- (1.) THIS is a revision against an order of the Sessions Judge, Balotra, by which he has upheld the order of forfeiture of the surety bond of the petitioner Bhopal Singh.
(2.) THE material facts are briefly these. THE accused Rania and another were committed by the First Class Magistrate Balotra to stand their trial in the court of the Civil and Additional Sessions Judge, Balotra and were directed to appear in that court on the 25th July, 1951. Rania, therefore, appeared in the court of the Additional Sessions Judge on that date. He was released on bail on the same day on producing a bail bond in the sum of Rs. 1000/- and a surety for the like amount. Bhopal Singh the present petitioner is the surety. THE surety bond was executed on the same day, viz. , the 25th July, 1951 Rania continued to appear in the court of the Additional Sessions Judge on various hearings proceeding the 18th February, 1953. He however, failed to appear on the last mentioned date. THEreupon the respective bonds of the accused and the surety were forfeited and notices were issued to show cause why the penalty mentioned in the bond should not be recovered. Bhopal Singh thereupon raised a number of objections, with which I propose to deal presently, and these objections were overruled by the Additional Sessions Judge. THEreupon Bhopal Singh went in revision to the learned Sessions Judge who also upheld the order of the trial Judge. This revision has been preferred against the order of the Sessions Judge. The main grounds raised by the petitioner in support of his contention that the surety bond is inoperative are these: (1) The initial date on which the accused was to be present in the court concerned was not filed in the bond. (2) The place where the accused was required to be present was mentioned in the bond was the Court of Session Balotra, but it is contended that there was the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge only at Balotra at the time,and the court of sessions for that area was located at Jodhpur. It was further contended in this connection that the bond was addressed to the Assistant Sessions Judge and that there was no such officer as an Assistant Sessions Judge who held his court at Balotra at the time when the bond was executed. Before proceeding further, it appears to me desirable to quote the surety bond in extenso, and it is in these terms: *** It would appear from a perusal of the bound that it was addressed to the Assistant Sessions Judge. Balotra, and that the space after "date'; has been left blank and further that the place where the accused was to attend was mentioned as Sessions Court, Balotra, and lastly that the accused would appear on every date of hearing Learned counsel for the petitioner relies on two decisions of this Court in support of his contention that the surety bond was vague and, therefore, inoperative. The first is Chiranjilal vs. The State (1 ). Now, in that case, the terms of the surety bond have not been quoted in the judgment but it appears that the place where the accused was required to appear was not at all mentioned. In such circumstances it was held that the bond was void and could not be enforced. This case is, therefore dis-tinguishable from the case before me because the bond in the present case has undoubtedly mentioned the place, viz. , the Court of Session at Balotra. It is true that the place where the accused was required to be present has been mentioned as the Sessions Court, Balotra, although, at the relevant time the court there was that of the Additional Sessions Judge. This is, however a mere technicality on which nothing, in my opinion, really turns in the circumstances of this case. There was only one such court at Balotra and it was in that court that the bond had been furnished and verified, nor was the case ever transferred from that court to any other court at any other place. In these circumstances, it is idle to contend that there was any vagueness as to the place where the accused was required to be present. It may be as well to point out here that it was nothing but pure carelessness that the bond was addressed to the Assistant Session Judge In arriving at the conclusion, on this aspect of the case, which has commended itself to me, I wish emphatically to point out however, that such errors are greatly to be deprecated and those who are responsible for filling the bonds and accepting them should exercise all due care and caution to see that are correctly prepared and it is only the want of such care that results in tremendous waste of public time and money. The other ground on which the bond in the present case has been vehemently attacked is that the date on which the accused was required to be present in the court concerned for the first time has not been filled. It is argued on the basis of this omission that the further requirement that the accused shall continue to be present on every subsequent date of hearing contained in the bond is bereft of all meaning and cannot be enforced. Reliance is placed on a decision of this court in Allah Bux vs. The State (2), in support of this contention. This facts there were that the accused was challaned in a certain court and was released on bail on the 24th July, 1951, and one surety A executed a bond for the appearance of the accused on the 24th July, 1951, and subsequent dates. Thereafter the case was transferred to another court. The latter court ordered for a fresh bond and surety, and in the fresh surety bond that thus came to be executed the initial date on which the accused was required to appear was not mentioned. The next date of hearing was the 29th August, 1951, and the accused absented himself on that date. In these circumstances it was held that the bond was vague and unenforceable. With great respect the actual decision appears to be perfectly unexceptionable on the facts of the case because the accused was found absent on the very hearing next following the date on which the surety bond had been executed and the date therefor, had been left blank in the surety bond. From a perusal of the bond it is clear that the place was not at all vague in the case but there was certainly vagueness as regards time, or, in other words, as to the very first date on which the accused was required to be present subsequent to the execution of the surety bond. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, laid great stress on the general observations contained to wards the end of the penultimate para of the judgment, these observations being as follows : " The subsequent words that the accused would continue to be present would only be applicable if the first day on which he is to attend is mentioned in the document. " With due deference it appears to me that these observations are obiter dicta and were not at all required for the decision of the case for the simple reason that it was not a case where the accused defaulted in appearance on subsequent hearings but the default was with r3espect to the date immediately following that on which the surety bond was executed. In fact, it was a case of a breach of the bond on the very first date after it was executed and that date was not mentioned in the bond. I may also add that the cases relied on in that judgment, namely, Emperor vs. Chintaram (3), Brahma Nand vs. Emperorc4) and Fatehchand Wadhu Mal vs. Emperor (5) also arose under different circumstances. In Chintaram's case, the bond was executed in the court of a Magistrate at Janjgir and Katghora where the accused was produced and the undertaking given by the accused and the surety was that the accused would attend in "the court at Bilaspur". Now, there were a number of courts at Bilaspur, and, therefore, the bond was certainly vague and could not be enforced. In other words, the undertaking was given in one court for the accused to be produced in some other court and the latter court was not mentioned with any precision whatsoever. Then in Brahma Nand's case it appears that a bond was taken from the surety to produce the accused who was on bail without any bond having been taken from the accused himself. It also appears that the bond furnished by the surety was couched in extremely vague language. All that the surety undertook was that he would produce the accused in case the latter was prosecuted and required by court. This undertaking was obviously a very unsatisfactory one and the whole proceeding was, therefore, declared to be illegal. In the last case (5) it appears that no date was specified in the bond but the day was to be a day on which notice was to be given thereafter and, therefore, it was held that reasonable notice must have been given to both the accused and the surety to attend, and as such notice was given, the forfeiture was held to be bad. It, therefore, seems to me that the observations in Allah Bux's case relied on by learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be said to flow from the cases cited therein. In any case, I am unable to hold that Allah Bux's case can be taken to be any authority applicable to a case like the one before me. As I have already pointed out above, the accused here continued to be present in the court of the Additional Sessions Judge right from the 25th July, 1951, up to the beginning of 1953 and he or his surety could be in no manner of doubt as to where the accused had to be present. The case was in the same court and had not been transferred from there to any other court. In these circumstances it appears to me that nothing really turns on the circumstance that the initial date in the bail bond had not been filed. This omission would, in my opinion, have been of considerable importance if the accused in this case and failed to be present just on the next date of hearing after the bond was executed as in Allah Bux's case. In this view of the matter, I am disposed to hold that the case relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner are of no assistance to him and that the contentions raised on his behalf are without any substance. This revision fails so far as the merits are concerned. In the last resort it was urged before me that the amount of the penalty ordered to be recovered from the surety, which is a sum of Rs. 800/-, is unduly harsh and deserves to be reduced. It may be pointed out in this connection that the accused Rania presented himself in the court of the Additional Sessions Judge just on the next date of hearing after the 18th February, 1953, in March, 1953. This in my opinion, is a mitigating circumstance and the courts below should have taken it into consideration in fixing the amount of penalty. In all the circumstances of the case, I am of opinion that interests of justice would be met if the amount ordered to be recovered by the courts below is reduced to half, that is, a sum of Rs. 400/- only Anything recovered in excess of the amount last mentioned shall be refunded. With this modification, this revision fails and is hereby dismissed. .;