. 36 (2) of the Act, to our mind, is clear enough and the Legislature perhaps did not contemplate the giving of the right to challenge a co-option to electors. The right was confined to candidates only. By this we do not mean to suggest that the piece of legislation we are dealing with shows good draftsmanship. If purity of an election is a virtue,, it is equally so in the case of a co-option which is nothing but an election to the Board by the elected members thereof. By the remedy of an election petition the purity of the elective process, so very necessary for establishment of healthy democratic institutions, is tested, However by straining the language, it is not for the Court to fill up the gaps in the legislation. Construing sec. 36 (2) as it is, we are of the view that it does not give power to an elected member of the Board to challenge the co-option. The observations from Tirath Singh's case (2), on which Mr. Lodha relied were as follows: - "where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice presumably not intended, a construction be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the structure of the sentence. " As we have already observed, the language of the statute under consideration is not ambiguous and does not lead to any manifest contradiction though it does leave some gaps in providing for the machinery for challenging the election. The following passage from Craies on Statute Law, Sixth Edition, may be quoted with advantage (at page-103): "it is good general rule in jurisprudence," said the Judicial Committee in Ditcher V. Denison, "that one who reads a legal document whether public or private, should not be prompt to a ascribe - should not, without necessity or some sound reason, impute to its language tautology or superfluity, and should be rather at the outset inclined to suppose every word intended to have some effect or be of some use. " And this is as justly and even more tersely put by Lord Bramwell, who said, in Cowper-Essex V. Acton L. B. : "the words of a statute never should in interpretation be added to or subtracted from, without almost a necessity. " "it may not always be possible," said Jessel M. R. in Yorkshire, etc. , Insurance Co. V. Claytion, "to give a meaning to every word used in an Act of Parliament, and many instances may be found of precaution. " Nor is surplusage, or even tatutology, wholly unknown in the language of the legislature. " Thus, the rule against superfluity discussed herein accords with what their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down in Aswini Kumar Ghose's case (1 ). The learned Single Judge was thus right in holding that the appellant could not have maintained the election petition under sec. 34 of the Act. The appeal has thus no force and consequently we hereby dismiss it, but in the circumstances of the case we leave the parties to bear their own casts. .;