Pratap Krishna Lohra, J. - (1.) THE appellants have laid this appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short, 'Act of 1996') challenging the impugned order dated 10th of October 2014 passed by Addl. District & Sessions Judge No. 4, Jodhpur Metropolitan. By the order impugned, the learned Court below has rejected the application of the appellants under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 for setting aside arbitral award on the ground of limitation.
(2.) THE facts, apposite for the purpose of this appeal, are that the first respondent was appointed as dealer of the appellant -Corporation for sale of petroleum products. The retail outlet of the first respondent was inspected and samples were collected. During laboratory examination, it was revealed that the products have excessive sulphur contents and High Speed Diesel is also adulterated. Noticing these omissions in the petroleum products, the appellant -Corporation issued show cause notice to the first respondent. Assailing the show cause notice, first respondent preferred a writ petition before this Court wherein on behalf of appellants an application under Section 8 of the Act of 1996 is filed. This Court, while allowing the said application, permitted the appellant -Corporation to appoint arbitrator for deciding the dispute and disposed of the writ petition. In terms of the orders passed by this Court, the Corporation appointed second respondent as sole arbitrator. Before the sole arbitrator, first respondent submitted its claim which was replied by the appellants. After submission of reply, the sole arbitrator directed the appellant -Corporation to make necessary investigation about previous TT retention of sample of the first respondent. On thorough investigation, it was revealed that the sample was not in consonance and conformity with the Marketing Discipline Guidelines which were in vogue at the relevant point of time. Taking into account this aspect, the sole arbitrator passed the award on 15th April 2013 favouring cause of the first respondent. Being aggrieved by the arbitral award, appellant -Corporation filed an application under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 before the District & Sessions Judge, Jaipur. The case was subsequently transferred to Addl. District Judge No. 4, Jaipur. The application under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 filed by the appellant -Corporation was opposed by the first respondent on merits as well as on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. Considering the genuine objection of the first respondent, the Addl. District Judge No. 4, Jaipur returned the application of the appellant -Corporation under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 by order dated 21st of April 2014 for its presentation before the Court of competent jurisdiction. Pursuant to the order of Addl. District Judge No. 4, Jaipur, dated 21st April 2014, appellant -Corporation submitted its application/objections before the learned Court below on 22nd of May 2014. Along with the objections under Section 34 of the Act of 1996, the appellants also preferred an application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act seeking extension of time for the interregnum it has pursued remedy bona fide before Addl. District Judge No. 4, Jaipur. The learned Court below after hearing the rival submissions found that application under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 is barred by limitation and consequently dismissed the same.
(3.) MR . O.P. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellants submits that the learned Court below while rejecting the application of the appellants under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 as barred by limitation has not properly construed the provisions contained in sub -section (3) of Section 34 of the Act of 1996. Mr. Mehta has vehemently argued that the appellants have bona fide pursued remedy before the Court at Jaipur and therefore for the interregnum when proceedings remained pending before that Court, the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act ought to have been extended to the appellants by the learned Court below. According to Mr. Mehta, while construing the application, the learned Court below has not appreciated the facts in right perspective and as such impugned order cannot be sustained. Lastly, Mr. Mehta would contend that the language employed under sub -section (3) of Section 34, if properly construed then it would reveal that in such proceedings provisions contained under Section 14 of the Limitation Act can be invoked and the period, during which a party has pursued remedy before a wrong forum bona fide, is liable to be excluded. In support of his contentions, Mr. Mehta has placed reliance on following legal precedents: "(1) M/s. Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal Secretary (Irrigation Department) & Ors. [AIR 2009 SC (supp) 396]. (2) State of Himachal Pradesh & Anr. v. M/s. Himachal Techno Eng. & Anr. [ : 2010 (3) CCC 305 (SC)] (3) Coal India Limited & Anr. v. Ujjal Transport Agency & Ors. ( : AIR 2011 SC 503). (4) Ram Ujarey v. Union of India ( : AIR 1999 SC 309). (5) Tirumareddi Rajarao & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. ( : AIR 1965 AP 388).";