- (1.) THIS is an appeal under sec. 40 of the Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act (No. LXX of 1951 ).
(2.) THE respondent instituted a suit for recovery of Rs. 2542/4/-on the allegation that the defendant No. 1, Phagumal borrowed Rs. 1500/- on 16th December, 1965, and that he made certain payments leaving a balance of Rs. 1417/12/- to be recovered from the defendant. THE plaintiff claimed Rs. 124/8/- by way of interest at 12 % p. a. , making his total claim for Rs. 2542/4/ -. It was mentioned that the plaintiff and the defendants were residents of the territory now forming part of Pakistan and the loan was advanced in that territory It was mentioned that after the partition, the plaintiff and the defendant left Pakistan for good and settled at Took. Defendant No. 2 Narain was the son of defendant No. 1, and he was impleaded being a member of the joint Hindu family with defendant No. 1, and liable to pay the debt. THE suit was instituted in the court of Civil Judge, on 18th December, 1952. It was treated as an application under sec. 10 of the Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act, 1951, the Civil Judge being appointed a tribunal for the purpose of that Act. THE defendants did not admit the claim, and raised the plea of limitation THE learned Civil Judge found that there were money dealings between the parties in Pakistan, and a certain balance was truck by the defendant in the account book of the plaintiff, and that the amount of money claimed was due against defendant. On the question of limitation he held the claim within time. He accordingly gave a decree to the plaintiff for Rs. 1417/-12/- with costs. He did not allow interest on the principal amount claimed. THE debtor-defendant has filed this appeal. A preliminary objection was raised by learned counsel for the plaintiff-creditor that an appeal was not competent, in view of the restriction placed by sec. 41on the right of appeal provided by sec. 40 of the Act. These sections are as follows: - "40. General provisions relating to appeals: - Save as otherwise provided in sec. 41, an appeal shall lie from - (a) any final decree or order of the tribunal, or (b) any order made in the course of execution of any decree or order of the tribunal, which is passed in the course of execution of a decree or order of a civil court would be appealable under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908tact V of 1908), to the High Court within the limits of whose jurisdiction the tribunal is situate 41. Restrictions on right of appeal in certain cases.- Notwithstanding anything contained in sec. 40, where the subject-matter of the appeal relates to the amount of a debt and such amount on appeal is less than rupees five thousands, no appeal shall lie. " There is no doubt that sec. 41 restricts to a certain extent the right of appeal given by sec. 40, but according to the plain reading of the section, the appeal is prohibited only when it raises the question of the amount of a debt such amount of an appeal being less than Rs. 5000/ -. The debtor-defendant by this appeal has no doubt raised the question as to amount of the appeal in one of the grounds, and that plea is barred. The other plea of limitation raised by the debtor is not barred according to the language of sec. 41, because it does not relate to the amount of the debt due, but to the enforceability of the claim The preliminary objection is, therefore, untenable, and the appeal is competent on the question of limitation. The learned Civil Judge has dealt with the question of limitation in a vary slipshod manner, but learned counsel for the respondent tried to support that judgment by reference to the various provisions relating to limitation applicable to a claim of this nature. Act XLVII of 1948 provided by sec. 4 for a suit to be instituted by displaced persons against a defendant who was (not a displaced person in certain court, and sec 8 provided that the suit which was to be instituted in pursuance of S. 4 may be admitted after the period of limitation prescribed, therefor, when the plaintiff satisfies the court that he was unable to institute the suit within such period owing to causes connected with his being a displaced person. Sec. 8 was amended by Act LXVIII of 1953, and the following was substituted for the original section: - Extension of period of limitation - Notwithstanding anything contained in sec. 3 of Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (lx of l908) or in any special or local law, any suit or other legal proceeding by a displaced person. (a) where such suit or other legal proceeding is instituted in pursuance of sec. 4 and the period of limitation expires or has expired on or after the 14th day of August, 1947, or - (b) where such suit or other legal proceeding is instituted otherwise than in pursuance of sec. 4 in respect of a cause of action which arises or has arisen in a place now situate within the territories of Pakistan and the period of limitation expires after the commencement of the Displaced Persons (Institution of Suits and Legal Proceedings) Amendment Act, 1950, may be instituted at any time before the date of expiry of this Act. The amended section consisted of two parts. Clause (a) related to suit referred to in sec. 4 of Act XLVII of 1948, that is, by a displaced person against a non-displaced person The limitation for such a suit, according to the original Act, was a period of three years during which the Act was to remain in force, subject of course to the plaintiff's satisfying the court that he was unable to institute the suit within the ordinary period of limitation owing to causes connected with his being a displaced person Clause (b) related to suits other than those referred to in sec. 4, and it permitted the institution of a suit upto 31st day of March, 1952, which was the date of expiry of the Act laid down in sec. 3 of the Amending Act. But this extension was only in respect of a cause of action which arose or had arisen in a place now situate within the territories of Pakistan, and the period of limitation for the suit only expired after the commencement of the Act. The date of commencement of the Act was 8th December, 1950. The present claim was not one which could be enforced as provided by sec. 4 of the parent Act, and its limitation expired on the 16th December. 1949, and so the plaintiff could not get the benefit of either clause (a) or clause (b) of sec. 8 of the Act as amended. Sec, 59 of the Displaced Persons Debts Adjustment) Act, 1951, repealed Act No. XLVII or 1948, except as provided by sec. 36. Sec 36 purported to extend the limitation for enforcement of a claim by suit or other legal proceeding which had received the benefit under sec. 8 the Amending Act of 1950. The limitation was extended in respect of the claims by one year from the date of the commencement of the Act. The date for the commencement of the Act in Rajasthan was 20th December, 1951. As stated above, the claim of the respondent was barred by time in 1949 prior to the commencement of Act LXVII of 1950, and the Legislature thus did not extend its limitation. Learned counsel relied on Lahorimal Pari vs. M/s. Pioneer Medical Stores (1 ). The decision related to a claim which was covered by sec. 4 of Act XLVII of 1948. and is, therefore, distinguishable. Learned counsel argued that sec. 4 was only a permissive section, and did not provide for limitation This is no doubt true, but the extension of limitation granted by sec. 8 of the parent Act was specified to be given in respect of suits which were to be brought in pursuance of sec. 4 of the Act. For suits which were outside the purview of sec. 4 of the parent Act, the extension was made for the first time under clause b) of sec. 8 as amended by Act LXVIII of 1950, and only those claims were saved which were within time on 8-12-50. Learned counsel for the respondent relied on sec. 6-A of the General Clauses Act and the learned Civil Judge also considered the claim to be within limitation by virtue of that section. But that section is totally irrelevant for the purposes of deciding the question of limitation Sec. 6-A of the General Clauses Act is as follows: - "where any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act repeals any enactment by which the text of any Central Act or Regulation was amended by the express omission, insertion or substitution of any matter, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not after the continuance of any such amendment made by the enactment so repeated and in operation at the time of such repeal. " It only means to say that on the repeal of the Amending Act the amendment made by the Act continues. It is not disputed that sec. 8 as amended by Act LXVIII of 1950 holds the place. Sec. 59 of the Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act, 1951, does not purport to repeal Act LXVIII of 1950, for it repeals the parent Act, except as saved by sec. 36. The argument raised as to the applicability of sec. 6-A is irrelevant. None of the provision relied upon thus save the claim from being barred by limitation under the ordinary law. The appeal is, therefore, allowed, the judgment and decree of the learned Civil Judge acting as a Tribunal under the Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act, 1951, dated 31st July, 1953, is set aside and the claim of the plaintiff-respondent is dismissed as being barred by limitation. The respondent shall pay costs of both the courts to the appellant. . ;