- (1.) THESE two revisions have been filed against a single appellate order of the Additional Settlement Commissioner, Rajasthan, Jaipur whereby the concurrent orders of the lower courts were reversed and it was directed that the land in dispute be recorded in the parcha chakbandi of the Settlement as being the khatedari of the masjid under the management of Imam Kazi Shabibullah, opposite party.
(2.) WE have heard the counsel for the parties and have also examined the record of the case. It has been argued before us by the counsel for the applicants that since the land was held as a estate grant by the masjid and his clients have been admitted as tenants thereof they were entitled to khatedari parcha under sec. 8 of the Jaipur Tenancy Act. The counsel for the opposite party contends that no khatedari rights can accrue in a land held by a religious institution like a masjid or a temple. In this connection reliance is placed on sec. 8 (b) of the Jaipur State Grants Land Tenures Act. This sub-section lays down that khatedari rights shall not accrue in land held as tenant by an artificial person such as an institution, corporation,temple or a mosque, This clearly means that no khatedari rights shall accrue in favour of an artificial person like a temple or a mosque. In other words, it is just the revenue of what the learned counsel for the opposite party interprets into mean. 1953 R. D. 233 has no applicability to the present case, for it was decided therein that tenancy rights as will as ex-proprietary rights can accrue in favour of an idol under the U. P. Tenancy Act 1949, for the obvious reason that there is no prohibition in that act as is to be found specifically in sec. 8 of the Jaipur State Grants Land Tenures Act. The point which is involved for determination before us is as to whether khatedari fights in favour of tenants can accrue or not in the land granted by the State to a religious instruction. Clearly there can be no two opinions on the point and this question is bound to be answered in affirmative. As laid down in sec. 8 of the Jaipur State Grants Land Tenures Act the provisions of sec. 7 to 10 of the Jaipur Tenancy Act, 1945, have been made applicable to the admission of persons as, or to the accrual in land held by them of the right of tenants of the different classes mentioned in sec. 7 in areas to which the State Grants Land Tenures Act applies. The view taken by the learned Additional Settlement Commissioner is clearly untenable. As regards the other point on which the learned Additional Commissioner has based his decision, we may observe that the term ijaredar is used in this part of the State in a very loose sense. Strictly speaking an ijaredar as defined in sec. 95 of the Jaipur Tenancy Act means a person holding a lease for collection of rents, but persons admitted as tenants on payment of fixed rents in cash or kind are vaguely designated as ijaredars. While determining the status of such persons the court should not allow themselves to be led away by the mere nomenclature but should look to the substance, and the nature of possession. In the present case, it is abundantly clear that there was no lease for collection of rents but the applicants were required to pay fixed rents. Hence they cannot be regarded as ijaredars within the meaning of sec. 95 of the Tenancy Act. The learned Additional Commissioner has disposed of the appeal filed before him on these two grounds which on examination have been found to be untenable. The question is to be determined with reference to the basis of possession as laid down in sec. 59 of the Jaipur State Grants Land Tenures Act. We would, therefore allow this revision, set aside the order of the Additional Settlement Commissioner dated 24. 7. 54 and remand the case back to him with the direction that the appeal filed before him be re-heard and decided afresh in the light of the observation made above. .;