- (1.) THIS is a revision application under sec. 10 (2) of the Rajasthan (Protection of Tenants) Ordinance), 1949, against an order of the Assistant Collector, Jaipur, dated 15. 1. 54 in a case regarding execution of an order of reinstatement under sec. 7 of the Ordinance.
(2.) I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and have examined the record as well. The validity of the lower court's order has been challenged before me mainly on two grounds. The last is that the application presented before the lower court was barred by limitation. The other is that the lower court had mis-appreciated the true import of the order of execution which includes, and did not exclude, Khasra No, 2 as well. As regards the first contention it has been argued that as physical possession over the land in dispute was actually transferred in favour of the applicant on 11. 7. 53 the opposite party should have raised objections within 30 days as provided in Art 165 of the Limitation Act. Thus the question to be determined is whether the application presented on 18-9. 53 can be treated within limitation or not. The objection was that the order of reinstatement includes khasra Nos. 3,4 and 5 only and not khasra No. 2. Hence the transfer of possession carried out by the revenue officials in respect of khasra No. 2 should be set aside and possession be restored back to the opposite party. In other words, the essence of the objection was that the execution proceedings were in excess of the order itself. Art. 165 provides a period of 30 days commencing from the date of dispossession for an application by a person dispossessed of immovable property and disputing the right of the decree-holder or purchaser at a sale in execution of a decree to be put into possession. At one time the words "by a person" in this article were interpreted so widely as to include applications by judgment debtors also within its purview. In A. I. R. 25 Allahabad 343, and 1914 Oudh 270, it was held that this article is wide enough to include applications by the judgment debtor who has been dispossessed of immovable property. But subsequently a contrary view was expressed in A. I. R. 1916 Allahabad 104, 1929 Oudh 76 and 1919 Madras 269 and it was held that this article does not apply to application by judgment debtors but only to application by a person other than the judgment debtor under Order XXI Rule 100 C. P. G. This letter view has been followed by the High Courts of Bombay, Calcutta Lahore and Patna as pointed out in Note 3 page 2537 Law of Limitation by V. V. Chitley and K. N. Annaji Rao 3rd Edition. Thus the present accepted view of practically all the High Courts is that this article does not apply to application by the judgment debtors which are governed by Art. 181 which provides a period of 3 years commencing from the time when the right to apply accrues under sec. 47 of the C P. G. corresponding to Rule 174 of the rules made under sec. 8 of the Rajasthan Revenue Courts (Procedure & Jurisdiction) Act. The application presented by the judgment debtor in the case, therefore, was clearly within limitation. As regards the other contention, suffice it to observe that the evidence led by the applicant himself made it perfectly clear that the patelwala khet means only khasra No. 3,4 and 5. There is absolutely nothing in the evidence led by the applicant that khasra No. 2 as well was included within this description. The lower court was, therefore, clearly justified in interpreting the order in the manner it did and excluding khasra No. 2 from its operation. The opposite party is clearly eligible to get possession over it. There is thus no substance in this revision which is hereby rejected. .;