SHARMA, J. - (1.) THE matter has been heard finally with the consent of learned counsel for parties.
(2.) THE petitioners in the instant writ petition have assailed the award dated October 16, 1997 passed by Labour Court Bharatpur whereby the reference made to it was answered in favour of respondent workmen and it was held that the termination order dated February 28, 1990 of respondents workmen was illegal and the workmen shall be reinstated in the services with continuity of service and 50% back wages. Mr. H. V. Nandwana, Dy. Govt. Advocate contended that the respondent workmen failed to discharge the burden that they had worked for more than 240 days in one calendar year but the Labour Court answered the award without properly considering the law of burden of proof. Reliance is placed on Rajasthan State Ganganagar Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. State of Rajasthan, (2004) 8 SCC 161 = RLW 2004 (4) SC 565and Municipal Corporation Faridabad vs. Siri Niwas (2004) 8 SCC 195 = RLW 2004 (4) SC 552. Having considered the submissions and on scanning the record, I notice that the respondent workmen moved an application on April 10, 1996 in the Labour Court for summoning the record pertaining to Muster Rolls, Paid Vouchers, Hand receipts and Muster Roll issue register. The Labour Court thereafter directed the petitioners to produce the record. The petitioners failed to produce entire record as directed by Labour Court and adverse inference was drawn against the petitioners. The Labour Court on appreciating the evidence adduced by both the parties held that the respondent workmen had worked for more than 240 days in one calendar year and answered the reference in favour of the workmen. The ratio indicated in the case-law cited by the petitioners does not help them. In Rajasthan State Ganganagar Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. State of Rajasthan (supra), it was held that where the workman claimed that he had worked for more than 240 days in the year concerned it was for the workman to show that he had in fact worked for 240 days in the year preceding his termination. In that case the workman filed his affidavit and on the basis of his own statement he claimed that he had worked for more than 240 days in one calendar year. Their Lordships of Supreme Court in such a situation observed that only the statement of workman could not be regarded as sufficient evidence for any court or tribunal to come to the conclusion that in fact the claimant had worked for 240 days in a year. In the instant case not only the muster rolls, but attendance register, hand receipts, pay vouchers and other documents related to workmen had to be produced by the petitioners pursuant to the directions of Labour Court and when the petitioners failed to produce the required documents the adverse inference under section 114, III (g) of the Evidence Act was drawn against the petitioners. In Municipal Corporation Faridabad vs. Siri Niwas (supra), it was held that the burden of proof was on the workmen to show that he had worked for 240 days in the preceding twelve months prior to his alleged retrenchment. In terms of Section 25f of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 an order retrenching a workman would not be effective unless the conditions precedent therefor were satisfied. In para 15 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:- " A court of law even in a case where provisions of the Evidence Act apply, may presume or may not presume that if a party despite possession of the best evidence had not produced the same, it would have gone against his contentions. The matter, however, would be different where despite direction by a court the evidence is withheld. Presumption as to adverse inference for non production of evidence is always optional and one of the factors which is required to be taken into consideration is the background of facts involved in the lis. "
(3.) I do not find it a fit case for invoking Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The Labour Court in my opinion rightly answered the reference. Consequently, the writ petition being devoid of merit stands dismissed without any order as to costs. The petitioners shall comply with the award within sixty days from today. .;