- (1.) TO appreciate the objection as regards limitation raised by the respondent in this appeal it is necessary to examine the relevant facts first. Jivan Singh etc. plaintiffs, brought a suit against Vijai singh etc. defendants in the court of the Assistant Collector Jaitaran under item 28 Group B, Schedule I of the Rajasthan Revenue Courts (Procedure and jurisdiction) Act, 1951, on 10-8-51. The trial court decreed the suit on 29-5-1953. The defendant went up in appeal before the Additional Commissioner, who modified the decree of the trial court on 20-10-1953. it is significant to note hare that the lower appellate court drew up a decree in accordance with its judgment and the same is dated 20-10-53. Vijai Singh appellant filed a revision petition against this decree on 23-11-1953 in this Board which was presented by Shri Shivalal Porwal, advocate. 14-5-1954 was fixed in the case for hearing but as the applicant and his advocate did not turn up in spite of notice the revision was rejected. On 12-7-1954 the appellant's request for restoration was allowed and the case was fixed for hearing for 30-7-1954. On 20-7-54 Shri Dhonkal Singh, advocate, who was engaged by the appellant on 12r7-1954 applied that the revision petition was drawn up in ignorance of the provisions of the Rajasthan Revenue Courts (Procedure and Jurisdiction) Act and the same be treated as an appeal. On 31-7-1954 a copy of the decree of the lower appellate court was applied for which was delivered to him on 12-1-1954. It was, however, produced in the Board on 16-8-1954.
(2.) ON behalf of the respondents two objections have been raised. The first is that, as a second appeal lay to the Board, revision was incompetent and the appellant should not be allowed to treat this revision as an appeal. The second is that, even if this revision is converted into an appeal, it would be beyond limitation as the copy of the decree appealed against was filed much beyond the period of limitation. ON behalf of the appellant it has been prayed that the delay may be condoned under sec. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act. As regards the first objection much need not be said. It is within the discretion of the court to allow a revision to be trated as an appeal on payment of proper fees. If any authority is needed for this view it will be found in A. I. R. 1918 Lahore 67. The only question to be determined is as to whether the delay in the present case can be condoned under sec. 5 of the Limitation Act. As observed by their Lordships of the High Court of Judicature of Rajasthan in 1951 RLW page 303 - "it is duty of an applicant praying for condonation under sec. 5 to explain each day's delay satisfactorily and if he fails to do so he cannot get the benefit of section 5. " In the present case no attempt has been made to explain any days delay leaving aside each days delay in the case. To being with there is absolutely no explanation for the fact as to why prior to 20-7-1954 it could not be ascertained that an appeal lay in the matter and not a revision. Shri Dhonkal Singh who has appeared before us today has argued that Shri Shivalal generally practises in Criminal Courts and hence he was unaware of the provisions of the Rajasthan Revenue Courts (Procedure and jurisdiction) Act, as regards appeals. This does not appeal to us at all. He (Shri Shivalal) has not only not cared to explain his view point before us but also failed to put in appearance on the date when the revision was called for hearing. Secondly, there is no reason as to why Shri Dhonkal Singh could not realise this omission of mistake earlier than 20-7-1954 although he was engaged on 12-7-1954. Thirdly no explanation has been offered as to why a copy of the decree was applied for on 31-7-1954 and not on 20-7*1954 on which date a request was put in for treating the revision as an appeal. Lastly, the copy of the decree was prepared on 9-8-1954, yet it was obtained on 12-8-1954 and the same was filed four days after that i. e. on 16-8-1954. In the absence of any explanation for all the aforesaid delays there can be no basis for condonation under sec. 5 of the Limitation Act. The appeal is, therefore, clearly time-barred and is rejected on this ground alone.;