Dr. Vineet Kothari, J. - (1.) NONE is present on behalf of appellant/plaintiff, though names of Mr. Arpit Bhoot, Mr. Surendra Singh, and Ms. Mehak Chopra have been shown in the cause list at Serial No. 48, and despite message sent to them nobody put in appearance on behalf of plaintiff/appellant though Mr. Surendra Singh had appeared in a case before this Court today in the case listed at Serial No. 16 only. The matter was thus heard from the side of the respondents for about one hour before lunch break. Even in the second round post lunch session, nobody has put in appearance on behalf of appellant/plaintiff to argue the case, therefore, the case was again heard after lunch break and learned counsel for the respondents/defendants and applicant addressed the Court and the present appeal is being disposed of by the following order.
(2.) BY the impugned order dated 01.10.2012, learned trial court of Additional District Judge (FT) No. 3, Jodhpur Metropolitan, has allowed the application filed by the respondents/defendants under Order 7 Rule 11 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and dismissed the Suit No. 14/2002 - Mrigendra Singh v. Sohan Raj Surana & Ors. The reasons and findings recorded by the learned trial court for rejection of the suit, allowing such application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC are quoted herein below ready reference: - - If on a meaningful not formal reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue the trial court should exercise its power under O -7 R -11 CPC, taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. Rejection of plaint - Non -disclosure of cause of action -Suit for declaration that sale deed was bogus and unauthorized -Except again and against using the words "collusion" and "fraud" in plaint, no details given nor it demonstrated manner in which any prejudice in law by breach of any rights in law had been caused - Plaint thereby did not disclose any valid cause of action for relief prayed in suit/plaint -Plaint liable to be rejected. There must b e a cause of action to enforce the claim made in the plaint/petition, and it should be specifically disclosed in the plaint/petition. A plaint/petition not disclosing a cause of action if i.e. illusory or vexatious or that is bound to be abortive, then a Court should reject such plaint/petition without wasting any further time for adjudication by conducting trial. No written or registered document is necessary for an individual to contribute any and or immovable property as a contribution against his share of the capital of a new partnership business. By virtue of S.14 of the partnership Act and certain provisions of the Contract Act, they become the properties of the firm as soon as the partners intend to so bring them in and treat them as such. This sort of contribution or transfer is not prohibited by the Transfer of Property At, 1852 or the Registration Act 1908. Rejection of plaint for suppression 'of material act - When permissible - Manner in which such power to be exercised - Burden of proof on defendant to obtain rejection of plaint on such ground -Delay in and non -pressing for rejection of plaint on such ground at the earliest opportunity - Effect - Held, such rejection is permissible only if the suppressed fact is material, in the sense that had it not been suppressed it would have had an effect on the merits of the case, whatever view the court may have taken - To obtain such rejection defendant must show that plaintiff could not possibly succeed on the basis of the pleadings and in the circumstances of the case, given the suppression of the fact(s) in question. Learned counsel for the respondents/defendants, Mr. Vikas Balia, urged that the suit filed by the plaintiff/appellant did not disclose any cause of action to the plaintiff, nor he challenged the various sale -deeds in question, which were executed by the land owners in support of various purchasers and without impleading all the parties to said sale -deeds, the present suit was filed. He also submitted that the plaintiff/appellant claims his title in the said land through his grandfather, late Sh. Col. Mohan Singh Bhati, while denying rights of his own father, Sh. Narendra Singh Bhati; and without impleading his own sisters and mother as party in the suit, he claimed the relief of quashing of those sale -deeds. He also submitted that the suit was barred by limitation and, therefore, the learned trial court by a detailed discussion gave all cogent reasons and has dismissed the suit rightly and the present appeal filed by the plaintiff has no merit and the same deserves to be dismissed.
(3.) HE also drew the attention of the Court towards the judgment rendered by this Court in SBCWP No. 3881/2011 -Shreyansh Daga v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. on 17.07.2013, which petitioner, Shreyansh Daga (Respondent No. 3 herein) had laid a challenge to a notice/communication dated 20.04.2011 on the representation of son of the present petitioner, viz. Jorawar Singh S/o Mrigendra Singh, a minor by which some proceedings under Section 83 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956, were sought to be initiated at the instance of the Revenue Minister against the petitioner and the petitioner in that writ petition being the purchaser of the part of the land in the present case also had challenged those proceedings and while allowing the writ petition on 17.07.2013, this Court had noticed the fact relating to this case in the following manner: - - "23. Besides the point that the matter relating to revenue entries and dispute for that fall in the First Schedule of the Act and, thus, being a "judicial matter" does not attract Section 83 of the Act, it is also significant to note that powers of such suo moto revision conferred upon the State Government under Section 83 of the Act has been delegated by the State Government to the Board of Revenue by two Notifications. The first Notification issued in this regard is Notification No. F.4(3) Rev./Col.67 dated 17/4/1967 published in Rajasthan Extra Ordinary Gazette dated 18/4/1967, which is quoted below for ready reference. "COLONISATION DEPARTMENT NOTIFICATION Jaipur, April 17, 1967 No. F. 4 (3) Rev./Col./67. - -In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (a) of sub -section (1) of section 260 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 (Rajasthan Act XV of 1956), the State Government hereby delegates all its powers under section 83 of the said Act to the Board of Revenue; and further in exercise of powers conferred by sub -section (2) of section 8 of the said Act, the State Government hereby transfers to the Board of Revenue for disposal all the pending cases under section 83 of the said Act. By Order of the Governor, S.D. Ujjawal, Addl. Chief Secretary to Government." 24. The aforesaid Notification was issued by Colonization Department and another Notification was issued by the Revenue Department itself on 23/8/72 vide Notification No. P.6(46)Raj.Gr.4172, S.O.101 published in Part 'C' of the Rajasthan Gazette on 24/8/1972, which is also reproduced hereunder for ready reference. 25. Thus, with the aforesaid delegation of powers by the State Government under Section 83 of the Act to the Board of Revenue, the Hon'ble Revenue Minister simply had no jurisdiction in the matter even if the conditions for invoking Section 83 of the Act could be said to be available in the matter, which, as shown above, were not so available. For this reason also, the impugned proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction & deserve to be quashed. 26. There is yet another aspect of the matter and that is the delay of about 40 years in making such a frivolous & collusive representation directly to the Hon'ble Revenue Minister at the instance of a minor. Since no limitation under Section 83 of the Act has been provided as such, the settled legal position in this regard is that where no such limitation is prescribed, such powers can be invoked only within a reasonable time. The long lapse of 40 years simply cannot be said to be a reasonable period by any stretch of imagination. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Shri Santoshkumar Shivgonda Patil and Ors. v. Shri Balasaheb Tukaram Shevale and Ors. - : (2009) 9 SCC 352 dealing with the provisions of Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1976, Section 257, which contained the similar suo moto revisional powers, as are contained in Section 83 of the Act here, held in para 11 to 13 as under: - - "11 It seems to be fairly settled that if a statue does not prescribe the time limit for exercise of revisional power, it does not mean that such power can be exercised at any time; rather it should be exercised within a reasonable time. It is so because the law does not expect a settled thing to be unsettled after a long lapse of time. Where the legislature does not provide for any length of time within which the power of revision is to be exercised by the authority, suo motu or otherwise, it is plain that exercise of such power within reasonable time is inherent therein. 12. Ordinarily, the reasonable period within which power of revision may be exercised would be three years under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code subject, of course, to the exceptional circumstances in a given case, but surely exercise of revisional power after a lapse of 17 years is not a reasonable time. Invocation of revisional power by the Sub -Divisional Officer under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code is plainly an abuse of process in the facts and circumstances of the case assuming that the order of Tehsildar passed on March 30, 1976 is flawed and legally not correct. 13. Pertinently, Tukaram Sakharam Shevale, during his lifetime never challenged the legality and correctness of the order of Tehsildar, Shirol although it was passed on March 30, 1976 and he was alive upto 1990. It is not even in the case of Respondent Nos. 1 to 5 that Tukaram was not aware of the order dated March 30, 1976. There is no finding by the Sub -Divisional Officer either that order dated March 30, 1976 was obtained fraudulently." 27. Similarly, the Division Bench of this Court headed by then Chief Justice in the case of Anandi Lal v. State of Rajasthan - : 1995 (1) RLR 555, dealing with the reference under Section 232 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act and Section 82 of the Land Revenue Act, held in para 24 and 25 that such powers cannot be exercised even after expiry of one year. The relevant portion is quoted below: - - "To permit the exercise of revisional powers under Section 82 of the Act of 1956 and/Or under Section 232 of the Act of 1955 after unreasonable delay, would amount to putting imprimatur of the Courts on the unreasonable and arbitrary exercise of power. Within a period of one year the tenant/khatedar of the land would have spent money for the improvement of the land, he would have arranged his affairs of life on the basis that he is in occupation of the land, he would have entered into several transactions on this basis and made many commitments. Therefore, ordinarily revisional powers under Section 82 of the Act of 1956 and under Section 232 of the Act of 1955, cannot be exercised after a period of one year. If this requirement of reasonable length of time is not read into the aforesaid provisions, the provisions would become unconstitutional." 28. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Raj Narain Sarin v. Laxmi Devi & Ors. - : 2002 (10) SCC 501 observed that after 40 years a challenge to transfer of land held by sale deed executed by predecessor of plaintiff cannot be sustained and plaint in such cases is to be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. The relevant portion of the said judgment is quoted below for ready reference: "4. It is significant to note that the transfer of a portion of the property in the year 1941 has not been challenged or disputed in any way. On the contrary, it has been averred (vide paragraph 9 of the plaint) that the second area, i.e., 6 Bighas 13 Biswas being plot No. 673 (old) and new 460 was sold without any authority and contra recital in the said sale deed is illegal and invalid and not binding on the Plaintiff. Learned Additional District Judge however having considered the same and came to the conclusion that it was with the knowledge of the Plaintiff that such sale did take place and since the Plaintiff has not taken any steps in the matter or having the document of sale declared invalid or not binding or ineffective, it is too late to contend the same at this stage. 8. On an analysis of the plaint, apart from there being a mere bald statement that the sale deed has nothing to do with the rest of the area, i.e., 6 Bighas 13 Biswas and the Bungalows built thereon which stands to be owned and possessed by the Plaintiff and prior to him by Munni Lal, there is No. other averment tracing the title for 6 Bighas and 13 Biswas Admittedly, several portions of the plot stood demarcated as being 3 Bighas 13 Biswas and the other being 6 Bighas 13 Biswas: whereas there is No. dispute as regards 3 Bighas 13 Biswas but the conferment of title on to the Plaintiff as regards 6 Bighas 13 Biswas is not available in the plaint itself. The plaint is totally silent on that score, though, however, the existence of the deed of sale noticed above stands accepted by the Plaintiff. The litigation, in our view, cannot but be termed to be utterly vexatious and abuse of the process of court, more so by reason of the fact that the deed of sale being executed as early as 1941 stands unassailed for a period of over 50 years. The decision of this Court in T. Arvandandam (supra) has its due application and having regard to the decision as noticed above and upon consideration of the relevant provisions as engrafted in the Code itself, we have No. hesitation in accepting the order of learned Additional District Judge. The High Court obviously fell into a manifest error and as such this appeal is allowed. The order of the High Court stands set aside. The order of the learned Additional District Judge stands restored. No. order as to costs." 29. The authorities on this issue need not be multiplied as there are large number of them and, therefore, it can be deduced that exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 83 of the Act even by a competent authority of the State Government after such a long lapse of period of 40 years would be illegal, time barred and unauthorized. 30. The question relating to validity of Gift Deeds cannot be raised by a minor. The remedy in law, if any, can be only a properly instituted civil suit, which is said to have been filed by Mrigendra Singh s/o Narendra Singh Bhati. In view of this, these contentions need not be examined by this Court in the present case in detail. As aforesaid, the transaction & such transfers made even by unregistered Gift Deeds cannot be unsettled by a challenge laid after 40 -50 years of the same, otherwise there would be never a finality to those entries in the Revenue record, which have held the field for such a long period. 31. Therefore, viewed from any angle, this Court is firmly of the view that the initiation of proceedings against the petitioner in the present case under Section 83 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 by the Hon'ble Revenue Minister, at the instance of respondent No. 2 - Jorawar Singh, a minor son of Mrigendra Singh and grand son of Narendra Singh Bhati, was absolutely without jurisdiction and void ab initio. Therefore, the impugned notice as well as initiation of proceedings by the Hon'ble Revenue Minister by a Note on such representation of the respondent Jorawar Singh, as quoted above, deserve to be quashed and treated as null and void and writ petition filed by the petitioner deserves to be allowed. 32. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed and impugned notice Annex.6 dated 20/4/2011 and Note dated 4/4/2011 on the representation of the petitioner by the Hon'ble Revenue Minister made on 4/4/2011 and the subsequent proceedings pending with the Hon'ble Revenue Minister in this case are quashed. No costs. Copy of this judgment be sent to the Board of Revenue & revenue courts below and the Chief Secretary of the State Government.";