P.K.LOHRA,J. - (1.) Petitioner-tenant has preferred this writ petition under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India to challenge the impugned order dated 05.11.2015 (Annex.5) passed by the Additional District Judge No.2, Bikaner (Camp Dungargarh) [for short 'the Appellate Court']. The bare necessary facts are that respondents-plaintiffs filed a suit against the petitioner for eviction from the disputed premises which is a shop situated at Main Market, Sri Dungargarh and also claimed mesne profits for use and occupation of the premises from 01.03.2005. The suit was filed after serving notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1872. The learned Senior Civil Judge, Dungargarh, Bikaner (for short 'the Trial Court') decreed the suit for eviction and awarded mesne profits for use and occupation of the premises to the respondents- landlord to the tune of Rs.5,000./- per month with effect from 01.03.2005 till possession is handed over by the petitioner-tenant. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the learned Trial Court, the appellant-tenant preferred regular first appeal before the learned Appellate Court and the learned Appellate Court while considering the prayer for stay under Order XLI Rule 5 CPC stayed the decree passed by the Trial court to the extent of eviction from the premises but as regards the arrears of mesne profits, the learned Appellate Court directed the petitioner to deposit 50% of the arrears of mesne profits before the Trial Court. Thus, a conditional stay order was granted by the learned Appellate Court. The learned Appellate Court has also directed the respondent-landlord to furnish an undertaking to refund the excess amount of mesne profits if upon final adjudication, the Appellate Court comes to the conclusion that amount of mesne profits determined by the learned Trial Court requires reduction. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the impugned order. Upon perusal of the impugned order, in my considered opinion, it is not a fit case wherein the supervisory jurisdiction is to be exercised for interfering with the discretionary order passed by the learned Appellate Court. It is trite that Appellate Court while exercising power under Order XLI Rule 5 CPC can pass stay order on satisfaction of requirements envisaged therein and can also impose necessary conditions on the appellant. In the present matter, the petitioner has suffered decree for eviction and, therefore, in such a situation, the learned Appellate Court has rightly exercised its discretion by putting condition that the petitioner is required to deposit 50% of the arrears of mesne profits for stay of execution of the decree for eviction. Hon'ble Apex Court in Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd. Vs. Federal Motors (P) Ltd., (2005) 1 SCC 705 has examined the discretionary power of the Appellate Court in the matter of granting stay order. The Court held,- "18.That apart, it is to be noted that the appellate court while exercising jurisdiction under Order 41 Rule 5 of the Code did have power to put the tenant appellant on terms. The tenant having suffered an order for eviction must comply and vacate the premises. His right of appeal is statutory but his prayer for grant of stay is dealt with in exercise of equitable discretionary jurisdiction of the appellate court. While ordering stay the appellate court has to be alive to the fact that it is depriving the successful landlord of the fruits of the decree and is postponing the execution of the order for eviction. There is every justification for the appellate court to put the appellant tenant on terms and direct the appellant to compensate the landlord by payment of a reasonable amount which is not necessarily the same as the contractual rate of rent. In Marshall Sons and Co. (I) Ltd. Vs. Sahi Oretrans (P) Ltd. this Court has held that once a decree for possession has been passed and execution is delayed depriving the judgment- creditor of the fruits of decree, it is necessary for the court to pass appropriate orders so that reasonable mesne profits which may be equivalent to the market rent is paid by a person who is holding over the property." In view of law laid down by the Supreme Court and taking into account the factual backdrop of the instant case, I find no merit in this petition and the same is, accordingly, dismissed summarily. ;