- (1.) THIS is an appeal against the order of the Revenue Appellate Authority dated 22-10-62, whereby he rejected the appeal of the appellants against the judgment and decree dated 27-3-61 passed by the Asstt. Collector, Jodhpur, decreeing the plaintiffs-respondents suit for declaration in their favour.
(2.) THE land in dispute comprises of khasra Nos. 2236 and 2237 measuring 37 bighas and 8 biswas in Pipar Town. It is submitted that this is Doli land belonging to Piplad Mataji of Pipar. THE plaintiffs-respondents, Bhanwarilal, Ram Jivan and defendants-respondents Ram Ratan and Magh Raj are the Pujaris of the temple which has in all 224 bighas 13 bighas of land attached to it for its maintenance, including the above fields. Defendant No. 3, Ram Ratan sold away this land to the appellants and got the sale deed registered on 21-5-57 on the ground that it was his Khudkasht land which had come to his share as a result of the partition of the estate between the parties. On the other hand, the plaintiffs-respondents contended that the land in dispute being Doli land was impartible and challenged the sale transaction made in favour of the plaintiffs by defendant No. 3. They prayed for the restoration of the disputed Khasra Nos and a declaration to the effect that the sale deed dated 22-5-57 was invalid. They also claimed mesne profits. After framing the necessary issues and recording evidence, the trial court decreed the suit. Having felt aggrieved by this order, an appeal was filed by the appellants before the learned Revenue Appellate Authority who rejected the same as stated above. Hence this second appeal by the vendees appellants. As has been stated by the learned Revenue Appellate Authority, the suit land belongs to the temple and the idol of the Piplad Mataji is the estate holder. The Pujaris are the servants of the idol who are paid out of the proceeds of the land for their maintenance and are responsible for the management of the estate in the interest and for the benefit of the idol. It is not, therefore, understood how the estate could be deemed to be partible as this would frustrate very purpose for which the estate was granted to the temple. This is obviously,a grant made by the State for the purpose of the maintenance of the temple and its succession or transfer would attract the provisions of sec. 137 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act 1956 which lays down that notwith- standing anything contained in this Act succession to and transfer of, an estate shall be governed and regulated by and be determined in accordance with the law, usage or practice of the local area in which such estate lies, and such law, usage or practice shall, notwithstanding the provisions of sec. 263, continue in force for the purpose aforesaid. As this estate lies in the erstwhile Marwar State, we have, therefore, to examine the provisions of the Marwar Land Revenue Act 1949 to determine the law governing the succession or the transfer of the suit lands. Under sec. 169 of the Marwar Land Revenue Act, the ownership of all lands vested in His Highness and all Jagirs, Bhoms, Sansans, Dolis or similar proprietary interests were held as grants from His Highness. Sec. 181 lays down that succession to grants made for the maintenance of temples or for other religious or charitable purposes,, shall be governed by the terms of the grant or failing such terms by custom. Sec. 191 lays down that no grant shall be transferable except to the extent provided in this Act and sec. 188 lays down that any transfer of land in contravention of the provisions of this Act shall be void, and the land so transferred shall be presumable by His Highness. This Act does not provide for the permanent alienation of religious grants made for the maintenance of temples or religious bodies by the Pujaris thereof. Sec. 6 of this Act which is analogous to sec. 23 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act lays down that the control of all non-judicial matters connected with the land revenue in Marwar is vested in the Government and the control of all judicial matters and to the extent provided in this Act of all matters connected with settlement is vested in the Board. It is obvious that the land which had been granted by the State to the temple for its maintenance could not be alienated by the Pujaris except in accordance with the terms of the grant. The onus to prove that the alienation had been made in accordance with the terms of the grant squarely rests on the Pujari concerned and if he has violated the terms of the grant he must suffer the consequences. This question would, however, fall within the compass of a non-judicial matter within the control of the Government. An admission by any of the Pujaris that a working partition had been made in respect of the land and the vendor Pujari had sold only the parcel of land which was in his exclusive possession would not clothe the title of the vendor Pujari with any validity. Nor would it bring the matter within the jurisdiction of revenue courts. It has been pleaded that the vendee had been admitted as tenant of the land by the vendor defendant No. 3 before St. 2012 and thereby they had acquired khatedari rights in the land. This is also an argument which we are not prepared to accept in view of what has been stated above. The vendor could not transfer better rights than he had in the land and he has yet to prove before a competent authority that he had the right to alienate the land. In view of the fact that the grant of land to the temple is a non-judicial matter, we are constrained to hold that the lower courts have wrongly clutched the jurisdiction in proceeding with the suit filed by the plaintiffs. In our view the matter should appropriately be transferred to the Collector who should examine whether or not the vendor has violated the terms of the grant and, if so, what consequences should be visited on him. We, therefore, see no merit in this appeal and hereby reject the same. As the orders of the two courts below are without jurisdiction, we have no hesitation in setting them aside and hereby direct that the matter may now be referred to the Collector who may proceed to dispose of it in accordance with the law and the rules made thereunder, after giving an opportunity of being heard to the parties concerned. .;