- (1.) IN the reference in case No. 22 Svt. 2009 (Kotah) the main points to be answered by the Full Bench are: - (i) whether an application under Sec. 7 of the Rajasthan (Protection of Tenants) Ordinance lies against the military personnel referred to in clauses (1) and (2) of the Revenue Department Notification F. 1 (4) Rev. 51, dated 11.1.51; and (ii) whether the expression "Government" used in Clauses (1) and (2) of the aforesaid Notification means the Government of Rajasthan or the Central Government ?
(2.) THE Revenue Department Notification dated 11.1.51 is as follows: - "In exercise of the powers conferred by Sec. 15 of the Rajasthan (Protection of Tenants) Ordinance 1949 (No. IX of 1949) the Government of Rajasthan is pleased to exempt the following land from the provisions of the said Ordinance, namely: - (1) land belonging to persons who are in the military employment of the Government; or (2) land belonging to persons who were discharged from military employment of the Government after the coming into force of the said Ordinance." Shri Mahabir Prasad, counsel for the applicant Major Durjansal Singh contends that the S.D.O. Chechat was wrong in extending protection to the non-applicants under Sec. 7 of the R.P.T.O. as they had been dispossessed from land to which that Ordinance was not applicable. Shri Brij Sunder Sharma, counsel for the opposite-party argues that the exemption granted under the Revenue Department Notification dated 11.1.51 operated only in respect of Secs. 5 & 6 of the Ordinance and not Sec. 7. His view is that the exemption was given in respect of "lands" and not "persons". If a military personnel described in clauses (1) & (2) of the Notification brought a suit for ejectment of his tenant or filed an application for execution of a decree obtained by him for ejectment of a tenant, then the trial of the suit or the execution of the decree would not be kept in abeyance according to secs. 5 & 6 of the Ordinance. In case, however, such a military personnel took the law into his own hands and ejected a tenant then the Notification dated 11.1.51 shall not confer any special rights on him as he then does not come forward with clean hands. In other words the Notification was not intended to debar tenants from being reinstated under the Ordinance on lands belonging to military personnel. None of the counsel cited any precedents in support of their respective contentions. We have given the matter very careful consideration. To our mind, the meaning of the Notification is very clear. All land belonging to military personnel mentioned in the Notification has been exempted from the provisions of the R.P.T.O. If it was the intention of the legislature to restrict the exemption to secs. 5 & 6 of the Ordinance then the word "provisions" in the Ordinance would not have been used. We are unable to read any such restricted meaning in the Notification as suggested by the learned counsel for the opposite-party. The intention of the legislature appears to be that a tenant of land belonging to military personnel cannot have recourse to the quick remedy provided for reinstatement under Sec. 7 of the R.P.T.O. It is appropriate in this connection to refer to a Full Bench decision of the Revenue Board in a reference made in case No. 21 (Nagaur) of Svt. 2008. It was decided on 10.8.51 and reported in 1952 Rajasthan Raw Weekly (Revenue Supplement) 38. In that case the reference was with regard to the question whether the Revenue Department Notification of 11.01.51 operated with retrospective effect and in the course of its decision, the Full Bench observed that "the Ordinance should have deemed to be repealed so far as land belonging to military personnel was concerned." We also hold the same view. As regards the second point, Shri Mahabir Prasad's contention is that the expression "Government" used in the Notification in question means the Central Government as at the time the Notification was issued i.e. January, 1951, the Rajasthan Government did not have an Army of its own. He has drawn attention to Sec. 259 of the Constitution of India under which the Armies of all the Part B State were taken over by the Union Government. His contention is that any interpretation of the expression "Government" to mean the Rajasthan Government would lead to an absurd position. He has quoted from Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes and has also cited A.I.R. 1953 Patna 109 and 1953 Punjab 109 in support of his contention. Shri Brij Sunder Sharma on behalf of the opposite-party argues that the expression "Government" used in the Notification dated 11.1.51 was clear and following the well known "Golden rule" referred to by Mexwell at page 6, on interpretation of the term "Government" in this case was necessary as the expression was to be given its ordinary meaning as defined in Sec. 2(1) of the Ordinance itself. In case No. 2 (Nagaur) of Svt. 2009 where also the interpretation of the expression "Government" is in dispute and a reference has been made to the Full Bench, Shri Roop Chand Sogani counsel for the applicant, cited A.I.R. 1953 Bombay P. 170 to show that the expression "the Government" means the State Government and "Government" means the Central Government. Shri Brij Sundar Sharma on behalf of the opposite-party contends that the General Clauses Act was not applicable to Rajasthan and even otherwise the expression used in the Notification in question was "the Government" and not "Government" and hence it referred to the Rajasthan Government alone. We have heard the parties' counsel at some length and gone through the law and the precedents on which they rely. We consider that no interpretation defeating the very purpose of the legislation can be accepted. The Rajasthan Government certainly did not have any Army of its own in January, 1951, and hence clause (1) of the Notification relating to serving personnel would be rendered utterly meaningless if we were to accept the interpretation that the expression "Government"used in the Notification referred to the Rajasthan Government only. The whole object of the Notification was to grant certain concessions to the Indian Army personnel and to hold that it was restricted to men of the Rajasthan Government army only would not carry out the intention of the legislature. It is a sound rule of interpretation that statute must be so construed as to prevent the mischief and to advance the remedy according to the true intent of the makers of the Statute. Judges have been enjoined to avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility. To accept the interpretation put forward by the learned counsel for the opposite-party would tantamount to reducing the Revenue Department Notification to an absurdity. We accordingly hold that the expression "Government" as used in the Revenue Department Notification dated 11.1.51 applies both to the Rajasthan and the Central Government. The references are, therefore, answered as above. ;