- (1.) THE facts which have given rise to this application under Sec. 12 of the Rajasthan Board of Revenue Ordinance 1949 are stated below.
(2.) BAIJU, the applicant, applied to the Settlement Officer, Kotah for the issue of parcha chakbandi in respect of filds Nos. 193/1-19, 194/1-9, 196/1-5, 198/2-13, 197/3-14, 155/1-14. 158/1-3, 160/-14, 162.1-18, 166/1-5, 167/1-15, 168/1-1 of village Baswa on the ground that the land in question which was recorded as sewat chak had been in his cultivatory possession for the last several years. Jagna the opposite party also applied for the issue of a parcha for the same land on 2.1.53 to the Settlement Officer, Kotah. In support of his claim, BAIJU examined two witnesses and produced a copy of the orders of the S.D.O., Sawai Madhopur in a proceeding under sec. 145, Cr.P.C. between the parties by which possession over the land in dispute had been declared to be that of BAIJU, on 17.8.53. On another application of Jagna, dated 8.1.53 to the S. O. in respect of this land separate proceedings were started. On the 19.10.53, the S. O. summarily decided this application and ordered that parcha be given to Jagna etc. Upon this, the office of the S.O. invited his attention to his previous order, dated 17.8.58 under which the parcha of this land had already been given to BAIJU and necessary entries in the land records had been made in his favour. It was also suggested that if the new parcha were to be issued to Jagnia etc. the parchas issued earlier in the name of BAIJU be sent for and ordered to be cancelled. On 23.11.53, the S. O., however, passed an order that the parchas issued previously be withdrawn and new parchas be issued. This Jagnia also got the parchas of the land in dispute. On the 22.1.54, Baiju applied to Tehsil Khatedar alleging that under orders of the Settlement Deptt. the parchas of the land in question had been given to him, but the Patwari Halqa had not made necessary entries in his records and was also not accepting the rent for this land from him and, therefore, necessary orders be issued to the Patwari. On the same date Jagnia also applied to the Tehsildar stating that the parcha in respect of this land had been given to them by the S.O. and necessary orders be given to the Patwari to accept rent of the land from them and make entries in his records. This application was allowed by the Tehsildar and necessary instructions were issued to the Patwari and Baiju was asked to return the parchas issued to him in the past and was also directed to execute a navisht that he would hand over possession of the land to Jagnia etc. Baiju went up in appeal to the Collector, Sawai Madhopur, who held that as the subsequent parcha was in the name of Jagnia the order of the Tehsildar was correct except that Baiju should not have been asked to execute the Navisht. With this modification the appeal was dismissed on 22.6.54. Baiju instead of perfering an appeal against the order of the Collector has approached this Board to exercise its inherent powers of superintendence and control under Sec. 12 of the Rajasthan Board of Revenue Ordinance, 1949 and quash the illegal and ex parte orders given against him by the Settlement Officer. We have carefully gone through the record of the case and heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties. The application is opposed mainly on the ground that the Revenue Board cannot exercise its extraordinary powers under Sec. 12 of the Ordinance, unless it was satisfied that no other legal remedies were available to the applicant It is contended that if the applicant was aggrieved from the order of the S.O. he should have gone in first appeal to the Settlement Commissioner and in a second appeal to the Board of Revenue in accordance with the provision of secs 19 and 20 of the Rajasthan Revenue Courts (Procedure and Jurisdiction) Act. Again, if he was aggrieved from the order of the Collector, he should have filed an appeal to the Commissioner and a revision to the Board It was, therefore, argued that as the applicant had failed to avail of the remedy available under the statutory provision of law, and had unduly taken recourse to this short cut method, the Board was not competent to exercise its extraordinary powers under sec. 12 of the Board of Revenue Ordinance and the application deserved to be rejected. Reliance has been placed on a single Bench decision of this Board reported in RLW, 1954 (Rev. Supplement) Page 69, in which it was held that these powers should be exercised most sparingly only in appropriate cases to keep subordinate courts within bounds of their authority. Reference has also been made to an unreported decision (Kant Singh vs. Rawat Ummed Singh, District Barmer) of the Division Bench of this Board to which one of us was also a party. It was held therein that if a party had some other legal remedies open to him, the Board shall ordinarily be reluctant to exercise its inherent powers under Sec. 12 of the Ordinance. The facts of both these can cases be easily distinguished from those of the present one. In RLW 1954, the Board rightly refused to exercise its powers of superintendence and control because the Collector concerned had not decided the case but had made certain observations and reported the case for the order of the Government. In the other unreported case, the applicant had failed to avail of the statutory provisions of secs. 41 and 42 of the Court of Wards Act under which he could get a relief by filing a regular suit. In the present case, we have to observe with great regret, that the S. O. had issued parchas of the land in a most perfunctory and irresponsible manner in the name of both the rival claimants without caring to examine their respective claim in spite of the fact that his office had pointed out the irregularity of the procedure adopted by him. No opportunity whatsoever, was given to the applicant to show cause as to why the parcha issued in his name should not be cancelled. It is clear from the record that the entire proceedings were taken in a surreptitious manner behind the back of the applicant which clearly amounts to abuse of the process of court. In order to clarify the circumstances under which the S. O. had recourse to these irregular proceedings we summoned Shri Sobhag Singh S. O. but he was not able to throw any light on the matter. The learned counsel for the applicant urged that the provisions of Sec. 12 of the Ordinance are in substance the same as those of Art. 227 of the Constitution of India which provide the High Court with power to superintend over the works of the courts and tribunals and that in the present case it was appropriate that these extraordinary powers be used in order to correct the gross irregularities committed by the S.O, Sec. 12 of the Ordinance runs as follows : "Superintendence and control of subordinate courts. The general superintendence and the control over all other revenue courts and officers shall be vested in, and all such courts and officers shall be subordinate to the Board." Art. 227 of the Constitution reads as below : - "Every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction." There is no doubt that the powers of superintendence can be exercised by the Board of Revenue in administrative as well as in judicial cases as observed by the Rajasthan High Court in 1953 RLW page 280. But as observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in A.I.R. 1954 "this power of superintendence is to be exercised most sparingly, only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors " Similarly in 1955 Patna A. I. R. Page 113, it was held that "the High Court's power of superintendence is a power to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority to see that they do what their duty requires and that they do it in a legal manner. The right should be exercised only in cases where the courts have clearly done something which they were not entitled to do". In A. 1. R. 1954 Calcutta 356, it was further held that the existence of an alternative remedy like a suit, does not preclude the High Court from exercising the powers under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India, provided that alternative remedy is not as speedy or effective as an application under Art. 227". Applying these rulings to the facts of the case, we find that the S.O. had no jurisdiction to order the issue of a parch, in respect of the same land to two persons on different dates, without giving an opportunity to either of them to controvert the claims set up by the other. In doing so the S. O. has clearly violated the principles of natural justice. It may be true that the applicants had other remedy open to him to set right the wrong done to him in consequence of the impugned order of the S. O. but in view of the gross injustice resulting from the order of the S. O. and also of the fact that the alternative remedy open to the applicant may not be as effective and speedy as the one under Sec. 12 of the Revenue Board Ordinance, we feel that it is a fit case in which the Board should in the exercise of its powers under Sec. 12 of the Ordinance interfere. In the result we allow the application and direct that the entire proceedings about the issue of parchas to both the parties be quashed, and the Collector Sawai Madhopur should get the case decided according to law. If, however, the area, wherein this land situated, is still under record operations, the case may be sent to the S. O. concerned for disposal.;