Bapna - (1.) THIS is a second appeal in proceedings relating to ejectment of a tenant under the Matsya Premises (Rent Control) Ordinance, 1948.
(2.) THE relevant provisions of the Matsya Ordinance are secs. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12, which are as follows: - "(8) No tenant shall be liable to be evicted except in the following circumstances: - (i) he fails to pay the rent for 3 months, (ii) uses the permises or damages the property so as permanently to deteriorate its value; (iii) commits a breach of any of the conditions of the lease, in case the lease was in writing ; (iv) when the landlord proves to the satisfaction of the Controller that the house is, for sufficient reasons, needed by him for his own occupation and use ; Provided that if a tenant is evicted under sub-sec. (iv) the landlord shall not relet the premises for one year next after the eviction of the tenant. (9) In the event of a dispute regarding eviction any party may make an application to the Controller who will, after enquiry, pass an order regarding the liability of the tenant to eviction. (10) Any person aggrieved by an order of the Controller may within one month from the date of the communication of order, present an appeal in writing to such Officer as the Government of the United State may appoint. THE decision of such officer, and subject to such a decision, the order of the Controller shall be final. (11) When a decision has been given under this Ordinance that a tenant is not liable to eviction, no civil suit shall lie and such order shall be final. Where however it is decided that a tenant is not entitled to protection under this Ordinance, the order shall be final and shall be executed by such Civil Court as may be specified in this behalf by the District Judge, as if it were a decree of that Court, (12) No civil suit shall lie with regard to any matter covered by this Ordinance." The landlord, who is respondent in this case, made an application to the Rent Controller u/s 8 and 9 of the Ordinance that he required the premises for this own occupation and use. This was contested by the appellant, who was in occupation. The Controller decided under sec. 11 that the tenant in occupation was not entitled to protection under the Ordinance by his order dated 28th September, 1949 The landlord made an application to the District Judge for eviction of the tenant and the same was transferred to the Civil Judge under sec. 11 of the Ordinance. The tenant took an objection that the order of the Rent Controller did not amount to a decree and could not be executed by the Court of Civil Judge. It was also urged that the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act had come into force in December, 1950 and there was no provision in that Act for execution of orders of this nature. The objection was rejected both by the Civil Judge and the District Judge on appeal. The tenant filed a second appeal, which came before the learned Single Judge, who referred the case to a Division Bench. A Division Bench of this court has held in Mool Chand vs. The District Judge, Alwar (D.B. Writ Application No. 26 of 1951 decided on 9th May, 1952), that the jurisdiction of the Controller or the Appellate Authority under sec.11 is restricted to a declaration that a tenant is not liable to eviction or that a tenant is not entitled to protection under the Ordinance, and it has no jurisdiction to pass a decree or order for eviction. Learned counsel for the respondent contends that the subsequent words of sec. 11 indicate that the court is not only entitled to give a declaration, but also to pass an order for eviction in case it is held that the tenant was not entitled to protection, for only that kind of order can be executed, for which provision is made in the last three lines of sec, 11. Sec. 11 is not happily worded, but there seems no doubt that the jurisdiction of the Controller or the Appellate Authority must be deemed to be restricted to a declaration whether the tenant is or is not liable to eviction on the grounds mentioned in sec. 8 of the Ordinance. The Ordinance obviously does not take into consideration the various grounds which can be set up by a tenant against his liability to eviction, except those mentioned in sec. 8, under the provisions of law relating to leases in the Transfer of Property Act. The purpose of the Rent Control Ordinance is to place a restriction on the powers of the landlords in the matters of eviction besides other matters, and it could never have been the intention that the defences open to a tenant under the Transfer of Property Act should not be made available to him. The restrictions mentioned in sec. 8 would, in our opinion, be over and above those which are imposed on the landlords under the Transfer of Property Act before their claim to eviction can be decreed. The language of sec. 11 does not entitle the Controller to pass a decree for eviction, and therefore, the subsequent words of sec. 11 that "the order shall be executed" are meaningless. The view taken in the case of Moolchand that it is beyond the competence of the Controller or the Appellate Authority to pass a decree or order for eviction covers the present case. It may be mentioned that the order passed by the controller is only to the effect that the tenant is liable to be evicted, which only means that he was not entitled to the protection under the Ordinance. He did not pass an order that the tenant do vacate the premises. The view taken by the two Courts is not correct. This appeal is, therefore, allowed, the order of the District Judge and that of the Civil Judge are set aside, and the application of the landlord-respondent for seeking assistance of the Court to obtain ejectment of the tenant is dismissed. The respondent will pay costs to the appellant in all the courts. ;