Alok Sharma, J. - (1.) THIS petition has been filed challenging the order dated 2 -4 -2014 passed by the Appellate Rent Tribunal Kota (hereinafter the Appellate Rent Tribunal) allowing the appeal filed by the respondent -non -applicant -tenant (hereinafter 'the tenant') and remanding the matter to the Rent Tribunal Kota (hereinafter 'the Tribunal'). Also under challenge is the order dated 30 -9 -2013 passed by the Appellate Rent Tribunal allowing tenant's application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC.
(2.) A perusal of the order dated 30 -9 -2013 indicates that while exercising power for reasons purportedly analogous to grounds under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC, the Appellate Rent Tribunal has overlooked its raison d'etre Order 41 Rule 27 CPC, inter alia provides that a party to an appeal shall not ordinarily be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the Appellate Court except where the court from whose decree in the appeal has been preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted, or the party seeking to produce additional evidence, establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within its knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced before the decree appealed against was passed. Similarly when the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other like substantial cause it can allow additional evidence. Sub -rule 2 of Rule 27 of Order 41 CPC incorporates a safeguard in it that wherever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an Appellate Court, it "shall record the reasons for admission of such evidence". It is thus evident that the admission of additional evidence at the stage of the appeal is an exception to the rule, and unless conditions set out in Order 41 Rule 27 CPC or analogous thereto are satisfied, no such evidence can be admitted. The power of the Appellate Court to admit additional evidence are thus circumscribed and not at large to be exercised at its ipse dixit Proprio vigore for the Appellate Rent Tribunal exercising summary appellate jurisdiction. This court cannot countenance a situation where the Appellate Rent Tribunals can be set free to admit additional evidence without any limitation, recklessly allow additional evidence in the course of an appeal and consequently seriously set back the object of the legislature and encapsulated in Section 19(8) of the 2001 Act which provides that Appeals against the orders of Rent Tribunal be disposed of within 180 days of Service on the opposite party. The counsel for the resp. -tenant (hereinafter 'the tenant') argued obviously as an after thought, with the tenant himself invoking the provisions of Order 41 Rule 27 CPC before the Rent Tribunal, that Order 41 Rule 27 CPC not attract to the proceedings under the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 (hereinafter 'the 2001 Act'). That is indeed so but, yet the Appellate Rent Tribunal can in any event draw on the content of the said provision analogously on the grounds of equity, justice and good conscience when an application to submit additional evidence is moved before it.
(3.) A perusal of the order dated 30 -9 -2013 by the Appellate Rent Tribunal allowing the tenant's application purporting as one under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC, indicates that in respect of a petition for eviction filed in the year 2006 which was allowed by the Rent Tribunal on 24 -4 -2008, an application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC for bringing on record additional evidence was moved on 1 -10 -2010. The only ground in support of the application was that for the duration of proceedings before the Rent Tribunal the agreement of dealership dated 1 -2 -1991 (sought to be produced as additional evidence) was not readily available with the tenant, and further that in the course of cross examination before the Rent Tribunal the landlord had admitted that the petrol pump over the tenanted premises was being run since 1954 and since 1991 in the name of M/s. Kewal Prakash and Company - -a partnership firm in which the landlord seeking eviction on the lease deed dated 10 -1 -1985 having been determined by efflux of time, had only a 50% share, with her two sons having 25% shares each. In my considered opinion, these two aspects, which prevailed with the Appellate Rent Tribunal do not even remotely establish that the tenant had exercised due diligence in leading "evidence" well within its control during the proceedings before the Rent Tribunal. The dealership agreement dated 1 -2 -1991, which was in the estimation of the tenant relevant for determination of the question as to whether the lease agreement between the parties executed on 10 -1 -1985 had been determined by efflux of time with the passage of contracted 20 years, ought to have been filed before the Rent Tribunal. Non filing was quite apparently for reasons of lethargy and negligence wholly contra distinguished from the pre condition of "due diligence" required for allowing additional evidence at the appellate stage. Further the Appellate Rent Tribunal while allowing the application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC has not recorded its reasons. Aside of aforesaid, it is quite apparent that the Appellate Rent Tribunal has confused the lease deed executed on 10 -1 -1985 between the landlord and tenant with the dealership agreement dated 1 -2 -1991 between M/s. Kewal Prakash & Company and HPCL, in recording that the landlord had terminated the lease deed dated 1 -2 -1991, when in fact it was not at all the case set up by the landlord. The case of the landlord for the tenant's eviction set up before the Rent Tribunal was on the ground of determination of the lease deed dated 10 -1 -1985 with reference to Section 111(a) of the Transfer of Property Act by efflux of time.;